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Victims and Perpetrators: An Argument for
Comparative Liability in Criminal Law
Vera Bergelson
Abstract
This article challenges the legal rule according to which the victim’s conduct is
irrelevant to the determination of the perpetrator’s criminal liability. The author
attacks this rule from both positive and normative perspectives, and argues that
criminal law should incorporate an affirmative defense of comparative liability.
This defense would fully or partially exculpate the defendant if the victim by his
own acts has lost or reduced his right not to be harmed.
Part I tests the descriptive accuracy of the proposition that the perpetrator’s liabil-
ity does not depend on the conduct of the victim. Criminological and victimologi-
cal studies strongly suggest that criminal liability may be properly evaluated only
in the context of the victim-perpetrator interaction. Moreover, criminal law itself
has a number of doctrines, such as consent, self-defense and (to some degree)
provocation, which include victims’ actions in the determination of perpetrators’
liability.
Part II makes a normative claim that victims’ actions should reduce or eliminate
the perpetrator’s liability in all appropriate cases and not merely in the context of
a few distinct defenses. This claim draws on:
(a) the just desert principle which requires that individuals be punished only for
the amount of harm caused by them and not by the victim himself;
(b)the efficiency principle, which requires that, in order to preserve the moral au-
thority of criminal law, penal sanctions should not be overused and the law should
develop in a dialogue with community perceptions of right and wrong;
(c)the consistency principle, which mandates that punishment-justifying consid-
erations be applied systematically;
(d)the analysis of mitigating factors recognized at the penalty stage of a crimi-
nal trial; and
(e)considerations of fairness underlying the comparative liability reform in torts.
Part III proposes a basis for a theory of comparative liability in criminal law and
suggests a method that makes it possible to distinguish between cases, in which
the victim’s conduct should provide the perpetrator with a complete or partial de-
fense, and cases, in which the victim’s conduct should be legally irrelevant. The
author offers a unitary explanation to the defenses of consent, self-defense and
provocation. That explanation lies in the principle of conditionality of rights. Pur-
suant to this principle, the perpetrator’s liability should be reduced to the extent
the victim, by his own acts, has changed the balance of rights between him and
the perpetrator. The victim can do that either voluntarily, by waiving a right not
to be harmed, or involuntarily, by forfeiting this right as a result of his unjustified
attack on some legally recognized rights of the perpetrator.
The article concludes with comparative analysis of factors that may affect the
determination of the scope of the perpetrator’s liability. These factors include the
magnitude of the affected rights of the perpetrator and the victim, the causative
impact of their respective conduct, and their personal culpability.
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INTRODUCTION
A motorist driving ten miles per hour in excess of the 
speed limit hits and kills a pedestrian who intentionally 
threw himself in front of the car.  Had the motorist not 
been speeding, he would have been able to avoid the 
collision.  Is the motorist guilty of criminal homicide?
A man agrees to be killed and eaten by another man.  
Should his voluntary consent to the homicide be a factor 
mitigating the killer’s criminal liability?
Two drivers participate in a drag race.  One loses 
control of his car and is killed.  The other one is charged 
with a homicide.  Should the surviving driver’s culpability 
be reduced because of the decedent’s own recklessness?
After years of abuse, a woman lashes out and, during a 
non-violent confrontation, kills her husband.  Should she be 
punished as severely as if there were no history of domestic 
violence?
In other words, should the victim’s own acts ever be 
taken into account when we evaluate the criminal liability 
of the perpetrator?  The law seems to be clear on the point: 
“Victim fault is not a defense, either partial or complete, to 
criminal liability.”1
“Don’t blame the victim” is probably one of the 
cornerstone maxims of Anglo-American jurisprudence.2
But is that maxim true—does the law in fact ignore the 
victim’s behavior in determining the level of the 
defendant’s criminal liability?  Even more importantly—
should the law ignore it?  And, if the answer depends on 
the circumstances, how should we decide when the victim’s 
behavior is a mitigating factor and when it is irrelevant?  
To answer these questions, we need to integrate the victim 
into the theory of criminal law.
In recent years, as a result of the victims’ rights 
movement, victims have become active participants in the 
American criminal justice system.3  That development has 
1. Beul v. ASSE Intern., Inc., 233 F.3d 441, 451 (7th Cir. 2000).
2. See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, Corrective Justice for Moderns, 106 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1658, 1673 (1993) (“The distinctive feature of criminal liability is that, in 
principle, the victim’s contributory fault is irrelevant to liability.”).
3. Today, thirty-two states have victims’ rights amendments, and all states 
have victims’ bills of rights that grant victims rights to notice of important 
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prompted new interest in the role of victims in criminal 
law.  However, most academic discussions of victims have 
focused on their role in the criminal process rather than 
substantive criminal law.4
Moreover, as both legal and non-legal scholars agree, 
the substantive penal law has developed “without paying 
much attention to the place of victims in the analysis of 
responsibility or in the rationale for punishment.”5  Some 
authors have pointed out that there is a need for a 
comprehensive theory that would assign victims and 
perpetrators their proper places in each aspect of criminal 
law.6  Despite a number of insightful works that have 
discussed victims in connection with various areas of 
criminal doctrine,7 such a comprehensive theory is yet to be 
written.  This article is a step in that direction.  It takes the 
proceedings; participation in those proceedings, including victim impact 
statements at the time of sentencing; and restitution.  See Aileen Adams & David 
Osborne, Victims’ Rights and Services: A Historical Perspective and Goals for the 
Twenty-First Century, 33 McGeorge L. Rev. 673, 675-76 (2002).
4. Markus Dirk Dubber, The Victim in American Penal Law: A Systematic 
Overview, 3 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 3, 3 (1999).  But see Alon Harel, Efficiency and 
Fairness in Criminal Law: The Case for a Criminal Law Principle of Comparative 
Fault, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 1181 (1994) (arguing in favor of an efficiency-based regime 
of comparative criminal liability); Aya Gruber, Victim Wrongs: The Case for a 
General Criminal Defense Based on Wrongful Victim Behavior in an Era of 
Victims’ Rights, 76 Temple L. Rev. 645 (2003) [hereinafter Victim Wrongs] 
(advocating a nonspecific victim liability defense as a response to the victim-
oriented privatization trend in current criminal law); Aya Gruber, Righting 
Victim Wrongs: Responding to Philosophical Criticisms of the Nonspecific Victim 
Liability Defense, 52 Buff. L. Rev. 433 (2004) [hereinafter Righting Victim 
Wrongs] (examining victim liability defense from the perspective of theories of 
punishment).
5. George P. Fletcher, The Place of Victims in the Theory of Retribution, 3 
Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 51, 51 (1999).  See also Stephen Schafer, Victimology: The 
Victim and His Criminal 5 (1977) (observing that, up until a few decades ago, 
“there has been virtually no consideration of the victim’s participation in the 
wrongdoing, or of any other interaction or interrelationship between criminal and 
victim”).
6. See Dubber, supra note 4, at 3 (opining that “any satisfactory solution to 
this problem will require a new integrated theory of penal law that assigns victim 
and offender their proper place in each aspect of penal law in light of that aspect’s 
purpose or purposes, as well as the general requirements of constitutionality and 
legitimacy”).
7. See, e.g., Markus Dirk Dubber, Victims in the War on Crime (2002); 
Fletcher, supra note 5; Michael Moore, Victims and Retribution: A Reply to 
Professor Fletcher, 3 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 65 (1999) [hereinafter Victims and 
Retribution]; Bernd Schünemann, The Role of the Victim within the Criminal 
Justice System: A Three-Tiered Concept, 3 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 33, 39-40 (1999) 
[hereinafter Role of the Victim].
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position that victims may reduce their right not to be 
harmed either voluntarily, by consent, waiver or 
assumption of risk, or involuntarily, by an attack on some 
legally recognized rights of the perpetrator.  If that 
happens, perpetrators should be entitled to a defense of 
complete or partial justification, which would eliminate or 
diminish their criminal liability.
The article consists of three parts.  Part I challenges 
the accuracy of the proposition that the perpetrator’s 
liability does not depend on the conduct of the victim.  I 
start with a review of criminological and victimological 
research, which strongly suggests that criminal liability 
may be properly evaluated only in the context of the victim-
perpetrator interaction.  I then turn attention to criminal 
law itself and show that a number of criminal doctrines, 
such as consent, self-defense and provocation, do in fact 
include victims’ actions in the determination of 
perpetrators’ liability.
In part II, I make a normative claim that victims’ 
actions should be considered a liability mitigator in all 
appropriate cases and not merely in the context of a few 
distinct defenses.  My main arguments draw on:
(a) the just desert principle, pursuant to which 
individuals should be responsible only for the 
amount of harm caused by them and not by the 
victim;
(b) the efficiency principle, which requires that, in order 
to preserve the moral authority of criminal law, 
penal sanctions should not be overused and the law 
should develop in a dialogue with community 
perceptions of right and wrong;
(c) the consistency principle, which mandates that 
punishment-justifying considerations be applied 
systematically;
(d) the analysis of mitigating factors recognized at the 
penalty stage of a criminal trial; and
(e) considerations underlying the theory of comparative 
liability in torts.
In part III, I propose a basis for developing a theory of 
comparative responsibility in criminal law and offer a 
method that allows us to determine when the victim’s 
conduct should provide the perpetrator with a complete or 
partial defense and when it should be legally irrelevant.  I 
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argue that there is a unitary explanation to the theories 
of consent, self-defense and provocation.  That explanation 
lies in the principle of conditionality of rights, which should 
be recognized as a general principle of criminal law.  
Pursuant to this principle, the perpetrator’s liability should 
be reduced to the extent the victim, by his own acts, has 
diminished his right not to be harmed.  Finally, I analyze 
some factors that may be important for the determination 
of the scope of the perpetrator’s liability, including the 
magnitude of the affected rights of the perpetrator and the 
victim; the comparative causative impact of their conduct; 
and their respective culpability.
I.  VICTIMS IN SOCIAL SCIENCES AND IN CRIMINAL LAW
A. Victims in Social Sciences
For years, social scientists have been calling attention 
to the incomplete, decontextualized approach taken by the 
law—not only with respect to the victim-offender 
relationship but also to other aspects of criminal behavior 
relevant to the concept of personal responsibility, the 
overarching concept of criminal justice.8  This narrowness 
has been the source of great frustration among social 
scientists whose work has been systematically excluded 
from the lawmaking process.9  One of the major 
shortcomings of criminal law, in their view, is that penal 
statutes do not adequately reflect the variations of human 
interactions.  A scholar has criticized criminal law because
It introduced abstraction as a domineering force, it 
introduced the rule of the paper, and it made criminal 
8. Craig Haney, Mitigation and the Study of Lives: On the Roots of Violent 
Criminality and the Nature of Capital Justice, in America’s Experiment With 
Capital Punishment 351 (James R. Acker et al. eds., 1998) (“Among social 
scientists, at least, the criminal law is notorious for its extremely narrow focus on 
decontextualized criminal acts and what seem to be arbitrarily defined states of 
mind.”).
9. Id.  “Much that a social scientist would want to know about the historical, 
social contextual, and even immediate situational influences on criminal 
behavior—knowledge that otherwise would be crucial to meaningfully analyze 
and truly understand the actions of a criminal offender—is deemed irrelevant by 
the criminal law.”  Id.
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justice merely the interpretative machinery of the 
printed law: the goddess Justicia probably was impartial 
and knew the law very well, but her blindfold deprived her 
of the sight of complex interactions, group characteristics, 
and social problems.  The criminal-victim relationship, like 
many other aspects of crime, therefore remained unknown 
to her.10
The first systematic sociological studies of the 
criminal-victim relationship date back to the middle of the 
twentieth century.  Benjamin Mendelsohn is generally 
recognized as the founder of a new discipline,11 victimology, 
a branch of criminology12 that focuses on the victim-
offender relationship and the harm suffered by the victim 
as a result of the offense.13  A practicing attorney, 
Mendelsohn conducted a questionnaire study of his clients 
and formulated a typology that encompassed several 
degrees of victim culpability, ranging from the “completely 
innocent victim” (e.g., a child) to the “victim who is guilty 
alone” (e.g., an attacker who is killed by the target in self-
defense).  Between these two extremes Mendelsohn placed 
the “victim with minor guilt,” the “victim as guilty as the 
offender,” and the “victim more guilty than the offender.”14
Another important figure in the history of victimology 
was Hans von Hentig who, approximately at the same time 
as Mendelsohn, suggested that there is an interconnection 
between “killer and killed, duper and dupe.”  According to 
von Hentig, the victim is not just a passive figure but 
rather an “activating sufferer” who plays a part in the 
creation of the criminal act and who is barely considered by 
our legal system.15  Von Hentig wrote:
10. Schafer, supra note 5, at 25.
11. Daniel C. Claster, Good Guys and Bad Guys 160 (1992); Schafer, supra 
note 5, at 34-35.
12. Mendelsohn himself would probably object to this description.  He argued 
in favor of separating victim-related factors of a crime from criminal-related 
factors into a new science parallel to criminology or even “the reverse of 
criminology.”  See Schafer, supra note 5, at 35, citing Benjamin Mendelsohn, The 
Victimology, Etudes Internationales de Psycho-Sociologie Criminelle, 25-26 (July-
Sept. 1956).
13. Andrew Karmen, Crime Victims 8 (2001).
14. See Schafer, supra note 5, at 36, citing Mendelsohn, supra note 12, at 105-
07.
15. See Hans Von Hentig, The Criminal and His Victim, Studies in the 
Sociobiology of Crime 383-450 (1948).
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I maintain that many criminal deeds are more indicative 
of a subject-object relation than of the perpetrator alone.  
There is a definite mutuality of some sort . . . .  In the long 
process leading gradually to the unlawful result, credit and 
debit are not infrequently indistinguishable.16
Mendelsohn’s and von Hentig’s studies were followed 
by numerous other typologies that used sociological, 
psychological, biological, and other criteria to measure the 
level of a victim’s susceptibility to, and involvement in, a 
criminal act.17  A contemporary sociologist has commented 
that, “[b]y raising questions about victim proneness, 
vulnerability, and accountability, [the first victimologists] 
put forward a more complete but also more controversial 
explanation about why laws are broken and people get 
hurt.”18
The essence of the controversy was the idea of shared 
responsibility, which implied that some victims as well as 
offenders did something wrong.  Ever since the rise of the 
victims’ rights movement in the 1970s, that idea and its 
implications have been hotly debated among victimologists.  
The “victim-blaming” and “victim-defending” tendencies 
clashed on a number of issues.  However, as a recent 
influential work shows, victimologists cannot be simply 
divided into victim-blamers and victim-defenders.  
Advocates of both approaches often switch sides, depending 
on the facts of the case, the nature of the crime, and the 
parties involved.19  The same people may criticize one group 
of victims (e.g., abusive husbands who get killed by their 
wives) but defend another (e.g., women who have been 
raped by acquaintances).
The victims’ rights movement and the “discovery” of 
the victim by sociologists have resulted in an important 
change: crime victims stopped being invisible.  The 
enormous volume of research data collected and analyzed 
by victimologists is an invaluable source of information 
16. Id. at 384.
17. See Schafer, supra note 5, at 41-47 (analyzing various victim typologies, 
including those authored by Ezzat Abdel Fattah, Thorsten Sellin and Marvin E. 
Wolfgang, Robert A. Silverman, Gilbert Geis, Hans Joachim Schneider and 
setting forth his own typology).  See also Karmen, supra note 13, at 106-10 
(reviewing some typologies of “shared responsibility”).
18. Karmen, supra note 13, at 100.
19. Id. at 110-34.
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regarding crime, community standards, values, ethics, 
prejudices, and allegiances.
The first comprehensive empirical study of “victim-
precipitated” crimes focused on homicides committed in 
Philadelphia from 1948 to 1952.20  The study showed that, 
in approximately 25% of all murders, the deceased was the 
first to use force, either by drawing a weapon, striking the 
first physical blow during an argument, or in some other 
way initiating violence.21  Situations that resulted in 
violence included charges of infidelity, arguments over 
money, drunken brawls and confrontations over insults and 
“fighting words.”22
In the late 1960s, the National Commission on the 
Causes and Prevention of Violence (NCCPV) was formed to 
investigate the victim’s role in several types of street 
crime.23  The Commission concluded that instances of 
victim-precipitated behavior24 were not uncommon in cases 
of homicide and aggravated assault, less frequent but still 
empirically noteworthy in robbery, and least relevant in 
cases of rape.25
20. See generally Marvin E. Wolfgang, Patterns in Criminal Homicide (1958).
21. Karmen, supra note 13, at 104.
22. Id.  Here are some typical cases included in police reports:
A husband threatened to kill his wife then attacked her with a knife.  In 
the ensuing struggle he fell on his own weapon and bled to death.
The person who ended up the victim was the one who had started a 
barroom shoving match.  His friends tried to break up the fight, but he 
persisted.  Finally the tide turned, and the aggressor was knocked down; he 
hit his head on the floor and died from his injuries.
A man demanded money that he believed was owed to him.  The other man 
maintained that he had repaid the debt and, incensed over the accusation, 
drew a knife.  The creditor pulled out a gun and shot him as he lunged.
Id.
23. See id. at 106 (reporting findings of the NCCPV based on police files from 
seventeen American cities regarding victims’ shared responsibility with the 
offender in murders, aggravated assaults, forcible rapes, and robberies).
24. Victim precipitation was defined as a situation in which, in the case of a 
homicide, the killed person was the first to resort to force; in the case of an 
aggravated assault, the seriously injured person was the first to use physical force 
or offensive language and gestures; in the case of an armed robbery, the victim 
“clearly had not acted with reasonable self-protective behavior in handling 
money, jewelry, or other valuables”; and, in the case of a rape, the victim “at first 
agreed to sexual relations, or clearly invited them verbally and through gestures, 
but then retracted before the act.”  Karmen, supra note 13, at 106-07, citing 
National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, Crimes of 
Violence (1969), and D. Mulvihill et al., National Commission on the Causes and 
Prevention of Violence, The Offender and His Victim (Staff Report) (1969).
25. Id.  See id. at 106-07 (showing that victim precipitation accounted for 22% 
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Further studies have expanded on the results of the 
NCCVP and other research.26  Some researchers have found 
victim precipitation rates to be as high as 49 to 67% when 
victim precipitation was defined as any situation in which 
provocative behavior of the victim played an important role 
in the perpetrator’s decision to act27 or encouraged the 
offender into a progression of violence.28  In an examination 
of homicides preceded by “hard drinking, weapon 
possession, insulting banter, and displays of physical 
toughness,”29 a researcher concluded that “distinctions 
between victims and offenders are often blurred and [are] 
mostly a function of who got whom first, with what weapon, 
how the event was reported, and what immediate decisions 
were made by the police.”30
In addition to theoretical constructs and investigations 
of reported crimes, victimologists conducted numerous polls 
of public opinion.  The polls—predictably—discovered that 
people in general, and jurors in particular, assign 
significant weight to victims’ behavior prior to the crime.31
According to a famous study of juries, one of the main 
instances in which juries apply the power of nullification to 
acquit the defendant is when they take into account the 
contributory fault of the victim.32 Moreover, research has 
shown that evidence of the victim’s conduct affects all 
stages of a criminal proceeding:
of all murders, 14% of all aggravated assaults, 11% of all robberies and 4% of all 
forcible rapes).
26. See generally R.N. Antilla, Victimology: A New Territory in Criminology, 
in Victimology: A New Focus 5-14 (Israel Drapkin & Emilio Viano eds., 1974); 
Hans Toch, Violent Men (1969); David B. Wexler, Patients, Therapists, and Third 
Parties: The Victimological Virtues of Tarasoff, 2 Int’l J.L. & Psychiatry 1-28 
(1979); Eric P. Baumer et al., The Role of Victim Characteristics in the 
Disposition of Murder Cases, 17 Just. Q., 281, 297 (2000).
27. T. A. Silverman, Victim Precipitation: An Examination of the Concept, in 
Victimology: A New Focus, supra note 26, at 99-112.
28. N.H. Arison, Victims of Homicide, in Victimology: A New Focus, supra 
note 26, at 55-68.
29. Claster, supra note 11, at 163.
30. Lynn A. Curtis, Victim Precipitation and Violent Crime, 21 Soc. Probs. 
594, 597 (1974).
31. One reason people may “blame the victim” lies in their need to believe that 
the world is just and innocent people do not become victims of crime.  Therefore, if 
a person is victimized, he must be partially responsible for his own plight.  See 
generally Melvin J. Lerner, The Desire for Justice and Reactions to Victims, in 
Altruism and Helping Behavior 205 (Jacqueline Macaulay & Leonard Berkowitz 
eds., 1970).
32. Harry Kalven, Jr. & Hans Zeisel, The American Jury 193-347 (1966).
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Offenders who kill the victim in response to a physical 
attack are less likely to be prosecuted; if they are 
prosecuted, they are less likely to be indicted; and if they 
are indicted, they are less likely to be convicted of the most 
serious indictment charge rather than a reduced charge.33
When a homicide victim initiates violence, less blame is 
attributed to the offender, even when the situation does not 
support a claim of self-defense.34
It thus appears that sociological theories, factual 
findings and the views of the public all reflect the same 
intuition; i.e., the victim’s own behavior matters.  It is often 
a relevant “but for” cause and even a proximate cause of a 
crime.  In other words, victims may be partly responsible
for their own injury or loss.  What about the law?  Does it 
account for victims’ conduct and does it weigh the fault of 
the defendant against the fault of the victim?
In private law, the answer is clearly “yes.”  In 
contracts, a material breach by one party serves as a 
complete defense to the following breach by the other.  In 
torts, the closest relative to criminal law, long-established 
doctrines of comparative fault and assumption of risk35
effectively provide that the scope of the defendant’s liability 
depends on the injured party’s own acts.  The development 
of tort law doctrine from contributory fault to comparative 
fault has eliminated the unfairness of denying recovery to a 
partially faulty victim and marked a big step toward a 
more contextualized view of a victim-perpetrator 
interaction.  Tort law’s “no duty” rules, as applied to 
plaintiffs, guard against penalizing the victim in a 
situation in which the victim might have acted stupidly or 
reprehensibly but did not violate a legal duty.36  For 
33. Baumer et al., supra note 26, at 303.
34. Id.
35. Under the recently adopted Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment 
of Liability, § 3, the assumption of risk defense has been abolished as an 
independent doctrine that bars a faulty plaintiff’s recovery and instead is 
integrated into the doctrine of comparative fault.  See Restatement (Third) of 
Torts: Apportionment of Liability, § 3 cmt. c (1999).
36. See, e.g., id. at cmt. d (proposing plaintiff no-duty rules); Hennessey v. 
Pyne, 694 A.2d 691 (R.I. 1997) (holding that, by living near a golf course, a 
homeowner does not assume the risk of being injured by a negligent duffer); 
Lynch v. Scheininger, 744 A.2d 113 (N.J. 2000) (concluding that a woman cannot 
be charged with fault for conceiving a child even if she knows that, due to a 
physician’s negligence, it is risky to do so); Hutchinson ex. rel. Hutchinson v. 
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instance, a driver has no duty to lock his car.  Therefore, 
the fact that the plaintiff carelessly left his car keys in the 
ignition does not diminish his recovery against a car thief.
Criminal law, on the other hand, has explicitly 
rejected37 the idea of contributory fault.38  Courts are 
unanimous that, unless it is the sole proximate cause of the 
resulting harm, the victim’s conduct is irrelevant.39  This 
Luddy, 763 A.2d 826, 848-49 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (holding that a victim of sexual 
assault had no duty to avoid being harmed and that even negligent defendant 
could not raise the plaintiff’s comparative negligence as a defense).  See also Dan 
B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts 503 (2001) (explaining that plaintiff no-duty cases are 
“cases in which the plaintiff has a liberty (or right) to be free from constraints 
imposed by the defendant”); Ellen M. Bublick, Citizen No-Duty Rules: Rape 
Victims and Comparative Fault, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1413, 1478-83 (1999) 
(advocating complete plaintiffs’ no duty rule in civil rape cases).
37. See, e.g., State v. Crace, 289 N.W.2d 54, 59 (Minn. 1979) (“It is well settled 
that the contributory negligence of the victim is never a defense to criminal 
prosecution.”).  It has been said that there is a near universal rule that a victim’s 
own negligence is not a defense in a criminal prosecution.  See People v. Tims, 
534 N.W.2d 675, 681 n.6 (Mich. 1995), citing State v. Malone, 819 P.2d 34 (Alaska 
Ct. App. 1991) (the victim’s contributory negligence was no defense to criminal 
negligence); People v. Lett, 177 P.2d 47 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947) (the victim’s 
contributory negligence was no defense to vehicular manslaughter); People v. 
Maire, 705 P.2d 1023 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985) (the victim’s contributory negligence 
was no defense to vehicular homicide); Deshazier v. State, 271 S.E.2d 664 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1980) (unless it was unforeseeable, the negligence of the victim is no defense 
in drunk driving homicide); State v. Taylor, 177 P.2d 468 (Idaho 1947) (the 
victim’s contributory negligence was no defense to drunk driving vehicular 
manslaughter); State v. Plaspohl, 157 N.E.2d 579 (Ind. 1959) (the victim’s 
contributory negligence was no defense to reckless homicide prosecution arising 
out of a drag race); State v. Moore, 106 N.W. 16 (Iowa 1906) (“contributory 
negligence, if shown, is never a defense or excuse for a crime”); State v. Betts, 519 
P.2d 655 (Kan. 1974) (the victim’s contributory negligence was not a defense to 
drunk driving vehicular manslaughter); Wilson v. State, 536 A.2d 1192 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 1988) (the decedent’s intoxication was not a defense to vehicular 
manslaughter); State v. Kliegel, 674 S.W.2d 64 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (the victim’s 
negligence was no defense to vehicular manslaughter); State v. Rotella, 246 
N.W.2d 74 (Neb. 1976) (the victim’s negligence was no defense to vehicular 
homicide); State v. Phelps, 89 S.E.2d 132 (N.C. 1955) (the victim’s negligence was 
no defense to vehicular homicide); Williams v. State, 554 P.2d 842 (Okla. Crim. 
App. 1976) (the victim’s contributory negligence was not a defense to negligent 
homicide with a vehicle); Commonwealth v. Long, 624 A.2d 200 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1993) (the victim’s intoxication was not a defense to homicide); State v. Dionne, 
442 A.2d 876 (R.I. 1982) (unless it amounts to an independent intervening cause, 
the victim’s conduct is irrelevant).
38. In this article, when used in connection with criminal law, the term 
“contributory fault” is used in its most general sense, as any act of the victim that 
precipitated the crime, and not as an antonym of “comparative fault.”
39. See, e.g., Tims, 534 N.W.2d at 682 (holding that “defendant’s conduct need 
only be ‘a’ proximate cause of death” over the dissent’s view that, for defendant’s 
conviction, his conduct has to sufficiently dominate the other contributing 
factors); Dionne, 442 A.2d at 887  (unless it amounts to an independent 
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declaration, however, is not quite accurate.  Several 
criminal law doctrines do not fit within the declared 
paradigm.  The most prominent among those are the 
doctrines of consent, self-defense, and provocation.
B. Victims in Criminal Law
1. Consent
The victim’s40 consent to a perpetrator’s act is one 
situation in which the victim’s behavior dramatically 
changes the nature of the perpetrator’s criminal liability.  
The law looks upon the same actions very differently 
depending on whether they are consensual or not:
What is called a “fond embrace” when gladly accepted by a 
sweetheart is called assault and battery when forced upon 
another without her consent; the act of one who grabs 
another by the ankles and causes him to fall violently to the 
ground may result in a substantial jail sentence under some 
circumstances, but receive thunderous applause if it stops a
ball carrier on the grid-iron.41
In most instances, consent either negatives an element 
of the offense or justifies a nominally criminal act.42  A 
person is not guilty of rape, kidnapping, theft, and many 
other serious crimes, if what he did was based on a legally 
intervening cause, the victim’s conduct is irrelevant).  Note, however, that victim 
compensation statutes provide compensation only to “innocent” victims.  See 
Dubber, supra note 7, at 315-23 (discussing the meaning of innocence 
requirement in victim compensation statutes).
40. The term “victim” in the context of valid consent is somewhat of a 
misnomer; here it is used for the consistency of the terminology to mean an 
individual who has suffered either (i) no harm at all (that is the case when 
consent negatives an element of the offense) or (ii) an injury to person or property 
to which the individual consented (that is the case when consent is a defense).  
For example, no harm occurs in the case of consensual sex, whereas, when a 
participant of a boxing match is badly beaten, harm still occurs but it is justified 
by the boxer’s consent.
41. Rollin Perkins, Criminal Law 962 (2d ed. 1969).
42. See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 2.11 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 
1980) (providing that consent is a defense “if such consent negatives an element of 
the offense or precludes the infliction of the harm or evil sought to be prevented 
by the law defining the offense”).
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valid consent.43  To be valid, consent has to be 
voluntary, i.e., freely given and informed.44  Consent 
obtained by duress or fraud regarding the nature of the 
perpetrator’s act does not count.45  Certain groups of people 
(children, mentally ill, intoxicated) are deemed incapable of 
issuing valid consent to a specific agreement due to some 
internal deficiencies.46  For example, minors’ consent to sex 
is legally invalid.47
Yet, with respect to some acts, society does not 
recognize even the possibility of valid consent.  A 
commentary to the Model Penal Code (MPC) lists a number 
of offenses to which an individual may not consent.  The 
most prominent among them is homicide—the victim’s 
consent to be killed is never a complete justification for the 
43. See id. § 2.11 cmt. 1 (noting that, for many crimes, including rape, false 
imprisonment and criminal trespass, “it is essential to the commission of the 
crime that there be an unwilling victim of the actor’s conduct”).  See also Leo 
Katz, Ill-Gotten Gains 147 (1996) (“If consented-to, the taking isn’t theft, the 
intercourse isn’t rape, the tackling isn’t battery, even the killing may not be 
murder.”).
44. Consent may be treated differently, depending on whether it is a defense 
(e.g., consent to assault in a boxing match) or its absence constitutes an element 
of an offense (e.g., larceny, rape).  See George P. Fletcher, The Right Deed for the 
Wrong Reason, 23 UCLA L. Rev. 293, 318-21 (1975) (arguing that, when the 
absence of consent is an element of an offense, even uncommunicated consent 
releases the actor from liability; however, when consent serves as a defense, the 
actor must be aware of it).
45. The law usually distinguishes between fraud in the factum (fraud 
regarding the fact itself) and fraud in the inducement (fraud regarding a 
collateral matter).  Consent is legally invalid only in the first case.  See, e.g., 
Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law 1079 (3d ed. 1982).  The authors explain:
If deception causes a misunderstanding as to the fact itself (fraud in the 
factum) there is no legally recognized consent because what happened is 
not that for which consent was given; whereas consent induced by fraud is 
as effective as any other consent, so far as direct and immediate legal 
consequences are concerned, if the deception relates not to the thing done 
but merely to some collateral matter (fraud in the inducement).
Id.
46. 3 Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of Criminal Law: Harm to Self 316 
(1988) [hereinafter Harm to Self] (“If he is so impaired or undeveloped cognitively 
that he doesn’t really know what he is doing, or so impaired or undeveloped 
volitionally that he cannot help what he is doing, then no matter what expression 
of assent he may give, it will lack the effect of genuine consent.”).
47. See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 213.1 cmt. 6 (Official Draft and Revised 
Comments 1980) (explaining that, at least for sex with pre-pubescent children, 
strict liability is appropriate because “[t]hey are plainly incapable of giving any 
kind of meaningful consent to intercourse and manifestly inappropriate objects of 
sexual gratification”).
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perpetrator.48  Other offenses include riot, escape, 
breach of the peace, bribery, and bigamy.49
Interestingly, the reasons for denying the defense of 
consent in the case of homicide have little in common with 
the reasons for denying the defense in the case of these 
other offenses.  If we look closely at the group of offenses 
from riot to bigamy, it will be clear why consent may not 
work as a defense.  There is simply no identifiable victim 
who would be able to give consent and thus legitimize the 
defendant’s conduct.  Or, put differently, the victim is the 
general public, and the general public has already spoken 
out by adopting a law proscribing the respective behavior.
Homicide is unlike that.  There is a specific victim in 
each act of homicide, the person who was killed.  Therefore, 
it is not the lack of a subject capable of waiving his rights 
that explains why homicide may not be consented to.  The 
explanation is probably partly historical and partly 
pragmatic.  Historically, it can be explained by the 
influence on criminal law of Christianity and Christian 
moral philosophy that did not view the life of an individual 
as his own.50  Suicide was a crime; therefore, the victim of a 
consented killing was, in fact, the perpetrator’s co-
conspirator and accomplice.  Naturally, consent of a co-
felon did not suffice to obliterate the criminal nature of the 
act.  This logic, however, does not work today since, in the 
overwhelming majority of states, suicide is no longer a 
crime.51  Accordingly, there is a strong argument that 
48. See, e.g., 40 Am. Jur. 2d Homicide art. 105 (“[I]t is the rule that, in a 
prosecution for homicide, consent of the deceased is no excuse.  The right to life 
and to personal security is not only sacred in the estimation of the common law, 
but it is inalienable.”) (footnotes omitted); Model Penal Code § 2.11 cmt. 1 (Official 
Draft and Revised Comments 1980) (pointing out that consent to homicide “does 
not operate to prevent consummation of the crime”).  See also 3 James Stephen, A 
History of the Criminal Law in England 16 (1883) (observing that consent to one’s 
own death “is wholly immaterial to the guilt of the person who causes it”).
49. Model Penal Code § 2.11 cmt. 1 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 
1980).
50. See 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries On The Laws of England 133 
(1904) (noting that one’s natural life, being “the immediate donation of the great 
Creator, cannot legally be disposed of or destroyed by any individual, neither by 
the person himself, nor by any other of his fellow-creatures, merely upon their 
own authority”).
51. See 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 15.6, 543 n.3 (2d ed. 
2003) (“No state has a statute making successful suicide a crime.”). Suicide is 
apparently still a common law crime in Virginia, Rhode Island and, possibly, 
Illinois.  See Wackwitz v. Roy, 418 S.E.2d 861, 864 (Va. 1992); Clift v. 
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assisting in a legal act should not be a crime either.52
The other explanation for invalidating consent to 
homicide is not entirely logical either.  It deals with the 
fear of abuse and manipulation of people in a situation or 
state of mind when they are not capable of making rational 
choices of that magnitude.  These concerns ought not to be 
lightly discarded.53  It is, however, important to distinguish 
a rule from an abuse of that rule.  The abuse is something 
Narragansett Television L.P., 688 A.2d 805, 808 (R.I. 1996); Burnett v. People, 68 
N.E. 505, 509-11 (Ill. 1903).
The Supreme Court has held that there is no constitutionally protected 
right to commit suicide.  See  Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 714; 736 (1997) 
(Ginsburg concurring) (“The Court frames the issue in [this case] as whether the 
Due Process Clause of the Constitution protects a ‘right to commit suicide which 
itself includes a right to assistance in doing so, . . . and concludes that our 
Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices do not support the existence of 
such a right.”).  At the same time, the Court has held that an individual has a 
constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.  See 
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) (“[W]e assume 
that the United States Constitution would grant a competent person a 
constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.”).  It 
thus appears that the Constitution, as interpreted by the current Supreme Court, 
protects only some forms of suicide.  Sadly enough, in this interpretation, it 
protects more barbaric forms (starving to death) and excludes more humane ones 
(a lethal injection).
52. In addition, a view according to which the right to life may be forfeited 
(where the death penalty is authorized by law) but not voluntarily alienated leads 
to a paradoxical result.  A person wishing to die can achieve that only by 
murdering someone else and thus forfeiting the right that keeps him away from 
the desired death.  And a person wishing to die with someone else’s help can 
receive that help but only from one person, his executioner.  Joel Feinberg was 
right when he warned:
Those who believe in the inalienability of the right to life . . . might well 
think twice before enforcing its forfeitability. . . .  Whenever the right in 
question can be thought of as burdensome baggage, it cannot be made 
inalienable and forfeitable without encouraging wrongdoing—the pursuit 
of relief through “error, fault, offense, or crime.”
Joel Feinberg, Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life, 7 Phil. & 
Pub. Aff. 93, 112 (1978) [hereinafter Voluntary Euthanasia].
53. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 731-32 (observing that “the State has an 
interest in protecting vulnerable groups—including the poor, the elderly, and 
disabled persons—from abuse, neglect, and mistakes”).  See generally  Daniel 
Callahan & Margot White, The Legalization of Physician-Assisted Suicide: 
Creating a Regulatory Potemkin Village,  30 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1 (1996) (opposing 
euthanasia and physician assisted suicide both on moral and practical grounds).  
The authors observe that “[i]llness is a quintessential state of vulnerability; it 
entails a loss of confidence in one’s body and one’s future.”  Id. at 28.  They also 
express concern that physicians may influence their patient’s choice.  “Through 
their tone, the encouragement they provide or withhold, and the way they present 
the information available, physicians can often determine the patient’s choice.”  
Id. at 28-29 (emphasis and footnote omitted).
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that is not the rule, that is outside of the rule.  After all, 
anything, even a good thing, can be abused and turned into 
a bad thing, but this is not a reason to prohibit the good 
thing itself.  Sexual abuse, for instance, is a bad thing but 
we do not criminalize sex because of that.  In other words, 
when the reason for a law lies in uncertainty regarding the 
validity (voluntariness and rationality) of an individual’s 
consent, the law should be directed at those uncertainties 
by demanding persuasive proof of the valid consent and not 
by taking away the right to give it.54
However, even without homicide, there remains a 
group of offenses to which a person may not consent.55
That happens when the law makes the waived right 
inalienable or does not recognize it at all.  For instance, one 
may not lawfully agree to be maimed or tortured to death.56
To what extent these restrictions are justified is a question 
open for debate.
On the one hand, the liberal tradition with its 
emphasis on personal autonomy opposes criminal 
limitations on the decision-making power of rational adult 
citizens if their actions do not directly harm others.57  On 
the other hand, considerations of human dignity support an 
intuition shared by many that not any consensual conduct 
54. See, e.g., Norman L. Cantor, A Patient’s Decision to Decline Life-Saving 
Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus the Preservation of Life, 26 Rutgers 
L. Rev. 228, 261 (1973) (“So long as careful attention is paid to the capacity of a 
person to request euthanasia, there is a large gap between voluntary euthanasia 
and involuntary elimination of social misfits.”); Franklin G. Miller et al., 
Regulating Physician-Assisted Death, 331 New Eng. J. Med. 119, 120 (1994) 
(arguing in favor of legitimizing voluntary euthanasia upon adoption of “clear 
criteria, rigorous procedures, and adequate safeguards” protecting individuals’ 
right to decide for themselves).
55. See Harm to Self, supra note 46, at 172 (listing, among prohibited two-
party transactions, agreed-upon surgical mutilation, drug sales, bigamy, and 
prostitution).
56. Voluntary Euthanasia, supra note 52, at 104-10, 118-23 (distinguishing 
mandatory, duty-like rights from discretionary rights).
57. See e.g., John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, ch. IV, ¶¶ 10-11 (1869).
Whenever . . . there is a definite damage, or a definite risk of damage, 
either to an individual or to the public, the case is taken out of the province 
of liberty, and placed in that of morality or law.  But with regard to the 
merely contingent, or, as it may be called, constructive injury which a 
person causes to society, by conduct which neither violates any specific 
duty to the public, nor occasions perceptible hurt to any assignable 
individual except himself; the inconvenience is one which society can afford 
to bear, for the sake of the greater good of human freedom.
Id.
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should be permitted.58  A recent German case in which 
the victim responded to an Internet ad for a “young well-
built man who wants to be eaten”59 may serve as an 
example of such problematic consent.  Resolving this 
dilemma is beyond the scope of this article.  It may be 
worth noting, however, that normally society is more 
justified in criminalizing harmful behavior that, arguably, 
serves no rational purpose.  In this sense, one’s decision to 
avoid the pain and suffering of an advanced terminal 
disease by consenting to homicide is distinguishable from 
one’s wish to have a part of his body cut off and fried as a 
snack.60
Regardless of where the law draws the line of 
recognized consent, courts have a duty to determine that 
consent has been given voluntarily.  The more risky is the 
conduct and the more irrevocable is the risked harm, the 
greater degree of voluntariness should be required.61
Particularly dangerous or irreparable decisions (e.g., 
consensual homicide) may even be presumed involuntary 
until proven otherwise.62
Naturally, if the victim’s consent is legally invalid 
(either because society does not recognize an individual’s 
right to consent to a certain act or because consent is not 
fully voluntary), it does not exonerate the perpetrator.  In 
all other circumstances, voluntary consent of the victim 
should, and usually does, serve as a defense to the 
perpetrator’s actions.  Even when harm is as grave as 
death, the victim’s cooperative conduct often reduces the 
perpetrator’s criminal liability.  For example, the victim’s 
consent is viewed as a mitigating circumstance for the 
purposes of capital punishment both by the MPC and the 
58. See e.g., Meir Dan-Cohen, Harmful Thoughts 150 (2002) (arguing that the 
main goal of criminal law, mandated by the dignity principle, is to defend the 
unique moral worth of every human being).
59. See e.g., Michael Cook, Moral Mayhem of Murder on the Menu, Herald 
Sun (Melbourne, Australia), Jan. 15, 2004, at 17.
60. Id.
61. See Harm to Self, supra note 46, at 117-21.
62. Id. at 124-27.
In the cases of “presumably nonvoluntary behavior,” what we “presume” is 
either that that the actor is ignorant or mistaken about what he is doing, or 
acting under some sort of compulsion, or suffering from some sort of
incapacity, and that if that were not the case, he would choose not to do 
what he seems bent on doing now.
Id. at 124.
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majority of jurisdictions that impose the death 
penalty.63
In sum, in all instances where (a) there is an 
identifiable victim (b) capable of giving legally valid 
consent and (c) in fact, voluntarily consenting to a 
perpetrator’s act that infringes on some legally recognized 
right of the victim, the law, at least partially, takes that 
consent into account to reduce the perpetrator’s liability.
2. Self-Defense
A whole group of defenses (self-defense, defense of 
another and defense of property) are based on the unlawful 
harm about to be inflicted on the defendant by the putative 
victim.  Is the aggressor-victim the proximate cause of his 
own death or injury?  Certainly not.  The perpetrator quite 
intentionally chose to use preventive force, including 
deadly force, against the perceived harm or threat of harm.  
Nevertheless, all state laws as well as the MPC completely 
exonerate the perpetrator who reasonably defended himself 
or another.  Since this group of defenses is based on a 
single rationale, this article focuses on self-defense as a 
characteristic representative of the group.
What a person may do in self-defense depends to a 
large degree on what the aggressor attempted to do to that 
person; i.e., the scope of justified behavior is fundamentally 
63. See infra notes 189-197 and the accompanying text.  In addition, the MPC, 
as well as the codes or common law of most states, regards assistance in a suicide 
as a lesser offense than murder.  Cf., e.g., Model Penal Code §§ 210.2, 210.5 
(Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980) (murder is a felony of the first degree 
whereas causing or aiding suicide is a felony of the second degree).  See also Pain 
Relief Promotion Act of 1999, H.R. Rep. No. 106-378, pt. 1, at 4 n.11 (1999).  
Numerous states treat assisting a suicide as manslaughter rather than murder.  
See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 11.41.120(a)(2) (Michie 2002) (defining intentionally 
aiding another to commit suicide as manslaughter); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-
1103(A)(3) (2001) (“A person commits manslaughter by . . . [i]ntentionally aiding 
another to commit suicide”); Ark. Code Ann. §5-10-104(a)(2) (Michie 1997) 
(treating purposefully causing or aiding another to commit suicide as 
manslaughter); Cal. Penal Code § 401 (West 1999) (distinguishing assisted 
suicide from murder); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-104 (West 1999) (treating 
intentionally causing or aiding another to commit suicide as manslaughter); 
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-56(2) (2001) (“A person is guilty of manslaughter in the 
second degree when . . . he intentionally causes or aids another person, other than 
by force, duress or deception, to commit suicide.”); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 707-
702(1)(b) (Michie 2003) (“A person commits the offense of manslaughter if . . . [h]e 
intentionally causes another person to commit suicide.).
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determined by the acts of the victim.  For instance, the 
use of deadly force is only permitted in the face of death, 
serious injury, forcible rape, or kidnapping.64  However, it 
would be clearly inappropriate to use deadly force in an 
attempt to prevent a car theft.  In allocating rights between 
the person acting in self-defense and the victim-aggressor, 
the law looks at the conduct of both parties.  The majority 
of the states, for example, deny the initial aggressor the 
right to defend himself even when his minor attack was 
met by a grossly excessive response.65
What matters for self-defense is the kind of threat 
posed by the victim-aggressor, not his moral or legal 
culpability.  Thus, an unoffending party may be justified if 
he kills a child or an insane assailant attacking him with a 
handgun.66  He may be also justified if he kills a person who 
attacks him in mistaken self-defense, erroneously believing 
that she is about to be attacked by him.  Moreover, he may 
be justified even if he kills a sleepwalking aggressor, i.e., 
someone who has committed no voluntary act at all.67  Of 
course, each of these cases assumes that no less drastic 
alternative was available.
Although a person may be justified in killing an 
innocent aggressor, he is never justified in killing an 
innocent bystander—even if this is the only way to save his 
own life.  In fact, he may not defend himself against a 
deadly aggressor, if by doing so he will have to kill an 
innocent bystander.68  These examples show that what 
distinguishes permissible self-defense from impermissible 
is the actions of the victim—the defendant’s liability 
depends on whether or not the victim has attacked him.
64. See Model Penal Code § 3.04(2)(b) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 
1980).
65. See  Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law § 5.7(e) (2d 
ed. 1986).
66. See, e.g., George Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law § 10.5, at 869-70 
(1978); George P. Fletcher, Proportionality and the Psychotic Aggressor: A 
Vignette in Comparative Criminal Theory, 8 Isr. L. Rev. 367, 375 (1973) (arguing 
that self-defense killing of innocent aggressors is justified); Jeff McMahan, Self-
Defense and the Problem of the Innocent Attacker, 104 Ethics 252, 256-85 (1994) 
(discussing various justificatory theories of killing an innocent aggressor in self-
defense).
67. See discussion in section III.B.2 below.
68. See Larry Alexander, Propter Honoris Respectum: A Unified Excuse or 
Preemptive Self-Protection, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1475, 1482 (1999) [hereinafter 
Unified Excuse].
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The case of innocent aggressors should be 
distinguished from the case of innocent actors who are 
mistakenly perceived by the defendant as aggressors.  All 
criminal codes grant a mistaken defender the defense of 
justification, so long as the mistake was “reasonable.”69  In 
addition, many states recognize “imperfect self-defense” 
and partially excuse actors who killed another under an 
unreasonable belief that the circumstances justified the 
killing.70  The MPC justifies all acts of self-defense, 
reasonable or unreasonable, based on mistaken but sincere 
beliefs, although the defender may be liable for the 
negligent or reckless use of force if his beliefs were held 
negligently or recklessly.71
In my view, it is more appropriate, however, to 
characterize any mistaken self-defense as excused rather 
than justified.72  Justification means that, in addition to 
69. Id. at 1483.
70. See Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law 231 (3d ed. 2001) 
(discussing imperfect self-defense).
71. Model Penal Code § 3.09(2) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980).
72. See, e.g., Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law, supra note 66, at 696-97, 
762-69 (arguing that even a reasonable mistake regarding the presence of 
justifying conditions negates justification); Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law 
Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 199, 239-40 (1982) (arguing 
that mistaken self-defense should be treated as an excuse rather than a 
justification); Unified Excuse, supra note 68, at 1483-84 (supporting Robinson’s 
argument).  Alexander has persuasively argued that mistaken self-defense may 
not be viewed as a justification:
If this were not the case—if, instead, the law took seriously its 
characterization of the mistaken self-defender as “justified” and his use of 
force as legally “privileged”—a third party, seeing A about to employ force 
against an innocent B because of a mistaken belief that B was attacking 
him, would be justified in coming to the mistaken A’s rather than the 
innocent B’s aid.  Indeed, on one reading of the Model Penal Code, B 
himself could not use self-defensive force against A because A’s use of force 
against B would be “privileged.”
Id. at 1484 (footnote omitted).
For an opposite view, see, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Distinguishing 
Justifications From Excuses, 49 Law & Contemp. Probs. 89, 102 (1986) (arguing 
that “the actor’s blameless perception of the facts ought to be sufficient to support 
a justification”); Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and 
Excuse, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1897, 1909-09 (1984) (arguing that a reasonable 
mistake should be justified because the actor’s harmful conduct was warranted); 
Joshua Dressler, New Thoughts About the Concept of Justification in the 
Criminal Law: A Critique of Fletcher’s Thinking and Rethinking, 32 UCLA L. 
Rev. 61, 92-95 (1984) (critiquing Fletcher’s theory of justification and excuse for, 
among other things, denying justification to a reasonably mistaken actor).  See 
also Thomas Morawetz, Reconstructing the Criminal Defenses: The Significance 
of Justification, 77 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 277, 289-90 (1986) (proposing an 
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having the required state of mind, the actor was 
objectively right in what he did, whereas excuse focuses on 
the actor’s inability to make the right choice under the 
circumstances and forgives him for the wrong he has 
committed.  The victim’s conduct may be a mitigating 
consideration primarily under the justificatory rationale—
we look to the victim’s conduct to determine whether the 
defendant was right in his response to it.  Specifically, in 
self-defense, we assign the responsibility for the resulting 
harm to the aggressor.  But if the defendant made a 
mistake and there was no aggressor, how can we say that 
the defendant was “right”?
Certainly, we cannot blame a defendant who, through 
no fault of his, lacked the necessary information.  Due to 
the cognitive impairment, he was not a fully responsible 
agent, just like children or the insane, through no fault of 
theirs, are not fully responsible agents.  For the same 
reason, consent given by minors, mentally-ill, or ill-
informed individuals is legally invalid.  A reasonably-
mistaken person is perhaps the most sympathetic kind of a 
defendant.  However, our understanding of his predicament 
does not change the fact that we exculpate him due to his 
objectively limited understanding of the circumstances, 
assuming that he would have behaved differently had he 
known the true facts.
For this reason, I believe it is conceptually more 
accurate to analyze mistaken self-defense as excuse rather 
than justification.  Although the perpetrator may have 
numerous grounds for mitigating his fault, both 
justificatory and excusatory, only the actual attack by the 
victim presents grounds for moral approval (or at least 
acceptance but not merely forgiveness) of the perpetrator’s 
act.  Accordingly, only proper self-defense is discussed in 
this article.
alternative way of treating reasonable mistakes as “justified wrongs”); Benjamin 
B. Sendor, Mistakes of Fact: A Study in the Structure of Criminal Conduct, 25 
Wake Forest L. Rev. 707, 766-71 (1990) (attempting to reconcile Greenawalt’s and 
Dressler’s views with those of Fletcher and Robinson and proposing a theory of 
responsibility that treats reasonable mistakes as an excuse but denies 
wrongfulness of the actor’s conduct).
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3. Provocation
The defense of provocation, or “heat of passion,”73 is 
another illustration of the impact the victim’s behavior may 
have on the perpetrator’s criminal liability.  This defense 
mitigates what otherwise would be murder to 
manslaughter and is available to someone who killed in the 
heat of passion following a serious provocation.  This 
partial defense is incorporated in all state laws as well as 
the MPC.
This defense has been the subject of ongoing academic 
debate as to why the law treats a killing more leniently 
when it is provoked.  Do we reduce the defendant’s 
punishment because of his subjective state of mind 
(“extreme mental or emotional disturbance,” using the 
words of the MPC74) or because the victim’s own wrongful 
acts make the victim partially responsible for the suffered 
harm75; i.e., is this defense a partial excuse or a partial 
justification?76  In this section, I argue that provocation is 
largely (although not exclusively) a partial defense of 
justification.  Therefore, this is another circumstance in 
which the existing law takes the victim’s behavior into 
account when determining the perpetrator’s criminal 
liability.
We need to start with a more general question, 
however.  What does it mean to say partial justification?  
Normally, justified conduct is that which “the law does not 
73. See Model Penal Code §210.3(1)(b) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 
1980) (“Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter when . . . a homicide which 
would otherwise be murder is committed under the influence of extreme mental 
or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse.”).  
See also id. §210.3 cmt. 3 (noting that the MPC has significantly enlarged “the 
class of cases which would otherwise be murder but which could be reduced to 
manslaughter under then existing law because the homicidal act occurred in the 
‘heat of passion’ upon ‘adequate provocation.’”).
74. Id. §210.3(1)(b).
75. See John Langshaw Austin, A Plea for Excuses, 57 Proc. Aristotelian 
Soc’y. 1, 2-3 (1956-1957), reprinted in Sanford H. Kadish & Stephen J. 
Schulhofer, Criminal Law and Its Process 750 (7th ed. 2001) (“Is [the provoker] 
partly responsible, because he roused a violent impulse or passion in me, so that 
it wasn’t truly or merely me acting ‘of my own accord’ (excuse)?  Or is it rather 
that, he having done me such injury, I was entitled to retaliate (justification)?”).
76. See id. (“In the one defence, . . . we accept responsibility but deny that it 
was bad: in the other, we admit that it was bad but don’t accept full, or even any, 
responsibility.”).
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condemn, [and] even welcomes.”77  It is “a good thing, or 
the right or sensible thing, or a permissible thing to do.”78
When conduct is justified, the message the law sends is 
clear: you did the right (or at least a permissible) thing; if 
ever in similar circumstances, you may do it again.79  That 
message works well for complete defenses of justification, 
such as self-defense or necessity.  But what is the message 
contained in a partial justification?  May you do what you 
did again?  The answer is certainly “no,” since a partial 
defense only mitigates but does not completely eliminate 
the wrongfulness of a criminal act.
That answer has led some scholars to reject the very 
possibility of a partial justification.  If certain conduct is 
wrongful, how can it be justified, even partially, asks 
Suzanne Uniacke.80  In Uniacke’s view, a partial defense 
can only be excusatory.81  I disagree with that argument.  
The fact that, despite a valid defense, we still condemn the 
defendant’s act means only that his defense is partial; it 
does not determine the nature of the defense.
Much more persuasive is Douglas Husak in his 
analysis of defenses in the context of theories of 
punishment.  It is usually accepted that “justifications and 
excuses are desert-based rationales for reducing the 
severity of the defendant’s sentence.”82  A complete 
justification reduces the wrongfulness of an act, whereas a 
complete excuse reduces the blameworthiness of an actor, 
in both instances to such a degree83 that the actor’s 
77. H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility 13 (1968).
78. John Langshaw Austin, A Plea for Excuses, in Freedom and Responsibility
6 (Herbert Morris ed., 1961).
79. For contrasting views as to whether justification applies only to the “right” 
or also to the “tolerable” conduct, see, e.g., George Fletcher, Should Intolerable 
Prison Conditions Generate a Justification or an Excuse for Escape?, 26 UCLA L. 
Rev. 1355, 1358-59 (1979) (arguing that conduct that is merely permissible or 
tolerable is not justified); and Dressler, supra note 72, at 81-87 (arguing that 
justification should apply to the “tolerable” as well as the “right” conduct).
80. Suzanne Uniacke, Permissible Killing: The Self-Defense Justification of 
Homicide 13 (1996).
81. Id. at 14 (opining that the fact that a successful plea of provocation results 
in conviction of an offense is sufficient to identify provocation as an excuse).
82. Douglas N. Husak, Partial Defenses, 11 Can. J.L. & Jurisprudence 167, 
169 (1998).
83. Even in cases of complete justification, wrongfulness of an act may be 
above zero.  See, e.g., id. at 172 (“No one who believes that killings in self-defense 
are completely justified need suppose that the quantum of wrongfulness in all 
such killings is equivalent to that in, say, scratching one’s head.”).
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behavior does not merit punishment.84  That same logic 
applies to partial defenses, only the degree to which the 
wrongfulness of an act or the culpability of an actor is 
reduced does not eliminate liability altogether; instead the 
liability is mitigated.85  A partial justification, therefore, 
renders the act less wrongful and a partial excuse renders 
the actor less blameworthy compared to what they would 
have been in the absence of the mitigating circumstance.86
In light of that, is provocation a partial justification or 
a partial excuse?  For the majority of scholars who have 
addressed the subject, it is the latter.87  Joshua Dressler 
who, over the course of twenty years, has authored a 
number of insightful writings analyzing the defense of 
provocation and arguing against its abolition,88 maintains 
that society places too high a value on human life to justify, 
even partially, an intentional killing of a mere wrongdoer.89
This conclusion is rather doubtful.  There are 
circumstances when the law partially justifies a homicide 
based on something done by the decedent prior to death.  
For example, assisted suicide is a lesser offense than 
murder under both the MPC and the codes or common law 
of most states.90  The victim’s consent to, or participation 
84. Id. at 170.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., Uniacke, supra note 80, at 13 (noting that the usual 
interpretation of provocation is excusatory); V.F. Nourse, Reconceptualizing 
Criminal Law Defenses, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1691, 1717 (2003); Kyron Huigens, 
Homicide in Aretaic Terms, 6 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 97, 132 (2002) (noting the shift 
towards treating provocation as a partial excuse); Dubber, supra note 4, at 12 
(noting that American law treats provocation as a partial excuse).
88. See, e.g., Joshua Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion, 73 J. Crim. L. & 
Criminology 421 (1982) [hereinafter Rethinking Heat of Passion]; Joshua 
Dressler, Provocation: Partial Justification or Partial Excuse, 51 Mod. L. Rev. 467 
(1988); Joshua Dressler, When “Heterosexual” Men Kill “Homosexual” Men: 
Reflections on Provocation Law, Sexual Advances, and the “Reasonable Man” 
Standard, 85 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 726 (1995); Joshua Dressler, Why Keep 
the Provocation Defense?: Some Reflections on a Difficult Subject, 86 Minn. L. 
Rev. 959 (2002) [hereinafter Why Keep the Provocation Defense?].  But see 
Stephen J. Morse, Undiminished Confusion in Diminished Capacity, 75 J. Crim. 
L. & Criminology 1, 22-24 (1984) (arguing that provocation defense should be 
abolished because provoked killing is not substantively different from other 
intentional killing).
89. Rethinking Heat of Passion, supra note 88, at 458.  See also Uniacke, 
supra note 80, at 13 (completely rejecting justificatory rationale of provocation 
and criticizing Dressler for “conced[ing] too much to the claim that provocation 
functions as a partial justification”).
90. See supra note 63 and the accompanying text.
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in, the homicide is a mitigating factor for the purposes 
of capital punishment both under the MPC and the laws of 
the majority of death penalty jurisdictions.91  Therefore, the 
high value assigned to human life is not by itself a
sufficient reason to deny partial justification to the defense 
of provocation.
Another of Dressler’s arguments is more compelling.  
He observes that if the “heat of passion” defense is to be 
explained in justificatory terms, “it must also be recognized 
that the title of the defense is then a misnomer.” 92  Indeed, 
“[u]nder a justificatory theory, it is not the defendant’s 
mental state but Victim’s conduct, which primarily 
explains the rule.  To be consistent, passion should not be 
required.”93
It is true that the name “heat of passion” reflects only 
the subjective component of the defense—the defendant’s 
temporary volitional impairment.94  However, its other 
name, the defense of provocation, focuses more on the 
objective picture of the crime: it is the provocation by the 
victim that is central to the defense.  Anyway, as 
interesting as linguistic evidence can be, “what’s in a 
name?”95
It is perhaps more important to acknowledge that a 
defense does not have to be based on a single underlying 
principle.  A product of historical tradition, political 
compromise, and changing cultural norms, the law often 
combines elements of more than one rationale.  A 
justification defense may include an excusatory component.  
For example, to invoke a justification defense of necessity, 
the defendant has to prove, inter alia, that he (subjectively) 
believed his conduct to be necessary to avoid harm to 
himself or another and that the harm he caused is 
91. See infra notes 189-197 and the accompanying text.  See also a recently 
proposed Indiana bill that would allow certain offenders (those sentenced to at 
least two hundred years or life imprisonment without parole) petition a court 
for the death penalty instead of incarceration, available at 
http://www.in.gov/legislative/bills/2004/PDF/FISCAL/SB0492.001.pdf.
92. Rethinking Heat of Passion, supra note 88, at 458.
93. Id.
94. That is equally true for the MPC version of the defense which focuses on 
the “extreme mental or emotional disturbance” of the defendant “for which there 
is reasonable explanation or excuse.”  Model Penal Code § 210.3(1)(b) (Official 
Draft and Revised Comments 1980).
95. William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet Act 2, Scene II (Brian Gibbons 
ed., 1997).
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(objectively) less than the harm or evil he was able to 
avoid.96  The presence of a subjective component does not, 
however, strip necessity of its justificatory nature.
The same is true with respect to the partial defense of 
provocation.  It certainly includes a subjective component 
(the defendant’s state of reduced self-control).  However,
the only emotions that are taken into account are “anger, 
rage, resentment, or terror”97 directed at the putative 
victim, i.e., emotions responsive to an offense upon the 
defendant.98  A number of codes, following the broader MPC 
version not limited to specific states of mind, require an 
objectively “reasonable explanation or excuse”99 for the 
defendant’s emotional disturbance.  Why would the law 
require a reasonable explanation for the unreasonable 
behavior (killing)?  Partly as evidence of true loss of self-
control.  However, if the only rationale for the mitigating 
defense were excusatory, it should also be available to any 
defendant who can prove honest but unreasonable rage 
(just as imperfect self-defense is available to a person who 
honestly but unreasonably believes that circumstances 
96. Model Penal Code § 3.02(1) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980).  
For example, if the defendant, lost in the mountains, broke into an empty house 
because he heard on the radio about a severe weather change, he would be 
entitled to the defense of necessity.  If, however, he broke into the same house 
unaware of the impending weather change, he would not be able to use the 
defense despite that the weather did, in fact, change and his illegal act may, in 
fact, have saved his life.  But see Paul Robinson, A Theory of Justification: 
Societal Harm as a Prerequisite for Criminal Liability, 23 UCLA L. Rev. 266, 288-
91 (1975) (arguing that claims of justification should prevail regardless of the 
actor’s state of mind).  See also Fletcher, supra note 44, at 318-21 (arguing that 
justification presupposes proper intent).
97. See 40 Am. Jur. 2d, Homicide, § 49 (stating that emotions that mitigate a 
murder to voluntary manslaughter include “anger, rage, resentment, or terror 
sufficient to obscure the reason of ordinary man”).
98. Responsive acts in general have less determinative value in criminal law 
than independent acts.  A responsive intervening cause (an act that occurs in 
reaction or response to the wrongdoer’s prior wrongful conduct) usually does not 
break the chain of causation and relieve the initial wrongdoer of criminal 
responsibility, unless the response was highly abnormal or bizarre.  See Dressler, 
supra note 70, at 190.
99. Model Penal Code § 210.3(1)(b) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 
1980). See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-104(a)(1) (Michie 1987); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. 
§ 53a-54a(a) (West 2001); Del. Code Ann. § 641 (2003); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. §707-
702(2) (Michie 2003); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §507.020(1)(a) (Michie 1999); Mont. 
Code Ann. §45-5-103(1) (2003); N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25(1)(a) (McKinney 2003); 
N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-16-01(2) (2003); Or. Rev. Stat. §163.135(1) (2003); Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-203(4)(a)(i) (2003).
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justify the killing).100  The fact that the law asks not 
only how badly the actor was distressed but also why he 
was so badly distressed101 implies that the rationale for the 
defense lies in the source of provocation, not merely the 
actor’s disturbed state of mind.
Consider People v. Spurlin.102  In that case, the 
defendant killed his wife after an intense argument over 
their mutual infidelities, and then killed their sleeping 
nine-year-old son.  Assuming that Spurlin was entitled to 
the defense of provocation for the killing of his wife, should 
he have been able to claim the same defense for the killing 
of their child?  If we believe in the excusatory “heat of 
passion” rationale, the answer should be “yes.”  Indeed, 
what proves the lack of self-control better than a deadly 
attack directed at an innocent child?
Yet, many of us would probably feel uncomfortable 
with that answer.  After all, the intentional killing of an 
innocent unoffending person is an absolute taboo in the 
Anglo-American legal tradition.  In the famous case of 
Regina v. Dudley and Stephens,103 two starving men, after 
twenty days in a lifeboat and nine days without food, killed 
a boy to save their lives by feeding on his flesh.  At the trial 
for murder, they raised necessity as their defense.  Despite 
the court’s empathy for “how terrible the [defendants’] 
temptation was; how awful the suffering,”104 the court 
rejected their claim, saying that there is no defense to 
taking the life of another “when that other is neither 
attempting nor threatening [to take] yours, nor is guilty of 
any illegal act whatever towards you or anyone else.”105
Today as well, no American state recognizes necessity as a 
full or partial defense to murder.106
100. See e.g., Dressler, supra note 70, at 231.
101. See 40 Am. Jur. 2d Homicide, § 111 (“Extreme emotional distress without 
legally recognized provocation will not reduce murder to manslaughter.”).  See 
also MacEwan v. State, 701 So. 2d 66, 69-70 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997).
102. 156 Cal. App. 3d 119 (1984).
103. 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884), reprinted in [1881-5] All. E.R. Rep. 61.
104. Id. at 67.
105. Id. at 64.
106. See Kadish & Schulhoffer, supra note 75, at 825 (noting the explicit 
rejection of necessity as a defense to homicide by both statutes and 
commentators).  See also LaFave & Scott, supra note 65, § 5.4(c) (citing no cases 
in which necessity has been allowed as a defense to the murder of a third party); 
40 Am. Jur. 2d Homicide, §115 (noting that as a general matter “neither duress, 
coercion, nor compulsion are defenses to murder”).
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Similarly, in the vast majority of states, duress 
does not exonerate107 or mitigate108 the intentional killing of 
an innocent.  Finally, a person may not defend himself 
against a deadly attack if, while doing so, he has to kill an 
innocent party.  If I am attacked by a killer and my only 
chance to survive is by throwing a hand grenade at him, I 
still may not do that, if the grenade will also kill even one 
innocent bystander.109
Comparing necessity, duress, and self-defense with the 
“heat of passion,” I can’t help but wonder: if all sorts of 
overwhelming emotions (such as despair, temptation, fear 
of imminent death) do not reduce perpetrators’ culpability 
for killing an innocent, why should rage provoked by 
someone else?  If we deny mitigation to a man who shot his 
victim because of the fear induced by a third party,110 how 
can we grant it to a man who bludgeoned a sleeping child 
to death because of the rage induced by a third party?  And 
if we cannot grant it, we have to reject the excusatory 
rationale as the sole ground for the partial defense of 
provocation, as, in fact, courts and legislatures of a number 
of states have done pursuant to the doctrine of “misdirected 
retaliation.”111
107. 40 Am. Jur. 2d, Homicide, § 115 (“It is generally held that neither duress, 
coercion, nor compulsion are defenses to murder.”) (footnotes omitted).  See also 
Schertz v. State, 380 N.W.2d 404 (Iowa 1985); State v. Chism, 436 So. 2d 464 (La. 
1983); State v. McCartney, 684 So. 2d 416, 425 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1996) (noting 
that the defense of compulsion is unavailable in murder prosecutions); State v. 
Weston, 219 P. 180, 185 (Or. 1923) (stating that “[f]ear, duress or compulsion due 
to the act of another, seems to be considered no excuse for taking the life of a 
third person”); State v. Nargashian, 58 A. 953, 955 (R.I. 1904) (stating that no 
justification for murder is present when a defendant undertakes a voluntary 
course of action).
108. 40 Am. Jur. 2d, Homicide, § 115 (stating that duress does not mitigate 
murder to manslaughter).  See United States v. LaFleur, 971 F.2d 200, 206 (9th 
Cir. 1991) (holding that duress cannot mitigate first degree murder to 
manslaughter); State v. Rocheville, 425 S.E.2d 32, 35 (S.C. 1993) (finding that 
duress cannot serve to reduce murder to mansalughter).
109. See, e.g., Banks v. State, 955 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. App. 1997) (holding that 
even when a party would be justified in using force against an assailant, no such 
justification extends to an innocent third party who is recklessly killed).  See also 
Unified Excuse, supra note 68, at 1482.
110. See LaFleur, 971 F.2d at 206 (concluding that “consistent with the 
common law rule, a defendant should not be excused from taking the life of an 
innocent third person because of the threat of harm to himself”).
111. At least ten states by statute (Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, 
Illinois, Missouri, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, Wisconsin) and another fifteen by 
case law (California, Georgia, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, New 
Mexico, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, 
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The doctrine of misdirected retaliation denies 
provocation mitigation in cases in which the victim did 
nothing to provoke the attack.  In most American 
jurisdictions, the defense of provocation requires that the 
homicide occur as a result of the victim’s own 
provocation.112  This common law view of provocation 
clearly derives from the justification principle.  It assumes 
Vermont, Virginia, Wyoming) authorize mitigation from murder to a lesser 
offense only if the provocative act is attributable to the victim, the victim’s 
accomplice, or the intended victim.  See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1103(A)(2) (victim 
only); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.03(A) (victim only); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-
20(C)(b)(8) (victim only); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.002(7) (victim or accomplice); Tex. 
Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(2) (victim or accomplice); Ill. Comp. Stat. § 9-2(1) (victim 
or intended victim); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2503 (a)(1), (2) (same); Alaska Stat. 
§ 11.41.115(a) (same); Colo. Rev. Stat. §18-3-103(3)(b) (same); Wis. Stat. Ann. 
§ 939.44(1)(b) (same).  See also Foster v. State, 444 S.E.2d 296, 297 n.2 (Ga. 1994) 
(“[I]t appears that the voluntary manslaughter statute OCGA § 16-5-2(a) should 
be construed so as to authorize a conviction for that form of homicide only where 
the defendant can show provocation by the homicide victim.”); State v. Follin, 947 
P.2d 8, 16-17 (Kan. 1997) (determining that trial court appropriately declined to 
extend instruction on manslaughter when defendant killed a non-provoking 
victim); State v. Charles, 787 So. 2d 516, 519  (La. App. 3 Cir. 2001) (“Case law 
requires that there be some act or series of acts by the victim sufficient to deprive 
a reasonable person of cool reflection.”); Tripp v. State, 374 A.2d 384, 389 (Md. Ct. 
App. 1977) (“Except for rare instances of ‘transferred intent,’ where one aims at A, 
misses and hits B by mistake, a defendant seeking to extenuate an intentional 
killing upon the theory that he killed in hot-blooded rage brought on by the 
provocative acts of his victim is limited to those killings where the victim is the 
provocateur.”); State v. Auchampach, 540 N.W.2d 808, 1815 (Minn. 1995) (“[A] 
defendant’s emotional state alone is not sufficient to mitigate murder to 
manslaughter; rather, the words and acts of a victim must have been enough to 
provoke a person of ordinary self-control.”); State v. Bautista, 227 N.W.2d 835, 
839 (Neb. 1975) (indicating that a jury instruction on provocation is only 
appropriate when the victim caused the provocation); Krucheck v. State, 702 P.2d 
1267, 1269 (Wy. 1985) (“[T]he heat of passion, anger, rage, or hot blood ‘must 
have been entertained toward the person slain, and not toward another.’”); People 
v. Steele, 47 P.3d 225, 240 (Cal. 2002) (“But it does not satisfy the objective, 
reasonable person requirement, which requires provocation by the victim.”); State 
v. Gutierrez, 541 P.2d 628, 631 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975) (accepting rule against 
allowing provocation defense for killing persons other than the provoker); 
Hawkins v. State, 46 P.3d 139, 146 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002) (“[M]anslaughter . . . 
requires adequate provocation on the part of the deceased toward the defendant, 
not some implied provocation on the part of a third person sitting in a car a 
considerable distance away.”); State v. Winston, 252 A.2d 354, 358 (R.I. 1969) 
(“[A]n essential element of [voluntary manslaughter] is the presence of 
provocation offered by the person slain.”); Arnold v. Commonwealth, 560 S.E.2d 
915, 919 (Va. Ct. App. 2002) (“While it is true that ‘malice and heat of passion are 
mutually exclusive,’ we have held that where it is not the victim of the crime who 
invoked the defendant’s heat of passion, there was no evidence to support a 
finding of heat of passion.”).
112. See, e.g, 2 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton’s Criminal Law § 156 (15th ed. 
1994); LaFave & Scott, supra note 65, § 7.10(g).
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that, even though the defendant acted under the “heat 
of passion,” his guilt may be reduced only with respect to 
the victim who is partially responsible for his unhinged 
emotional state.113
Under the MPC, it does not matter who provoked the 
offender.114  The commentaries to section 210.3(1)(b) 
provide that the offender’s emotional distress does not have 
to arise from some “injury, affront, or other provocative 
act”115 attributable to the deceased.  Although several states 
have provisions modeled after section 210.3(1)(b),116 this
does not mean that they automatically reject the doctrine of 
misdirected retaliation.  Quite often states adopt the text of 
an MPC provision but reject a position expressed in the 
commentary.  For example, the MPC language regarding 
duress and necessity has been very influential among the 
states; however, the view (expressed in the commentaries) 
extending these defenses to prosecution for murder is 
followed, in the case of necessity, by none of the states, and, 
in the case of duress, by very few.
Similarly, some states that describe provocation in 
terms of “extreme mental or emotional disturbance” at the 
same time, either by statute or by case law, reject the MPC 
approach authorizing mitigation for the killing of a non-
provoker.117  In Spurlin, for instance, the court admitted 
that the California Penal Code is silent on the source of 
113. H.L.A. Hart & Tony Honore, Causation in the Law 58 (2d ed. 1985) (“It 
is . . . an integral part of the idea of provocation that one person arouses another’s 
passions and makes him to lose his normal self-control.”).
114. Model Penal Code § 210.3(1)(b) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 
1980) (defining manslaughter as a homicide which would otherwise be murder 
when it is “committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse”).
115. Id. § 210.3, cmt. 5(a).  “By eliminating any reference to provocation in the 
ordinary sense of improper conduct by the deceased, the MPC avoids arbitrary 
exclusion of some circumstances that may justify reducing murder to 
manslaughter.”  Id.
116. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
117. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 641 (2003) (providing that “emotional 
distress is not reasonably explained . . . when there is no causal relationship 
between the provocation, event or situation which caused the extreme emotional 
distress and the victim of the murder”).  See also State v. Stewart, 624 N.W.2d 
585, 590-91 (Minn. 2001) (the state statute was based on the MPC; however, the 
court noted that “a heat of passion that provokes an assailant to kill the 
provocateur will not necessarily satisfy the subjective or objective elements of 
heat-of-passion manslaughter as to other victims,” and concluded that the 
situation at bar was such a case).
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provocation.  Nonetheless, citing common law principles 
and interpretations of those principles adopted by several 
other jurisdictions, the court concluded that, for the 
provocation defense to be available, “the deceased must be 
the source of the defendant’s rage or passion.”118
In sum, the partial defense of provocation includes 
elements of both excusatory and justificatory rationales.  
The emphasis most states put on the objectively reasonable 
explanation of the defendant’s rage indicates, however, that 
the source of provocation is crucial for mitigation, i.e. that 
it is the act that is less wrongful, not simply the actor that 
is less culpable.  Moreover, the doctrine of misdirected
retaliation can be explained only in terms of a partial 
justification.  It is the behavior of the victim that partially 
justifies the offense.  That does not mean that it is right to 
kill a provoker, only that it is less wrong to kill a provoker 
than to kill an innocent victim.  Therefore, the provocation 
defense, just like defenses of consent and self-defense, is at 
least partially based on the victim’s conduct.
***
The foregoing review of consent, self-defense, and 
provocation shows that the rule according to which the 
victim’s conduct is irrelevant to the perpetrator’s liability 
has exceptions so broad that it can hardly be called a rule.  
In cases of consent, self-defense, and provocation, the law 
reduces or completely eliminates the perpetrator’s liability 
based on the acts of the victim immediately prior to the 
perpetrator’s harmful act toward that victim.  This 
inevitably raises a normative question: should not the law, 
as a coherent system of norms, apply the principle of 
victims’ contributory fault across the board?  Part II 
provides general arguments in favor of regarding the 
conduct of the victim as a factor affecting the criminal 
liability of the offender.
118. Spurlin, 156 Cal. App. 3d at 126.
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II.  NORMATIVE ARGUMENT: WHY VICTIMS’ CONDUCT 
SHOULD BE RELEVANT TO PERPETRATORS’ LIABILITY
A. Punishment Argument
The first reason to consider the role of the victim in the 
committed offense is a sense that, at least in some 
circumstances, it affects the liability of the offender and the 
punishment she should receive.  As Michael Moore has 
correctly pointed out, “the role of the victim of crime . . . is 
to be ascertained by thinking through the theory of 
punishment.”119  Conceptually, theories of punishment fall 
into two large groups, retributive and utilitarian.  For a 
retributivist, punishment is justified because the offender 
deserves it; for a utilitarian, it is justified if it promotes 
some societal good.120
1. Retributivist Argument
The dominant theory of punishment underlying Anglo-
American criminal doctrine is retributivism, according to 
which punishment is justified by the desert of the 
offender.121  Although other goals, such as deterrence, 
incapacitation, and rehabilitation may affect penal policies, 
the fundamental principle of criminal law is, and should be, 
“just desert.”  Otherwise, the state would be justified in 
punishing an innocent as long as that brings about a net 
social gain.122  The priority of the just desert principle is not 
only theoretical.  Research on the psychology of justice 
shows that the community’s principles of punishment are 
119. Victims and Retribution, supra note 7, at 65-66.
120. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in Encyclopedia of Crime and 
Justice 1336 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983) (explaining that “a retributivist claims 
that punishment is justified because people deserve it; a utilitarian believes that 
justification lies in the useful purposes that the punishment serves”).
121. Immanuel Kant, The Philosophy of Law 195-96 (W. Hastie ed., 1887) 
(“Juridical punishment can never be administered merely as a means of 
promoting another good either with regard to the criminal himself or to civil 
society, but must in all cases be imposed only because the individual on whom it 
is inflicted has committed a crime.”).
122. Michael Moore, Law and Psychiatry 239 (1984) (arguing that a consistent 
utilitarian would have to punish an innocent look-alike instead of a skyjacker who 
cannot be caught if that would deter skyjacking).
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largely retributive123 and that people explicitly name 
retributivism as the philosophy that should govern 
punishment in our society.124
In the retributive system of justice, a person may not 
be punished unless her wrongdoing was accompanied by a 
culpable mental state125 with respect to the wrongdoing.126
In addition, many scholars agree that “it’s not culpability 
alone that counts in determining desert. . . .  Rather, the 
amount of harm caused determines the seriousness of the 
wrong done, and the amount of wrong done does affect 
desert.”127
The bond between harm and just desert is recognized 
both in our law and morality.128  We decide whether people 
deserve praise or punishment based, in part, on the end 
results of their actions.  A sprinter who almost won the 
race does not deserve the same medal as the sprinter who, 
123. See, e.g., John M. Darley et al., Incapacitation and Just Deserts as 
Motives for Punishment, 24 Law & Hum. Behav. 659 (2000).
124. See Mark Warr & Mark Stafford, Public Goals of Punishment and Support 
for the Death Penalty, 21 J. Res. Crime & Delinq. 95, 99-101 (1984).
125. Tison v. Arizona,  481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987) (“The heart of the retribution 
rationale is that a criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal 
culpability of the criminal offender.”).
126. Victims and Retribution, supra note 7, at 87.
127. Id.  The opposing school of thought maintains that the amount of harm is 
irrelevant to the perpetrator’s desert: why should one be punished less severely 
only because, quite fortuitously, her attempted offense failed or caused less harm 
than it could?  See, e.g., Hart, supra note 77, at 131 (“Why should the accidental 
fact that an intended harmful outcome has not occurred be a ground for 
punishing less a criminal who may be equally dangerous and equally wicked?”); 
Sanford H. Kadish, The Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw, 84 J. Crim. L. & 
Criminology 679, 697 (1994) (arguing that allowing wrongdoing an independent 
moral significance is irrational).  The debate over the moral and legal significance 
of the resulting harm has a long history and still continues.  See, e.g., Bjorn 
Burkhardt, Is There a Rational Justification for Punishing an Accomplished 
Crime More Severely Than an Attempted Crime?, 1986 BYU L. Rev. 553, 556 
(1986) (remarking that “little progress has been made toward a solution of this 
issue in the last two hundred years”); Kadish, supra, at 679 n.2 (noting that, in 
fact, the issue is more than thousand years old—”Plato tried to explain the lesser 
punishment for a failed attempt to kill as an expression of gratitude to the gods”). 
For the insightful analysis of advocated positions on both sides of the debate, see, 
e.g., Michael Moore, Placing Blame 191-247 (1997).
128. Kadish, supra note 127, at 701.  Sanford H. Kadish has conceded that,
While in principle it’s difficult to find good reasons for making desert turn 
on chance, here’s the rub: most of us do in fact make judgments precisely of 
this kind.  Doesn’t it seem natural for a parent to want to punish her child 
more for spilling his milk than for almost spilling it, more for running the 
family car into a wall than for almost doing so?
Id. at 688.
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in fact, came first.  Similarly, a driver who almost hit a 
pedestrian does not deserve the same punishment as a 
driver who did, in fact, hit and kill someone.
Many criminal law doctrines implicitly or explicitly 
draw on the moral significance of harm.  Take the defense 
of necessity.  The perpetrator who invokes this defense is 
guilty of violating a legal (and often moral) norm.  
Nonetheless, she may be completely absolved of criminal 
liability if her prima facie offense was committed in order 
to avoid a greater harm or evil.129  If harm had no 
independent moral significance, the actor who has made 
the right choice and, say, saved lives of several 
mountaineers by breaking into a deserted house would not 
be justified in what she did.
The moral significance of harm makes the attribution 
of harm essential to the idea of just desert.130  If the victim 
is completely innocent and there is no other independent 
intervening cause, it is clear that the perpetrator is 
responsible for all the harm.  But what about a victim who 
was at least as instrumental as the offender in causing the 
resulting injury or loss?  Consider, for example, the victim 
who was a willing participant in a fatal drag race, or the 
victim who killed herself while playing a game of Russian 
roulette.131  Is it fair to say that, although there were two 
equally reckless participants, the defendant caused all the 
harm?
In Commonwealth v. Atencio,132 three friends, 
Marshall, Atencio, and Britch, played Russian roulette:
First, Marshall examined the gun, saw that it contained one 
cartridge, and after spinning it on his arm, pointed it at his 
head, and pulled the trigger.  Nothing happened.  He 
handed the gun to Atencio, who repeated the process, again 
without result.  Atencio passed the gun to the deceased, who 
spun it, put it to his head, then pulled the trigger.  The 
129. See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 3.02 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 
1980).
130. Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 397 (1988) (“If a jury is to assess 
meaningfully the defendant’s moral culpability and blameworthiness, one 
essential consideration should be the extent of the harm caused by the 
defendant”).
131. Kalven & Zeisel, supra note 32, at 243-44.
132. 189 N.E.2d 223 (Mass. 1963).
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
136
cartridge exploded, and he fell over dead.133
Both Marshall and Atencio were convicted of manslaughter 
in the death of Britch.  The appellate court recognized that 
Britch’s voluntary participation in the game would bar a 
civil action.134  In a criminal prosecution, however, Britch’s 
contributory recklessness was ignored because of the state 
interest “that the deceased should not be killed by the 
wanton or reckless conduct of himself or others.”135  The 
problem with this argument is that it essentially sacrifices 
the principle of just desert for the benefit of net social gain.  
Under the court’s logic, the state would be justified in 
punishing an innocent if that would deter undesirable 
social behavior.  Hence, this outcome contradicts a 
cornerstone principle of criminal law which allows courts to 
impose sanctions only when an actor is guilty of an offense.
Clearly, not all cases of the victim’s negligent or even 
reckless behavior should reduce the offender’s 
blameworthiness.  The fact that a victim may not have 
behaved cautiously enough does not and should not 
diminish the criminal liability of a rapist or a thief.  I will 
discuss these issues in part III.C.3.  For now it is sufficient 
to note that, in principle, there are circumstances in which 
the requirements of fair and proportionate punishment 
mandate that the offender’s liability be evaluated in light of 
the victim’s own behavior.
2. Utilitarian Argument
Whereas retributivism provides a non-consequentialist 
basis for punishment, various utilitarian theories view 
punishment as a means to achieving societal goals136—
deterring the offender from committing future crime 
(specific deterrence), deterring others from crime (general 
deterrence), isolating and incapacitating the offender 
(incapacitation), and rehabilitating the offender 
133. Id. at 224.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 120, at 1336 (explaining that “a 
retributivist claims that punishment is justified because people deserve it; a 
utilitarian believes that justification lies in the useful purposes that the 
punishment serves”).
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(rehabilitation).  Although not supporting a view that 
criminal justice should be governed by consequentialist 
considerations, I nevertheless recognize that they represent 
a value, and therefore should be promoted to the extent 
that doing so does not interfere with the just desert 
principle.
In the utilitarian world, the main criterion for 
determining whether a certain measure is warranted is its 
efficiency, economic or non-economic.  Two distinct 
efficiency arguments may be made in favor of incorporating 
comparative responsibility in criminal law—one, dealing 
with the reduction of costs of crime, and the other dealing 
with the increase of moral authority of criminal law.
a. Economic Efficiency Argument
Crime imposes economic costs on society both in terms 
of losses and precautionary measures against it.  One way 
to minimize those costs is to create incentives for potential 
victims to be more cautious.137  Alon Harel has proposed a 
system of comparative fault under which crimes against 
careless victims will be punished less severely.  As a result, 
criminals will be more inclined to commit crimes against 
careless victims because that will subject them to a lesser 
penalty.138  Criminals’ preference will, in turn, influence the 
behavior of potential victims.  “Potential victims will be 
disposed to take better precautions given that criminals 
will be less likely to commit crimes directed at cautious 
victims.”139
What is troublesome in Harel’s theory is that he does 
not seem to differentiate between two victims—one guilty 
of attacking an innocent person and the other guilty of 
merely walking late at night.  Moreover, it may well be that 
137. See Alon Harel, Efficiency and Fairness in Criminal Law: The Case for a 
Criminal Law Principle of Comparative Fault, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 1181, 1193 (1994).
Efficiency requires the distribution of the costs of precautions between the 
state and potential victims in a way that minimizes the total costs of crime.  
Without appropriate incentives, potential victims will invest less in 
precautionary measures than is socially optimal.  That is, potential victims 
will expose themselves to risks which are unjustified from the perspective 
of efficiency.
Id.
138. Id. at 1196.
139. Id. at 1197.
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it is easier to influence people’s everyday routine (e.g., 
going out late) rather than prevent certain antisocial 
behavior.  In that case, based on Harel’s logic, the law 
should reflect that discrepancy by punishing a mugger or 
rapist of a late-night walker less severely than their victim 
who was defending herself against an unprovoked attack.
I agree with Harel that criminal law should adopt a 
regime of comparative liability.  However, I disagree with 
his utilitarian reasoning, which completely subordinates 
moral considerations to efficiency.  The system of 
comparative liability advocated in this article significantly 
differs from the one proposed by Harel.
b. Increase of Moral Authority of Criminal Law
To be effective, criminal law must enjoy moral 
credibility.  That may be achieved only if the distribution of 
criminal liability is seen as just.140  This, in turn, requires 
that criminal law (i) is not over-used (and therefore 
devalued), and (ii) assigns “liability and punishment in 
ways that the community perceives as consistent with the 
community’s principles of appropriate liability and 
punishment.”141
(i) Reducing Criminal Sanctions Argument
An excessive use of criminal sanctions may reduce the 
deterring effect of the law, since the internalization of the 
rules of criminal law requires a strong moral condemnation 
of the proscribed conduct by the law-abiding members of 
the community.142  Consequently, the inflationary use of 
140. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 
Nw. U. L. Rev. 453, 477 (1997) (arguing that “the criminal law must earn a 
reputation for (1) punishing those who deserve it under rules perceived as just, (2) 
protecting from punishment those who do not deserve it, and (3) where 
punishment is deserved, imposing the amount of punishment deserved, no more, 
no less”); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Justice, Liability, and Blame: 
Community Views and the Criminal Law 5-7 (1995) (arguing that community 
views are important, from both the retributivist and the utilitarian perspectives, 
to what criminal law rules ought to be).
141. Robinson & Darley, The Utility of Desert, supra note 140, at 457.
142. Bernd Schünemann, The Future of the Victimological Approach to the 
Interpretation of Criminal Law: The Use of Victomological Considerations as a 
Comprehensive, Regulative Principle for Limiting the Scope of Certain Crimes, in 
Victimology in Comparative Perspective 150 (K. Miazawa, M. Ohya eds., 4th ed. 
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criminal law may cause the condemnation to eventually 
wear thin and vanish.143
To avoid that outcome, a German scholar, Bernd 
Schünemann, has advocated a restrictive approach to 
interpreting penal statutes urging to reject criminal 
sanctions in certain circumstances when the victim neither 
deserves nor needs protection.144  This rule of 
interpretation, known in Germany as Viktimodogmatik, 
was to be applied only to “relationship offenses,” such as 
fraud, and not to violent crimes.145  Decisions about when 
victims do not need or deserve protection were to be made 
based on the statistical findings of victimologists.146
Schünemann’s work was an important contribution 
toward a more realistic, contextualized vision of the crime.  
At the same time, his proposal was limited in a few 
important respects.  The first limitation is normative and 
relates to the fact that, for Schünemann, courts should pay 
attention to victims’ conduct mainly because that would 
result in the reduced use of criminal sanctions.  Thus, if it 
turns out that Viktimodogmatik does not have the desired 
effect, the rule would have to be abandoned, even though it 
results in more fair verdicts.
The second limitation lies in the procedural nature of 
Schünemann’s proposal.  Making victims’ conduct merely a 
part of a rule of interpretation leaves almost unlimited 
discretion to each interpreter and may lead to inconsistent 
verdicts.  In contrast, I believe that the conduct of the 
victim should be regarded as a full or partial defense 
incorporated in substantive criminal law.
Another problem with Schünemann’s proposal is that 
it applies only to a small group of non-violent offenses, in 
which the victim was not diligent enough to protect her 
own interests.  It is not clear why the victim’s fault should 
be given weight only in this context.  Shouldn’t the victim 
who initiated the game of Russian roulette be at least as 
responsible for her lot as a gullible victim who failed to 
double-check a fraudster’s information?
Finally, decisions about what victims do not need or 
1986).
143. Id. at 150-51.
144. Id. at 152.
145. See Role of the Victim, supra note 7, at 39-40.
146. See Schünemann, supra note 142, at 150-51, 158.
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deserve legal protection should not be based on 
victimological studies.  Statistical information may be 
helpful in identifying particularly frequent or vulnerable 
victims in order to educate and protect them from crime.  
This information, however, may not determine the level of 
liability of a particular defendant.  In order to preserve 
justice in a specific case, a defendant must be judged for 
what she did to her victim, not for what a statistical 
defendant did to a statistical victim.  Schünemann would 
have to agree with this principle in order to preserve his goal 
of efficiency based on internalization of moral norms by the 
community.  In general, although I do not see the reduction 
of criminal sanctions as the reason for adding the victim’s 
conduct into the liability equation, I agree with Schünemann 
that such reduction is likely to follow and to make the 
reformed criminal law more efficient and morally influential.
(ii) Respecting Community Standards Argument
Paul H. Robinson and John M. Darley have made an 
innovative argument in favor of changing the foundation of 
desert-based liability—from the system built on principles 
of moral philosophy to the system built upon the 
community’s shared principles of justice.147  The authors 
suggest that such a system would enjoy high moral 
authority, and that authority could be used for creating 
moral norms and ensuring compliance with them.148  While 
not following Robinson and Darley in their utilitarian 
revision of the rationale for justice, I share their view that 
it is generally a good thing when the law does not clash 
with moral perceptions of the community.
The famous Kalven and Zeisel study of American 
juries shows that public intuitions and jury verdicts do not 
follow the law regarding contributory fault of the victim.  
147. Robinson & Darley, The Utility of Desert, supra note 140, at 456.
148. Id. at 457.
The criminal law can have a second effect in gaining compliance with its 
commands.  If it earns a reputation as a reliable statement of what the 
community, given sufficient information and time to reflect, would perceive 
as condemnable, people are more likely to defer to its commands as morally 
authoritative and as appropriate to follow in those borderline cases in 
which the propriety of certain conduct is unsettled or ambiguous in the 
mind of the actor.
Id.
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According to the study, jurors consistently acquit the 
offender or convict her of a lesser offense if the victim 
contributed to her own injury.149  For example, jurors 
acquitted defendants charged with negligent automobile 
homicide where the “deceased driver may also have been 
negligent,”150 where the “[v]ictim, who drank to excess, 
walked or staggered across the road,”151 and where 
“[d]efendant traveled too fast, but woman (deceased) may 
have darted into path.”152  Changing the law to reduce the 
offender’s liability because of the faulty conduct of the 
victim would certainly bring it in accord with the public 
opinion.
At the same time, a law is not necessarily good simply 
because it mimics the public opinion.153  Public views on the 
allocation of responsibility for rape are well known for their 
unfairness to the victim.  “She got herself raped” read one 
of the slogans at a demonstration protesting against guilty 
verdicts issued in a gang-rape case.154  Numerous polls have 
pointed out that the public has redefined the crime of rape 
“in terms of its notions of assumption of risk.”155  Juries in 
rape cases do not limit their deliberations to the only 
legally relevant issue—consent of the victim.  Instead, they 
“closely, and often harshly, scrutinize . . . the female 
complainant and [are] moved to be lenient with the 
defendant whenever there are suggestions of contributory 
behavior on her part.”156  The “contributory behavior” of the 
victim sufficient for the defendant’s acquittal or conviction 
149. Kalven  & Zeisel, supra note 32, at 242-57.  That study was based on 
questionnaires filled out by 555 judges presiding, in sum, over 3576 criminal jury 
trials.  The judges were asked, among other things, how they would decide each 
case over which they presided had it been tried before them without a jury.  Id. at 
45, 50-51.
150. Id. at 244.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See Kenneth W. Simons,  The Relevance of Community Values to Just 
Deserts: Criminal Law, Punishment Rationales, and Democracy, 28 Hofstra L. 
Rev. 635, 653-59 (2000) (discussing the complexity of the connection between 
community views and punishment rationales).
154. Sydney H. Schanberg, We Should Be Outraged at All Rapes, N.Y. 
Newsday, Apr. 28, 1989, at 94.
155. Kalven  & Zeisel, supra note 32, at 254.
156. Id. at 249.  In Kalven and Zeisel’s study, only three out of forty-two 
defendants charged with simple rape were convicted of it.  Id. at 253.  The judge’s 
disagreement with the jury verdict on the major charge approached 100%.  Id. at 
253-54.
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of a lesser offense has included drinking,157 wearing sexy 
clothes,158 flirting159 or having a prior relationship with the 
defendant.160  One of the most extensive studies of citizen 
perceptions of rape found that 66% of the polled population 
believed that women’s behavior or appearance provokes 
rape, and 34% believed that women should be held 
responsible for preventing their own rape.161
Should these public views be incorporated into law?  If 
the law, according to Robinson and Darley, should assign 
“liability and punishment according to the principles of 
157. In the Kalven and Zeisel study, judges reported unwarranted acquittals 
where:
• the assault happened at a beer drinking party (“[t]he jury probably 
figured the girl asked for what she got”);
• victim had a few beers before “she entered a car with defendant and 
three other men and was driven to cemetery where act took place”; and
• victim who was “drinking but not drunk” accepted a ride back home 
from a man she just met at dance hall; “rape occurred in lonely wooded 
area.”
See id. at 249-51.
158. “In 1989, a circuit court jury in Florida acquitted 26-year-old Steven Lord 
of abducting a 22-year-old woman at knife point and repeatedly raping her.  The 
jury based its finding partly on the fact that she was wearing a lace miniskirt 
without underwear.  In explaining the decision of the three-man, three-woman 
jury, foreman Roy Diamond said: ‘We felt she asked for it for the way she was 
dressed.’”  Mary Nemeth et al., Chilling the Sexes: Women’s Growing Militancy 
About Harassment and Date Rape Alarms Many Men, MacLean’s, Feb. 17, 1992, 
at 42, 44.  See also Mark A. Whately, Victim Characteristics Influencing 
Attributions of Responsibility to Rape Victims: A Meta-Analysis, 1 Aggression & 
Violent Behav. 81, 91 (1996) (summarizing in a meta-analysis of various studies, 
that a rape victim in revealing clothing is held more responsible than a victim 
dressed otherwise and a less “respectable” rape victim is held more responsible 
than is a victim with “good” character).
159. See Kalven  & Zeisel, supra note 32, at 250 (reporting a judge’s 
explanation of acquittal: “[w]oman involved went to public dance and was picked 
up by defendant.  Then went to night club and permitted defendant to take her 
home over unfrequented road”).
160. See id. (reporting acquittals where victim and defendant were formally 
married and considered reconciliation, as well as where victim and defendant 
may have had sexual relations before, despite the “savage” character of rape).
161. See Hubert S. Feild & Leigh B. Bienen, Jurors and Rape: A Study in 
Psychology & Law 54 (1980).  See also Joyce E. Williams & Karen A. Holmes, The 
Second Assault: Rape and Public Attitudes 118 (1981) (conducting a cross-
cultural survey of attitudes toward rape, in which most respondents, including 
victims, named women’s behavior and/or appearance as the second (after the 
perpetrator’s mental illness) most frequent cause of rape).  A 1991 telephone 
survey of five hundred Americans found 38% of men and 37% of women believed 
that a woman is partly to blame for her own rape if she dresses seductively.  See 
Lynn Hecht Schafran, Writing and Reading About Rape: A Primer, 66 St. John’s 
L. Rev. 979, 995 n.58 (1993) (citing Telephone Survey of 500 Adult Americans by 
Yankelovich Partners, Inc., for Time/CNN (May 8, 1991)).
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justice that the community intuitively uses to assign 
liability and blame,”162 we may end up with a “mini-skirt” 
defense to the crime of rape.  As opposed to Robinson and 
Darley, I do not see a community’s beliefs as a self-
sufficient foundation for justice.  A rape victim is not, and 
should not be, responsible for rape even if the community 
believes otherwise.163  However, Robinson and Darley are 
perceptive in paying close attention to public views.  Both 
criminal law and community norms are parts of the same 
social discourse, and, unless criminal law addresses 
existing discrepancies, it would be perceived as divorced 
from real life, too abstract and irrelevant. 164
Moreover, as Robinson and Darley correctly point out, 
criminal law plays an important role in shaping the social 
consensus necessary for sustaining moral norms.165
Discussing the dialogue between the law and public 
opinion, Robinson and Darley wrote:
We have seen the process at work recently in enhancing 
prohibitory norms against sexual harassment, hate speech, 
drunk driving, and domestic violence.  It has also been at 
work in diluting existing norms against homosexual 
conduct, fornication, and adultery.  While it is difficult to 
untangle how much the criminal law reform followed and 
how much it led these shifts, it seems difficult to imagine 
that these changes could have occurred without the 
recognition and confirmation that comes through changes in 
criminal law legislation, enforcement, and adjudication.166
In contrast, by excluding an issue from the legal discourse, 
the law loses an opportunity to influence the social 
discourse.  If people’s everyday experience tells them that 
in some circumstances the victim is almost as guilty as the 
162. Robinson & Darley, The Utility of Desert, supra note 140, at 456.
163. See discussion infra notes 341-42 and the accompanying text.
164. Haney, supra note 8, at 351 (criticizing criminal law for ignoring “most of 
the racial, socioeconomic, and social psychological differentials that play such a 
crucial role in the etiology of crime in our society” and arguing that “this myopic 
focus probably also has been at the root of much injustice in the criminal 
system”).
165. Robinson & Darley, The Utility of Desert, supra note 140, at 473.  In a 
diverse society that role may be particularly important.  See id. at 457 (noting 
that “in a society as diverse as ours, the criminal law may be the only society-wide 
mechanism that transcends cultural and ethnic differences”).
166. Id. at 473-74.
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person on trial, and at the same time the law completely 
denies that, jurors have no guidance from the law.
When jurors blame the victim of rape, it is partly 
because the law does not offer them a way to distinguish 
her “fault” from that of the victim of a drag race.  As a 
result, jurors deliver unfair and inconsistent verdicts, and 
the law misses an opportunity to shape new social 
consensus on sexual misconduct and women’s rights.  In 
addition, the law loses its moral authority in general: it is 
not likely that people in borderline situations would turn 
for guidance to the system of rules that they perceive as 
unfair.  It is, therefore, crucial for maintaining the moral
authority and efficiency of criminal law to provide a 
meaningful theory of comparative fault, such that would 
directly address the community’s perceptions and 
judgments and offer a workable method for evaluating the 
liability of offenders and victims.
B. Consistency Argument
To take a simple example, if in every single state the 
defense of provocation reduces the perpetrator’s liability for 
killing an offending victim, why do most states have no 
similar defense for assault or battery?  Indeed, only a couple 
of states allow for a lesser form of assault to be charged 
when the victim provoked the attack or the defendant acted 
in the heat of passion,167 and only a few more states allow 
provocation to serve as a mitigating factor at sentencing 
once a defendant has been convicted of assault.168
Furthermore, the MPC provides that “simple assault is 
a misdemeanor unless committed in a fight or scuffle 
167. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2903.12 (Anderson 2001) (reducing a charge 
from felonious assault to aggravated assault in case of serious provocation by the 
victim); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 508.040 (Michie 1999) (allowing a reduction in charge 
when an assault is committed under extreme emotional disturbance); Mo. Rev. 
Stat. §565.060 (1999) (allowing a charge of second degree assault instead of first 
degree assault if the defendant acted under “sudden passion arising out of 
adequate cause”); Colo. Rev. Stat. 18-3-202(2)(a) (West 1999) (reducing first 
degree assault from a class three to a class five felony if committed in the heat of 
passion); Colo. Rev. Stat. 18-3-203(2)(a) (West 1999) (reducing second degree 
assault from a class four to a class six felony if committed in the heat of passion).
168. See Alaska Stat. § 12.55.155(d)(6) (Michie 2002); La. Code Crim. Proc. 
Ann. art. 894.1(24), (26) (West 1997); N.C. Gen. Stat. §15A-1340.16(e)(8) (2002); 
Tenn. Code Ann. §40-35-113(2) (2003); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §9.94A.535(1)(a) 
(West 2001).
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entered into by mutual consent, in which case it is a 
petty misdemeanor.”169  That language generally applies to 
an altercation, in which both parties were to some degree 
at fault and which did not result in serious injuries.170
However, very few states have followed the MPC.171  Some 
states, while adopting the general language of the 
provision, did not include the mitigation afforded by the 
MPC.172  Other states explicitly rejected mutual combat as 
a defense.173
Take one more example.  All states and the MPC 
criminalize intentional destruction of another person’s 
property.174 Section 3.10 of the MPC provides limited 
justification to “seizure or destruction of, damage to, 
intrusion on or interference with property of another,” 175 if 
these actions would be protected by a defense or privilege 
recognized in the law of torts or property.  Neither tort nor 
property law, however, recognizes the defense of 
169. Model Penal Code § 211.1(1) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980).
170. See, e.g., State v. Friedman, 996 P.2d 268, 272 (Haw. 2000) (confirming 
that a quarrel during which participants were pushing each other and slapping 
on each other constituted “mutual affray”).
171. Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. §707-712 (Michie 2003) (charging third degree 
assault as a misdemeanor, unless resulting from a fight or scuffle in which case it 
is a petty misdemeanor); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-310 (1989) (following the MPC); 
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 631:2-a (1996) (following the MPC); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:12-
1 (West 2003) (following the MPC); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2701 (1998) (following the 
MPC); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 1023 (following the MPC).
172. See Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-7 (1999) (closely following MPC § 211.1 but 
containing no provision for mutual combat); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-201 (2003) 
(same); S.D. Codified Laws § 22-18-1 (2001) (same).
173. See N.C. Gen Stat. § 14-33(a) (1983) (specifically punishes assault the 
same way regardless of whether the assault arose as a result of mutual combat or 
not); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-104 (2003) (specifically states that mutual combat is 
not a defense to assault).
174. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 16-7-21 (2003) (criminal trespass) & § 16-7-
23(a)(1) (criminal damage to property in the  second degree); Kan. Crim. Code 
Ann. § 21-3720 (West 1999) (criminal damage to property); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 14:56 (1997) (simple criminal damage to property); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-127 
(willful and wanton injury to real property) & § 14-160 (willful and wanton injury 
to personal property); W. Va. Code Ann. § 61-3-30 (Michie 2000) (injury to or 
destruction of property).  See also Model Penal Code § 220.3(1)(b) (Official Draft 
and Revised Comments 1980) (providing that a person is guilty of criminal 
mischief, if he purposely or recklessly tampers with tangible property of another 
so as to endanger person or property).
175. Model Penal Code § 3.10 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980). See 
also id. § 310, Explanatory Note (explaining that in this area the penal law must 
on the whole accept and build upon the privileges recognized in torts and 
property, except in rare situations where a penal law departure from the civil law 
position is made clear).
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provocation.  Thus, under the MPC, it may not serve as 
a partial defense for destructive or intrusive actions 
against property of another.
In a few limited circumstances, provocation has been 
successfully raised as a defense to the charge of malicious 
destruction of property.176  However, state penal codes carry 
no statutory provisions to that effect.  Instead, the 
applicability of the defense is based on how some courts 
have interpreted the requirement of malice.  In these 
decisions, most of which are quite old, courts have 
concluded that provocation defeats malice, thereby 
constituting a defense against malicious mischief or 
malicious destruction of property.177  Other courts have 
opined that malice “is a chameleonic term, taking on 
different meanings according to the context in which it is 
used.”178  These courts are more likely to believe that 
provocation may negate malice only in the context of 
homicide.179
In recent years, only one jurisdiction has explicitly 
allowed provocation as a defense to malicious destruction of 
property.180  In Brown v. United States, the District of 
Columbia appellate court reversed a conviction that 
stemmed from an incident in which the defendant smashed 
the front windows and door of her mother’s house in an 
176. See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 30 Ark. 433, 435 (1875) (malicious mischief not 
committed when the act was done under provocation); Mosley v. State, 28 Ga. 
190, 192 (1859) (injuries inflicted upon personal property in a passion, or under 
reasonable provocation, stand on different footing); State v. Martin, 53 S.E. 874, 
876 (N.C. 1906) (malicious mischief is not committed when such act is prompted 
or done under the influence of sudden aroused passion).  In each of these cases, 
provocation completely exonerated the defendant, a result quite different from its 
usual effect.
177. See cases cited supra note 176.
178. Richmond v. State, 623 A.2d 630, 633 (Md. App. 1993).
179. Id. at 634 (holding that “mitigation that will reduce one offense to another 
is a concept peculiar to criminal homicide cases”).
180. See Brown v. United States, 584 A.2d 537 (D.C. App. 1990).  For contrary 
treatment of the same issue, see, for example, Denny v. State, 486 S.E.2d 417, 
420 (Ga. App. 1997) (holding that “standard charges on provocation do not pertain 
to property offenses”); State v. Bourg, 615 So. 2d 957, 961 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 
1993) (holding that harassment of the defendant by the victim was not a defense 
to a charge of aggravated criminal damage to property).  The District of Columbia 
also authorizes the defense of provocation, in the unemployment compensation 
context, to employees’ misconduct resulting in their termination.  See Georgia-
Pacific Corp. v. Employment Div., 533 P.2d 829 (D.C. App. 1975); Williams v. 
District Unemployment Compensation Bd., 383 A.2d 345, 350 (D.C. 1978).
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effort to get inside and take custody of her runaway 
son.181  The appellate court concluded that the trial court 
erred in not allowing the defendant to introduce evidence of 
provocation:
We cannot say that an ordinary, reasonable person, after 
searching for her son for ten days only to learn that he was 
staying with her own mother and that her own mother had 
not only failed to inform her of her son’s whereabouts but 
also refused to return the boy to the custody of his own 
parent, could not have been so impassioned by these 
circumstances as to lose her self-control and, acting without 
reflection, destroy windows and a door in an attempt to get 
into her mother’s house and retrieve her lost son.182
According to the court, since malice was an element of the 
offense and provocation negates malice, provocation was a 
proper defense.183  Moreover, the court said in dicta that 
provocation should be available whenever an offense 
involves malice, e.g., in cases of malicious disfigurement and 
malicious interference with a contract.184  This approach, 
however, is atypical.  In most instances, the defense of 
provocation is allowed only in the prosecution for homicide.
That brings about a rather absurd result—criminal 
law grants a partial defense to a killer provoked by a 
victim.  Yet, if the justifiably outraged actor, instead of 
shooting, slapped the victim on her face (assault) or threw 
a valuable vase on the floor (destruction of property), in the 
majority of jurisdictions, there would be no similar 
mitigation.  How can it be reasonably explained that a 
more grave injury is partially justified by the offensive 
behavior of the victim, whereas a lesser injury is not?  As a 
matter of both logic and public policy, this is an 
unsatisfactory outcome.
C. Penalty Argument
Although the victim’s comparative fault is ignored at 
the liability stage of the trial, it comes back as a mitigating 
181. 584 A.2d at 544.
182. Id. at 543-44.
183. Id. at 539.
184. Id. at 539, n.2.  But see Richmond v. Maryland, 623 A.2d 630, 633-34 (Md. 
App. 1991) (rejecting provocation in a mayhem case).
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factor during the sentencing stage.  For instance, the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines provide that “[i]f the 
victim’s wrongful conduct contributed significantly to 
provoking the offense behavior, the court may reduce the 
sentence below the guideline range to reflect the nature 
and circumstances of the offense.”185  The Model Sentencing 
and Corrections Act lists among mitigating factors a 
situation when “the defendant acted under strong 
provocation.”186  The MPC gives the court a discretional 
authority to substitute probation for prison when “the 
victim of the defendant’s criminal conduct induced or 
facilitated its commission.”187  Presently, twenty-three 
states and the federal government recognize the victim’s 
participation in the crime or consent to the criminal 
conduct as a mitigating factor.188
The victim’s participation in, or consent to, a homicide 
is generally recognized as a mitigating factor for capital 
sentencing purposes.189  The MPC explains:
If a murder victim plays a role in bringing about his own 
death, either by participating in dangerous conduct (e.g., 
playing Russian roulette or joining in the commission of a 
violent felony), or by consenting to the homicidal act (e.g., in 
the context of a mercy killing), the judge or jury may wish to 
consider this conduct when sentencing the offender who is 
185. Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 18 U.S.C. § 5K2.10 (1999).
186. Model Sent. and Corr. Act § 3-108, 10 U.L.A. 396 (2001).
187. Model Penal Code § 7.01 (2)(e) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 
1980).
188. See Ala. Code § 13A-5-51(3) (1994); Cal. Penal Code § 190.3(e) (West 
1988); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141(6)9c) (West 1985); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 5/9-
1(c)(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993); Ind. Code Ann. § 35-50-2-9(c)(3) (Michie 1993); 
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 532.025(b)(3) (Michie 1990); Md. Code Ann. § 413(g)(2) 
(Supp. 1993); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101(6)(c) (Supp. 1993); Mo. Ann. Stat. 
§ 565.032(3)(3) (West Supp. 1993); Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-304(5) (1987); Neb. 
Rev. Stat. § 29-2523(2)(f) (1989); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 200.035(3) (Michie 1992); 
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 630:5 (1996); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:11-3 (West 2003); N.M. 
Stat. Ann. § 31-20A-6 (Michie 1978); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-2000(f)(3) (1983); Ohio 
Rev. Code Ann. § 2929.04 (Anderson 2001); 42 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 9711(e)(6) (West 
Supp. 1993); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(3) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993); Tenn. 
Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(3) (1991); Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(B)(iii) (Michie 
1990); Wash. Rev. Code §10.95.070 (2001); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-102(j)(iii) (Michie 
Supp. 1993); 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a)(7) (1999).
189. See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 210.6(4)(c) (Official Draft and Revised 
Comments 1980) (it is a mitigating factor when “[t]he victim was a participant in 
the defendant’s homicidal conduct or consented to the homicidal act”).
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legally responsible for causing the death.190
Twenty-four of the thirty-two death penalty 
jurisdictions listing statutory mitigating factors include the 
victim’s conduct as a relevant mitigating consideration 
under some circumstances.191  Eighteen states192 closely 
190. Id. at Commentaries, at 140-141.  Mitigating factors for capital sentencing 
purposes recognized under the MPC are:
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.
(b) The murder was committed while the defendant was under the 
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
(c) The victim was a participant in the defendant’s homicidal conduct or 
consented to the homicidal act.
(d) The murder was committed under circumstances which the defendant 
believed to provide a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct.
(e) The defendant was an accomplice in a murder committed by another 
person and his participation in the homicidal act was relatively minor.
(f) The defendant acted under duress or under the domination of another 
person.
(g) At the time of the murder, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate 
the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct 
to the requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease 
or defect or intoxication.
(h) The youth of the defendant at the time of the offense.
Id. § 210.6(4).  The same factors or their variations permeate most state death 
penalty statutes.  See James R. Acker & Charles Lanier, In Fairness and Mercy: 
Statutory Mitigation Factors in Capital Punishment Laws, 30 Crim. L. Bull. 299, 
313-33 (1994).  Other factors present in some state statutes are: (i) absence of 
intent to commit a murder; (ii) the offender’s lack of future dangerousness or 
likelihood of rehabilitation; (iii) cooperation with authorities; (iv) the fact that 
another defendant equally culpable in the crime will not be punished by death; 
and (v) the fact that the act of the defendant was not the sole proximate cause of 
the victim’s death.  Id. at 333-37.
191. Acker & Lanier, supra note 190, at 320 (listing thirty-one jurisdictions).  
By now, there are thirty-two such jurisdictions, including federal legislation.  See 
18 U.S.C.S. § 3592(a)(7) (1999); Ala. Code § 13A-5-51(3) (1994); Ariz. Rev. Stat. 
§ 13-703(G) (2001); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-605 (Michie 1997); Cal. Penal Code 
§ 190.3(e) (West 1999); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-1.3-1201(4) (West 1999); Conn. 
Gen. Stat. § 53a-46a(d) (2001); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141(6)(c) (West 2001); 720 Ill. 
Comp. Stat. 5/9-1(c)(3) (1993); Ind. Code Ann. § 35-50-2-9(c)(3) (West 1998); Ky. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 532.025(2)(b)(3) (Michie 1999); La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 
905.5 (West 1997); Md. Code Ann. § 2-303(h)(2)(ii) (2002); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-
19-101(6)(c) (West 1999); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.032(3)(3) (1999); Mont. Code Ann. 
§ 46-18-304(1)(e) (2003); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2523(2)(f) (2003); Nev. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 200.035(3) (Michie 2001); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 630:5(VI)(h) (1996); N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 2C:11-3(5)(b) (West 2003); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-20A-6(E) (Michie 
1978); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 400.27(9) (McKinney 1994); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-
2000(f)(3) (1983); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2929.04(B)(1) (Anderson 2001); Or. Rev. 
Stat. § 163.150(1)(c)(A) (1997); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(e)(6) (1998); S.C. Code 
Ann. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(3) (Law. Co-op. 2003); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(j)(3) 
(2003); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(4) (2003); Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(B)(iii) 
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follow the language of the MPC, which allows 
mitigation when “[t]he victim was a participant in the 
defendant’s homicidal conduct or consented to the 
homicidal act.”193  In three other jurisdictions, only the 
victim’s consent to, but not participation in, the defendant’s 
homicidal act qualifies as a statutory mitigating factor.194
Four more states consider whether “the victim was a 
willing participant in the defendant’s conduct,”195
“[w]hether the victim of the offense induced or facilitated 
it,”196 or list factors similar to the MPC’s.197
This discrepancy in how the role of the victim is 
evaluated at the liability stage and the sentencing stage of 
a trial is unwarranted.  Admittedly, these two stages serve 
different purposes.  The first one—the subject of penal 
codes and criminal trials—concerns the definition of 
(Michie 2003); Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.070(3) (2001); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-
102(j)(iii) (Michie 1993).
192. Acker & Lanier, supra note 190, at 320.  See also Ala. Code § 13A-5-51(3) 
(1982); Cal. Penal Code § 190.3(e) (West 1988); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141(6)(9)(c) 
(West 1985); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/9-1(c)(3) (West Supp. 1993); Ind. Code Ann. 
§ 35-50-2-9(c)(3) (Michie 1993); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §532.025(b)(3) (Michie 1990); 
Md. Code Ann. art. 27, § 413(g)(2) (Supp. 1993); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101(6)(c) 
(Supp. 1993); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 565.032(3)(3) (West Supp. 1993); Mont. Code Ann. 
§ 46-18-304(5) (1987) Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2523(2)(f) (1989); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
200.035(3) (Michie 1992); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-2000(f)(3) (1983) (specifically 
requiring the victim’s voluntary participation in the defendant’s homicidal 
conduct); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9711(e)(6) (West Supp. 1993); S.C. Code Ann. 
§ 16-3-20(C)(b)(3) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(3) 
(1991); Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(B)(iii) (Michie 1990); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-
1304(j)(3) (Michie 1991); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-102(j)(iii) (Michie Supp. 1993).  No 
reference is made to the victim’s conduct as a potential mitigating factor in the 
death penalty laws of Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Louisiana, 
Oregon, or Utah.  See Acker & Lanier, supra note 190, at 320-21.  However, both 
Colorado and Louisiana have statutory mitigating factors to the effect that the 
offender reasonably believed that there was a moral justification or extenuation 
for his conduct, and the homicide victim’s conduct may be relevant to such 
circumstances.  Id.
193. Model Penal Code § 210.6(4)(c) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 
1980).
194. See Acker & Lanier, supra note 194, at 320-21.  See also N.H. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 630:5(VI)(h) (Supp. 1993); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 10.95.070(3) (West 
Supp. 1993); 21 U.S.C.A. § 848(m)(9) (West Supp. 1993).
195. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-20A-6(E) (Michie 1990).
196. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2929.04(B)(1) (Anderson 1993).
197. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:11-3(c)(5)(b) (West Supp. 1993) (“The victim 
solicited, participated in or consented to the conduct which resulted in his 
death.”); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(8) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993) (including 
the MPC’s victim participation or consent provision and also a separate 
circumstance that considers whether “[t]he defendant was provoked by the victim 
into committing the murder”).
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culpable conduct and the adjudication of guilt.  The 
second one concerns the consequences of conviction for the 
offender.198  However, as has been correctly pointed out, “we 
are accustomed to thinking about the criminal law, and the 
procedures for enforcing it, as divided into two separate 
stages.  Only rarely do we acknowledge that the 
conventional separation of these stages into compartments 
is highly misleading.”199
There have been attempts to separate the functions 
performed at the two stages of a criminal trial.  For 
example, Paul H. Robinson has written in an insightful 
article about functions of criminal law:200
While the first step in the adjudication process, the liability 
function, requires a simple yes or no decision as to whether 
the minimum conditions for liability are satisfied, this 
second step, the grading function, requires judgments of 
degree.  It must consider such factors as the relative 
harmfulness of the violation and the level of culpability of 
the actor.201
I agree with Robinson that recognizing three separate 
functions of criminal law—rule articulation, liability 
assignment, and grading—is, indeed, “a useful way in 
which to analyze and organize criminal law doctrine.”202
My disagreement relates to an attempt to assign each 
function to a specific stage in a criminal adjudication 
process.  In my view, the grading function, the one 
requiring judgments of degree, goes through all stages of 
crime prevention, guilt adjudication, and penalty 
assignment.
For example, before a judge or jurors come to a simple 
yes or no decision in a case of involuntary homicide, they 
198. Gerald E. Lynch, The Sentencing Guidelines as a Not-So-Model Penal 
Code, 10 Fed. Sent. Rep. 25, *1 (1997).
199. Id.
200. See generally Paul H. Robinson, A Functional Analysis of Criminal Law, 
88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 857 (1994) (arguing that penal codes and courts often confuse 
three primary functions of criminal law: announcing ex ante the rules of conduct 
(the rule articulation function), determining ex post whether an actor’s violation 
is blameworthy and deserves condemnation as criminal (the liability assignment 
function), and deciding on the appropriate amount of punishment (the grading 
function).
201. Id. at 857.
202. Id.
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would have to consider the degree of the defendant’s 
fault.  The difference between regular recklessness and 
recklessness manifesting extreme indifference to the value 
of human life translates into the difference between 
manslaughter and murder.203  The magnitude of risk and 
the extent to which that risk was justifiable determines the 
choice between no liability, negligent homicide, and 
manslaughter.204  Therefore, a yes-or-no answer is a result 
of consideration of a number of questions involving “the 
relative harmfulness of the violation and the level of 
culpability of the actor,”205 which means that the grading 
function is continuously applied throughout the guilt 
adjudication stage.
This view finds support in one of the most important 
sections of the MPC, the one explaining its purposes.206
Those purposes are combined in two separate subsections—
one deals with the definition and grading of offenses (i.e., 
the adjudication of guilt), whereas the other addresses the 
sentencing and treatment of offenders (i.e., the penalty).  It 
is the former subsection that sets forth the goal to 
distinguish between serious and minor offenses.  An official 
comment explains that the provisions included in that 
subsection “not only serve to describe the conduct that the 
penal law makes criminal but also reflect a legislative 
grading of offenses, differentiating serious and minor 
derelictions and, within each class, offenses of greater or 
lesser gravity.”207  That strongly suggests that various 
fault- and harm-related considerations should be reviewed 
at the guilt adjudication stage and should affect not only 
the defendant’s punishment but also the offense or the 
grade of the offense of which she is convicted.
Should the same considerations be reviewed twice—at 
both stages of a criminal trial?  Robinson persuasively 
argues that considerations relevant at the guilt 
adjudication stage should be revisited at the penalty 
stage.208  For instance, excuse defenses serve the liability 
203. Model Penal Code §§ 210.2 & 210.3 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 
1980).
204. Id. §§ 210.3 & 210.4.
205. Robinson, supra note 200, at 857.
206. Model Penal Code § 1.02 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980).
207. Id. § 1.02 cmt. at 20.
208. See Robinson, supra note 200, at 907.
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function by assuring that criminal liability not be 
imposed unless the actor could have been reasonably 
expected to avoid the violation.209  If elements of a defense 
are present but, say, do not reach the required magnitude, 
the defense fails.  To give an example, a failed duress 
defense may mean that, while some coercion was present, it 
was not sufficient to render the actor completely blameless 
for the violation.  Does it follow, however, that the actor 
who fails to prove a duress defense is as blameworthy as 
one who commits the same offense with no coercion 
whatsoever?  While the degree of mitigation may not be 
dramatic, most people would likely distinguish the two 
cases.210
The fact that there are numerous factors significant to 
both stages of a criminal trial raises several questions: Why 
are some of the factors relevant to sentencing also included 
in the adjudication of guilt process while other ones are 
not?  Why does “extreme mental or emotional disturbance” 
or duress affect both the defendant’s verdict and her 
punishment whereas the defendant’s young age or good 
criminal record is reviewed only at her sentencing?211
Finally, how does the victim’s participation in the criminal 
act fit into this picture?
Addressing a capital trial, the Supreme Court has 
defined the issue for the penalty stage as the determination 
of the defendant’s “culpability,” “responsibility,” 
“blameworthiness,” or “desert.”212  Unfortunately, not only 
are these terms often used interchangeably but it is also far 
from clear what exactly they mean.213  If they are used in 
the same sense as at the liability stage, then it is 
inexplicable why any factors relevant to the defendant’s 
culpability, responsibility, blameworthiness, or desert are 
excluded from consideration at the liability stage.  If, on the 
other hand, these terms have different meanings when 
used in connection with a penalty, what are they?
In a very interesting article, Kyron Huigens shows 
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See Model Penal Code §§ 210.3(b), 2.09, 210.6(4) (Official Draft and 
Revised Comments 1980).
212. Kyron Huigens, Rethinking the Penalty Phase, 32 Ariz. St. L.J. 1195, 1195 
(2000).
213. Id.
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that the word “culpability” has been invoked in 
connection with the penalty phase of a capital trial in two 
different ways—as “fault in wrongdoing” and as “eligibility 
for punishment.”214  For example, a minor role of a 
defendant in the committed crime or the lack of intent to 
kill is a fault mitigator, whereas the offender’s young age is 
an eligibility mitigator.215
Fault mitigators differ from eligibility mitigators in 
several important respects.  One is that fault is not only a 
necessary condition for punishment, but is also an 
affirmative, justifying reason to punish.216  “Eligibility, in 
contrast, is only ‘a necessary condition for punishment.’  
We do not suppose that a person’s being possessed of 
ordinary capabilities is an affirmative, justifying reason to 
punish him.”217  Another important difference is that fault 
is an aspect of wrongdoing, and eligibility is not. Rules that 
govern eligibility for punishment are not correlated to 
criminal law’s conduct rules.218
If we look from that perspective at the victim’s conduct 
as a relevant mitigating consideration, it would be clear 
that it is a fault mitigator like “extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance” or duress, and not an eligibility 
mitigator like the defendant’s young age or good criminal 
record.  Not only may we, but we should punish an offender 
who killed an innocent, unoffending victim.  In the same 
way, not only may we, but we should acquit a defendant 
who killed an attacking victim in legitimate self-defense.  
The corresponding conduct rules prohibit killing of a non-
aggressor and permit necessary self-defense.
Then, if the victim’s conduct is a fault factor, why is it 
not considered at the stage at which all other fault is 
considered?  How can we satisfy the requirement of just 
desert if we ignore the magnitude of the offender’s fault 
when deciding whether she is guilty or innocent?  The only 
logical solution to this problem is to consider fault (as 
214. Id. at 1196.
215. See id. at 1228 (explaining that the defendant’s lack of “intent to kill and 
her minor role as an accomplice are mitigators which can be translated into 
converse forms, as offense elements or aggravating factors.  The matter of her age 
is a mitigator which does not have any such converse forms”).
216. Id. at 1251.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1252.
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opposed to eligibility) mitigators, including the conduct 
of the victim, at both stages of the criminal trial.
Pursuant to the advocated approach, all fault 
mitigators should be first assessed at the liability stage.  If, 
although present, they do not reach the threshold required 
to eliminate or reduce the liability of the offender, they 
may be considered again—at the penalty stage—in order to 
reduce the penalty.219  In fact, this approach is already 
followed in capital cases with respect to certain mitigators.  
For example, the “extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance” of the defendant is first considered at the guilt 
stage (as a factor reducing murder to manslaughter), and 
then, if the argument has not succeeded, again, just for the 
purposes of punishment.  For the correct determination of 
the actor’s responsibility, the conduct of the victim should 
be evaluated the same way, both in capital and appropriate 
non-capital cases.
One might ask: why does it matter at what stage of the 
trial a mitigator is considered as long as it reduces the 
defendant’s punishment?  There are several reasons why it 
matters.  First, conviction of a crime is by itself a form of 
punishment, a social stigma and an obstacle to a successful 
life.220  For that reason alone, a particular offense imputed 
to the defendant should reflect the amount of wrong done 
by her.  If the perpetrator deserves to be convicted of a 
lesser offense, it is unfair to convict her of a more serious 
crime, regardless of the imposed sentence.221
In addition, the disconnect between the amount of 
fault presupposed by a particular offense and the actual 
amount of the defendant’s fault may send a confusing 
message to the community and lead to inconsistent 
219. A more radical proposal would be to turn the menu of discrete offenses 
into a continuous percentage-based system of criminal responsibility.  Thus, say, 
instead of making a black-and-white determination of defendant’s criminal 
responsibility for a particular offense, the jury would be able to find him 62% 
guilty, and the punishment would be assigned accordingly.  This discussion, 
however, is far beyond the scope of this article.
220. See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 1.02 cmt. at 20 (Official Draft and Revised 
Comments 1980) (recognizing that, “in its effect on the offender’s status in society, 
the law delineating . . . distinctions [between serious and minor offenses] has an 
impact second only to that which establishes that proscribed conduct will be 
criminal”).
221. See, e.g., Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 697-98 (1975) (acknowledging 
that criminal law “is concerned not only with guilt or innocence in the abstract 
but also with the degree of criminal culpability”).
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verdicts.  It is well known, for instance, that jurors do 
consider the fault of the victim but, in the absence of a 
cohesive theory of comparative responsibility, they often 
have to choose between all-or-nothing options.  As a result, 
some offenders receive more severe verdicts than they 
deserve, while others, due to the jurors’ exercise of the 
power of nullification, walk away unpunished.222
Notably, jurors recognize the difference between 
reducing the defendant’s liability and reducing only her 
punishment.  For example, as Kalven and Zeisel have 
shown, in almost 30% of all criminal trials included in their 
study, the judge would have decided the issue of guilt 
differently than the jury.223  Yet at the penalty stage, the 
discrepancy between the judge’s and the jury’s decisions 
amounted only to 4%.224  Moreover, with respect to the 
determination of guilt and the proper charge, the jury 
would be six-and-a-half times more likely than the judge to 
show leniency; at the same time, there is very little 
disagreement between the judge’s and the jury’s penalty 
decisions.225  That proves that the general public assigns 
more importance to proper adjudication of one’s guilt than 
to the punishment alone.
Finally, although sentencing guidelines often 
authorize mitigation of the offender’s punishment due to 
the victim’s faulty conduct, in reality this factor may not be 
used much.  For instance, according to the Sourcebook of 
Federal Sentencing Statistics, in 2001, the victim’s conduct 
was cited as a reason for mitigation in only .2% of all 
federal cases in which the sentence to the defendant was 
reduced below the range set forth in the federal sentencing 
guidelines.226  This number seems somewhat low even 
222. See, e.g., Kalven & Zeisel, supra note 32, at 243 (reporting jurors’ acquittal 
of the defendant involved in a fatal drag race with the victim).  The judge 
explained his disagreement with the verdict: “Because the jury did not follow the 
charge of the court, they saw some evidence of contributory negligence on part of 
the person assaulted.  Contributory negligence is no defense in the laws of this 
state to criminal actions.”  Id.
223. Kalven & Zeisel, supra note 32, at 62 (study shows that, taken together, 
cases with disagreement on guilt (19.1%), hung juries (5.5%) and disagreement on 
charge (5.2%) equal 29.8% of all included cases).  It is worth noting that out of 
that 30%, the judge would be more lenient in only 4% of cases.  Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. (at the penalty stage, judge is more lenient than the jury in 1.5% of 
cases, whereas jurors are more lenient than the judge in 2.5% of cases).
226. United States Sentencing Commission, 2001 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing 
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considering that the majority of federal cases involve 
“victimless” crimes, and almost 75% of all downward 
departures from the guidelines happen in drug-trafficking 
and immigration cases. 227
For all these reasons—maintaining fairness, accuracy, 
and consistency of verdicts; respecting prevalent 
community expectations; and ensuring consistency between 
different stages of criminal adjudication—it is necessary to 
consider the victim’s conduct as a fault mitigator at the 
liability stage of the trial.
D. Torts Argument
The development of the theory of comparative fault in 
torts provides more support to the argument that the 
conduct of the victim is a relevant factor in the assessment 
of the perpetrator’s criminal liability.  Undoubtedly, 
criminal law and tort law differ in some significant 
respects—the former is public while the latter is private.  
The former punishes those who wrong society, in order to 
impose “just deserts” upon the wrongdoer and deter others 
from engaging in similar behavior.  The latter provides a 
remedy to individuals or entities harmed by other 
individuals or entities, in order to make them whole.228
Nevertheless, criminal law and torts share a lot.  First, 
they have a common origin—there was no distinction 
between torts and crimes in early English law.229  This 
common ancestry is reflected in many core concepts 
essential to both theories.  Requirements of harm,230
violation of a social norm,231 and causation232 are among 
Statistics, Table 25 (2001), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2001/tab2425.pdf.
227. See id. at Table 27, available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2001/table27.pdf.  
The departures included in this calculation do not include those granted for the 
substantial assistance to the prosecution.
228. Susan R. Klein, Redrawing the Criminal-Civil Boundary, 2 Buff. Crim. L. 
Rev. 679, 679-80 (1990).
229. See generally Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on the Role of Fault in the 
History of the Common Law of Torts, 31 La. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1970) (“Any distinction 
between crime and tort was unknown.”).
230. See Claire Finkelstein, New Perspectives And Legal Implications: Is Risk 
A Harm?, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 963, 965 (2003) (“While both tort and criminal law
recognize that there are harms that should not generate liability, harm appears
to be at least a necessary condition for liability in both areas.”).
231. See Betsy J. Grey, The New Federalism Jurisprudence and National Tort 
Reform, 59 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 475, 519 (2002) (“Although tort law thus moved 
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them.  Moreover, as far as punishment is concerned, the 
“line between criminal law and tort law is blurred by the 
imposition in tort actions of punitive damages, which 
address the moral culpability of the tortfeasor,”233 and by 
restitution statutes adopted in a substantial number of 
states.  Restitution statutes provide for monetary 
compensation by an offender to the victim of a crime234 and 
fundamentally rest on the tort principle that the wrongdoer 
should “restore” the victim to her status quo ante.235  There 
is a good reason, therefore, to consider some arguments 
related to the development of the concepts of perpetrator 
liability and victim’s fault in the law of torts.
The historical evolution of the concept of responsibility 
in torts was marked by a “progression away from the harsh 
and arbitrary common law rules of contributory negligence 
and joint and several liability toward the principle of 
comparative fault among all who contributed to the 
injury.”236  The rule of contributory negligence, for example, 
completely barred recovery to a plaintiff who was at fault, 
no matter how slightly compared to the defendant.237  The 
rule grew out of the common law doctrine of the unity of 
the cause of action, according to which an injury was a 
single event and could not be logically divided.238
away from the criminal law, it remains rooted in seeking to punish those who 
violate societal norms.”).
232. See Jerome Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 254-57 (2d ed. 1960) 
(discussing similarities and differences in how causation is understood in criminal 
law and tort law).
233. Beth Stephens, Conceptualizing Violence Under International Law: Do 
Tort Remedies Fit the Crime?, 60 Alb. L. Rev. 579, 582 (1997).  See also Smith v. 
Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 51 (1983) (noting that punitive damages are appropriate 
where defendant’s conduct is willful, wanton, or malicious, or demonstrates a 
reckless indifference to the rights of others or an evil motive).
234. Andrea G. Nadel, Annotation, Statutes Providing For Governmental 
Compensation For Victims Of Crime, 20 A.L.R. 4th 63 (2003) (“In an endeavor to 
assist in recovery from the damaging personal consequences of crime, a 
substantial number of states have adopted programs making provisions by 
statute for payment of compensation to victims of crimes or to their dependents.”).
235. Deborah M. Mostaghel, Wrong Place, Wrong Time, Unfair Treatment?  
Aid To Victims Of Terrorist Attacks, 40 Brandeis L.J. 83, 88 (2001).
236. Gregory C. Sisk, Comparative Fault And Common Sense, 30 Gonz. L. Rev. 
29, 30 (1994).
237. Id. at 31 (“If a plaintiff was at fault in part, she had to be treated as at 
fault in whole, and this contributory negligence barred recovery.”).
238. William L. Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 Cal. L. Rev. 413, 
418 (1936/37) (explaining that, pursuant to the concept of the unity of the cause of 
action, “the jury could not be permitted to apportion the damages, since there was 
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Prior to the 1970s, the overwhelming majority of 
states adhered to the rule of contributory negligence.  In 
the past thirty years, however, there has been a dramatic 
shift to comparative negligence, accomplished through 
judicial decisions and legislative enactments.  At present, 
forty-six states employ one form or another of comparative 
negligence which allows fault to be apportioned among all 
parties responsible for the injury or loss. 239
It is instructive to review some of the reasons cited in 
state supreme court opinions in favor of changing the rule.  
Numerous decisions criticize the contributory negligence 
doctrine as harsh,240 inequitable and unjust,241 opposed to 
interests of justice and fair play,242 and “draconian in 
operation.”243  One of the main arguments against the old 
rule is that its application produced an “all or nothing” 
result: the defendant was either liable for full damages or 
totally relieved of responsibility.244  Even though the 
harshness of the rule was mitigated by various 
exceptions,245 they still did not alleviate the general 
unfairness of the all-or-nothing approach.246 In the words 
of a commentator, “[t]he stark impression left by this ‘all or 
nothing’ process simply defied reality and, hence, offended 
one’s ordinary sense of justice.”247
but one wrong”).
239. Comparative Negligence Law and Practice. § 1-1[4] (Matthew Bender & 
Company, Inc. 2003), available at LEXIS (noting that contributory negligence 
remains to be the rule only in a small geographic cluster of jurisdictions: 
Alabama, the District of Columbia, Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia).
240. Goetzman v. Wichern, 327 N.W.2d 742, 746 (Iowa 1982); Scott v. Rizzo, 
634 P.2d 1234, 1241 (N.M. 1981).
241.  Wichern, 327 N.W.2d at 752; Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 
S.E.2d 879, 882 (W. Va. 1979).
242. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 
2d 431, 436 (Fla. 1973).
243. Bradley, 256 S.E.2d at 884.
244. Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037, 1047 (1975);  Wichern, 327 N.W.2d at 747;
Rizzo, 634 P.2d at 1241.
245. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 479-84 (1984) (excluding from 
the contributory fault rule (i) intentional or reckless injury; (ii) nuisance; (iii) 
strict liability offense; (iv) violation of a statute; and (v) situation when defendant 
had the last clear chance to avoid injury).
246. See David Sobelsohn, Comparing Fault, 60 Ind. L.J. 413, 413 (1985) 
(noting that the development of exceptions helped to alleviate the harshness of 
the contributory negligence rule but did nothing to ameliorate its unfairness to 
the parties in individual cases, since recovery was still had on all-or-nothing 
basis).
247. Comparative Negligence Law and Practice, supra note 239, at §1-1[5][b].
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In addition, a number of courts rejected the 
contributory negligence rule because jurors rebelled at 
applying it,248 thus violating their oaths to follow 
instructions249 and detracting from public confidence in the 
law.250  About a decade before the rapid spread and 
adoption of comparative negligence, one commentator 
observed that there is “something basically wrong with a 
rule of law that is so contrary to the settled convictions of 
the lay community that laymen will almost always refuse 
to enforce it, even when solemnly told to do so by a judge 
whose instructions they have sworn to follow.”251
All these arguments can be repeated almost verbatim 
with respect to the consideration of victims’ fault in 
criminal law.  Is it not unfair to assign all the responsibility 
for an injury to one party, the offender, and completely 
ignore the victim’s contribution?  Does not this practice 
simply defy the reality and, hence, offend one’s ordinary 
sense of justice?  Social scientists for years have voiced 
these concerns.  As one of them has pointed out, it is
[A]bsurd that, whenever a crime occurs, the entire blame is 
placed on the offender without taking a dynamic view of the 
crime from every angle, and without considering, among 
other things, any precipitative or causative behavior by the 
victim that may have eventually affected the development 
or concept of the crime.  Criminal responsibility has become 
one-directional.252
The argument that there may be a serious problem 
with a law that goes against community convictions is also 
applicable to the victim’s fault in criminal law, as an earlier 
discussion shows.253  Serving on a jury may be the only 
formal point of contact with the judicial system for many, if 
248. See, e.g., Alibrandi v. Helmsley, 314 N.Y.S.2d 95, 97 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970) 
(stating, “as every trial lawyer knows, the jury would likely have ignored its 
instructions on contributory negligence and applied a standard of comparative 
negligence”).
249. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 437 (Fla. 1973); Alvis v. Ribar, 421 
N.E.2d 886 (Ill. 1981); Wichern, 327 N.W.2d at 749.
250. Li, 532 P.2d at 1231.
251. Frank E. Maloney, From Contributory to Comparative Negligence: A 
Needed Law Reform, 11 Fla. L. Rev. 135, 151 (1958).
252. Schafer, supra note 5, at 20.
253. See discussion supra in section II.A.2(b)(ii).
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not most, of society’s members.254  From that 
perspective, a law that consistently causes jurors to apply 
their power of nullification is troubling.255
Recent developments in torts law raise new questions 
applicable to criminal law doctrine as well.  Adopted in 2000, 
the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability 
provides for apportionment of all personal injury claims 
“regardless of the basis for liability.”256  In other words, it 
allows for the apportionment of liability between negligent 
and intentional actors.  The new rule reflects a powerful new 
trend.  In the last decade, many state courts and legislatures 
addressed the issue of intentional/negligent comparative 
fault, including allocation of fault between a plaintiff and a 
defendant.257
The Restatement acknowledges that apportionment of 
liability between an intentional tortfeasor and a negligent 
victim presents special problems.258  In its final draft, the 
Restatement took no position on that issue, reserving it for 
the developing “substantive law.”259 One of the Reporters 
explained:
[W]e originally did think that plaintiff’s negligence should 
be a reduction to intentional torts.  There is a growing and 
emerging body of case law that supports that. . . .  and of the 
cases where courts have faced this issue over the last 10 
years or so, as courts have started to recognize this issue, 
they have more frequently than not recognized plaintiff’s 
negligence as a defense to an intentional tort.  Nevertheless, 
254. See Maloney, supra note 251, at 151.
255. Id. at 152 (“The disrespect for law engendered by putting our citizens in a 
position in which they feel it is necessary to deliberately violate the law is not 
something to be lightly brushed aside; and it comes ill from the mouths of 
lawyers, who as officers of the courts have sworn to uphold the law, to defend the 
present system by arguing that it works because jurors can be trusted to 
disregard that very law.”).
256. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability, § 1 (1999).
257. Ellen M. Bublick, The End Game of Tort Reform: Comparative 
Apportionment and Intentional Torts, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 355, 367 (2003) 
(“Courts in at least twenty-two states have recently faced questions about 
comparison of defendants’ intentional and negligent fault. State legislatures have 
faced similar questions. Moreover, a number of state courts have examined 
comparison of intentional and negligent fault between plaintiffs and defendants.”) 
(footnotes omitted).
258. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability, § 1 cmt. c at 7 
(1999).
259. Id. at 8.
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this is an emerging area.260
Traditionally, the harsh contributory fault rule did not 
apply to intentional torts.261  When courts and legislatures 
adopted the comparative responsibility instead of the 
contributory fault doctrine, they largely ignored intentional 
torts.262  Thus, the issue is still open, and courts263 and 
commentators264 provide arguments and propose solutions 
that may be helpful for deciding analogical questions in 
criminal law.
In the view of many courts and scholars, the main 
reason to use comparative fault in most types of intentional 
tort cases is simple: it is fair to do so.265  It is widely 
believed that “persons are responsible for their acts to the 
extent their fault contributes to an injurious result.”266
Accordingly, to the extent the injurious result is 
attributable to an act of another, the offender should not 
bear responsibility for it.  This logic is, to a large degree, 
applicable to both criminal and civil responsibility.
The Reporter’s Notes indicate that there are 
circumstances when the plaintiff’s conduct may be a 
260. The American Law Institute, 1999 Proceedings, 76th Meeting, at 34 (1999)
(remarks of Prof. Powers).
261. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability, § 1 cmt. c at 7 
(1999).
262. Id.
263. See, e.g., Comeau v. Lucas, 455 N.Y.S.2d 871, 873 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) 
(comparing disruptive behavior of plaintiff with intentional assault by defendant); 
Bonpua v. Fagan, 602 A.2d 287, 288-89 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) 
(comparing negligence of plaintiff in provoking fight with defendant’s intentional 
battery); Barth v. Coleman, 878 P.2d 319, 322-23 (N.M. 1994) (comparing 
negligence of plaintiff with negligence of defendant and intentional assault by 
other); Morris v. Yogi Bear’s Jellystone Park Camp Resort, 539 So. 2d 70, 77-78 
(La. Ct. App. 1989) (comparing intentional rapist with negligence of 13-year-old 
victim).  But see McLain v. Training and Dev. Corp., 572 A.2d 494, 496-97 (Me. 
1990) (refusing to compare defendant’s responsibility for assault and battery with 
contributory negligence of plaintiff); Kelzer v. Wachholz, 381 N.W.2d 852, 854 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (refusing to compare fault of plaintiff with intentional 
trespasser); Cartwright v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 914 P.2d 976, 996-98 
(Mont. 1996) (refusing to compare plaintiff’s negligence with defendant’s fraud).
264. See, e.g., Bublick, supra note 257; Gail D. Hollister, Using Comparative 
Fault to Replace the All-or-Nothing Lottery Imposed in Intentional Torts Suits in 
Which Both Plaintiff and Defendant Are at Fault, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 121 (1993); 
Sisk, supra note 236; Sobelsohn, supra note 246, at 442.
265. See Hollister, supra note 264, at 127.
266. Friedrich K. Juenger, Brief For Negligence Law Section of the State Bar of 
Michigan in Support of Comparative Negligence as Amicus Curiae, Parsons v. 
Construction Equipment Company, 18 Wayne L. Rev. 3, 50 (1972).
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comparative defense against an intentional tort—e.g., 
when the plaintiff’s, as well as the defendant’s, conduct was 
intentional or when the defendant honestly but 
unreasonably believed that her conduct was privileged.267
In order to distinguish cases in which the plaintiff’s failure 
to use reasonable care is relevant from those in which it 
should be ignored, the Restatement proposes that courts 
develop “substantive liability rules, often called ‘no duty’ 
rules, to cover certain types of plaintiff conduct, such as a 
claim that a victim of a sexual assault dressed 
provocatively, a claim involving domestic violence,”268 or a 
claim by a “mugger that the victim was negligent for being 
out too late at night or for wearing too much jewelry.”269
Under those rules, “a plaintiff who starts a fight in a bar 
should be treated differently from a plaintiff who walks
into a dangerous neighborhood and is assaulted.”270 The “no 
duty” rules offer a workable model for distinguishing 
relevant and irrelevant faulty conduct of the victim in 
criminal cases as well.  I discuss that further in section 
III.3(c) below.
Finally, the Restatement articulates criteria that may 
be considered for allocating responsibility among parties—
fault and causation.271  The fault factors in this comparison 
include the character and nature of each person’s risk-
creating conduct, the circumstances surrounding the 
conduct, each person’s abilities and disabilities, and each 
person’s intent, awareness of, or indifference to the risks.272
To summarize, tort law and criminal law are based on 
many similar principles.  In the past thirty years, tort law 
has experienced a significant change.  It has abandoned the 
artificial all-or-nothing approach to liability and adopted a 
theory of comparative fault that recognizes that more than 
267. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability, at §1, cmt. c, 
Reporter’s Notes at 13 (1999).
268. Id. at 14.
269. Id. at 13.
270. Id. § 3 cmt. d at 53.
271. Id. § 8.  Similar criteria are central in the Uniform Comparative Fault Act.  
See Uniform Comparative Fault Act, 12 U.L.A. 33, § 2(b) (1981 Supp.) (“In 
determining the percentages of fault, the trier of fact shall consider both the 
nature of the conduct of each party at fault and the extent of the causal relation 
between the conduct and the damages claimed.”).
272. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability, at §8 cmt. c at 
117 (1999).
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one person may be responsible for an injury or loss.  
Moreover, in recent years, courts and academics have 
confronted the issue of comparative responsibility between 
an intentional tortfeasor and a faulty victim, developing 
rules and criteria that allow situations in which the 
victim’s fault reduced the defendant’s liability to be 
distinguished from those in which it was irrelevant.  That 
last development is particularly important because 
intentional torts, with their focus not only on the 
compensation of harm but also on punishment and 
deterrence, are particularly close to criminal law.  Tort law, 
which in the past had been the target of many of the same 
criticisms as criminal law today, has reformed itself while 
criminal law continues to ignore the gap between its one-
dimensional doctrine of responsibility and the 
understanding of responsibility shared by social sciences, 
moral philosophy, and the community.  The comparative 
responsibility reform in torts provides both arguments and 
criteria for conducting a similar reform in criminal law.
***
In this part, I provided some general arguments why, 
under certain circumstances, viewed systematically, 
criminal law should reduce the offender’s liability due to 
the faulty conduct of the victim.  My main arguments 
included:
(a) The just desert argument.  Under the principle of 
just desert, individuals should be responsible only 
for the amount of harm they caused.  Accordingly, to 
the extent the victim is responsible for a portion of 
the harm, the offender’s liability should be reduced;
(b) The efficiency argument.  The law should be 
efficient.  I do not view that principle as the 
ultimate organizing consideration of criminal law 
and utilize it only to the extent that it does not 
contradict the just desert principle.  Accordingly, I 
do not rely on the economic efficiency line of 
reasoning.  On the other hand, I agree with 
arguments that, in order to be efficient, the law 
should (i) not overuse criminal sanctions, and (ii) 
develop in a dialogue with community perceptions of 
right and wrong.  In that sense, it is important to 
recognize that the community (acting through 
jurors) has already incorporated comparative fault 
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into criminal law.  To maintain a fair and lawful 
system of criminal justice, a theory of comparative 
fault must be worked out to guide people in their 
decision making;
(c) The consistency argument.  The law is a system in 
which various rules are interdependent.  To be 
consistent, the law must treat similar states of 
affairs in a similar fashion.  At this point, the law 
recognizes the victim’s fault as a mitigating 
circumstance in a number of specific situations, and, 
at the same time, refuses to recognize it as a general 
principle.  That leads to illogical, incoherent, and 
unfair decisions;
(d) The penalty argument.  The victim’s fault is a valid 
penalty mitigator in a number of circumstances.  
Since the victim’s fault is a “fault mitigator,” it 
should be allowed at the guilt adjudication stage, 
and not only at the penalty stage; and
(e) The torts argument.  Tort and criminal law 
doctrines have significant similarities.  Tort theory 
has recognized the principle of comparative 
responsibility and continues to broaden the scope of 
its application.  The comparative responsibility 
reform in torts supplies arguments and criteria for 
conducting a similar reform in criminal law.
These arguments make a general claim that the 
victim’s conduct may be a relevant consideration in 
determining the perpetrator’s criminal liability.  The next 
part suggests a method for distinguishing situations in 
which the victim’s conduct is, in fact, relevant from those in
which it should be legally irrelevant, i.e., proposes a basis 
for developing a theory of comparative responsibility in 
criminal law.
III.  TOWARD A UNIFYING THEORY OF COMPARATIVE 
LIABILITY
A. The Underlying Principle: Rights and Wrongs
It is recognized that the perpetrator’s liability depends 
not only on an act of wrongdoing committed with certain 
culpability but also on a violation of some kind of a legal 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
166
and moral norm.273  Most norms of criminal law are 
rights-based rather than duty-based.274  Namely, in non-
victimless crimes, part of what makes the perpetrator’s act 
offensive is a violation of a victim’s right275—the more 
serious the violation, the more serious the offense.
Conversely, a voluntary act (whether intentional, 
reckless, or negligent) that harms the victim but does not 
violate his rights, is usually not subject to criminal 
liability.  For example, I did not invite someone to my 
party.  That could happen by mistake, even an 
unreasonable, negligent mistake, or on purpose.  The 
uninvited person may be harmed—her reputation and 
social status may suffer, she may lose certain career 
opportunities presented at the party, or she may endure a 
monetary loss due to the purchases and other expenditures 
made in the anticipation of the party.  Despite all of those 
harms, tangible and intangible, subjective and objective, I 
am clearly not liable for them, because I have not violated 
any legal right of that person.
Now let’s revisit the theories of consent, self-defense 
and provocation.  What is common to all of them?  In all 
three theories, the victim did something that abridged his 
right not to be harmed and, therefore, completely or 
partially justified the actor by eliminating or reducing his 
responsibility for the harm.  That suggests a unitary 
explanation to the three theories, an explanation that takes 
into account actions of both the perpetrator and the victim.  
Moreover, that suggests a general principle of criminal law 
that needs to be recognized across the board, not just 
sporadically, in connection with a few historically defined 
defenses.  The essence of that principle is that the criminal 
liability of the perpetrator should be reduced to the extent 
the victim, by his own acts, has diminished his right not to 
be harmed by the perpetrator.  The following discussion 
illustrates what happens to the victim’s rights in situations 
of consent, self-defense, and provocation.
273. Victims and Retribution, supra note 7, at 70.
274. Id. at 71-72 (“An example of a duty-based norm is the duty not to be cruel 
to animals; an example of a rights-based norm is that protecting the right of a 
person to her own bodily integrity on which is based the duty of everybody else 
not to violate that integrity.”).
275. See id. at 69 (explaining that a criminal wrongdoing involves a violation of 
a norm, and “[v]ictims come in as part of the content of those norms”).
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B. Victims’ Rights in Situations of Consent, Self-
Defense and Provocation
1. Consent
Consent presents the most straightforward scenario.  
The victim voluntarily waives his right to a certain freedom 
that he otherwise would enjoy.  For example, one may not 
limit my freedom of movement by locking me up in his 
apartment, unless I agree to that.  By agreeing, I waive, for 
a certain period of time, my right to move freely.  In 
addition, whether I realize that or not, I assume the risk 
that I may not like being all alone in an empty apartment, 
that I may suddenly remember important business I have 
to attend to, or even that I may have a hard time getting 
out in a case of a fire.
In other words, I may be objectively hurt by my 
consent and I may subjectively regret it.  Nevertheless, my 
rights have not been violated; therefore, the person who 
locked me in is guilty of no wrongdoing.  As the famous 
maxim goes, “a person is not wronged by that to which he 
consents.”276  If a rational adult individual has a legally 
recognized right and is the only one to be directly harmed 
by waiving it, the liberal tradition, with its emphasis on 
free will and personal autonomy, demands that his consent 
(and the corresponding right to make a bad choice) be 
respected by society, and the actor who causes that 
individual consensual harm be completely justified.277  In 
fact, with a few exceptions that have been discussed 
earlier, that is the current law.278
276. Volenti non fit injuria.  See Terence Ingman, A History of the Defense of
Volenti Non Fit Injuria, 26 Jurid. Rev. 1, 8-9 (1981).
277. See, e.g., id. at 172.
When B requests that A do something for (or to) him that is directly 
harmful or dangerous to B’s interests, or when the idea originates with A 
and he solicits and receives B’s permission to do that thing, then (in either 
case) B can be said to have consented to A’s action.  If nevertheless the 
criminal law prohibits A from acting in such cases, it invades B’s liberty (by 
preventing him from getting what he wanted from A) or his autonomy (by 
depriving his voluntary consent of its effect).
278. See discussion supra in section I.B.1.
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2. Self-Defense
In the case of self-defense, the victim-aggressor does 
something similar to what the consenting victim does.  By 
attacking an unoffending person, the victim-aggressor gives 
up his right to bodily integrity, and possibly even his right 
to life.279  Most philosophical explanations of self-defense 
implicitly or explicitly draw on the idea of the aggressor’s 
forfeiture of rights280—”at the moment a homicidal 
aggressor puts another life in jeopardy, his own life is 
forfeit to his threatened victim.”281  Without a foundation of 
this kind, it is difficult to explain why the defendant is 
justified in killing a deadly aggressor, i.e., why the life of 
one person is preferable to the life of another.
The concept of forfeiture has an intuitive appeal when 
we think of a paradigmatic case of a culpable aggressor 
attacking an innocent victim.  That appeal slightly fades, 
however, when we apply the same theory to an innocent 
aggressor.  Aggressors may be innocent because of a valid 
legal defense—excuse (e.g., duress, insanity, or minority)282
or justification (e.g., self-defense).283  Moreover, innocent 
279. See, e.g., Dressler, supra note 70, § 18.04[B][1], at 234 (citing a typical 
non-utilitarian consideration that “a defensive killing is justifiable because the 
aggressor, by his culpable act of threatening an innocent person’s life, forfeits his 
right to life”).
280. See, e.g., Uniacke, supra note 80, at 194 (“Something akin to a theory of 
forfeiture of rights is necessary to the justification of homicide in self-defense: it is 
necessary to the justification of self-preferential killing”); Nancy Davis, Abortion
and Self-Defense, 13 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 175, 202 (1984) (stating that unjust 
aggressors “have in some sense done something that has weakened, forfeited or 
undermined their prior claims to moral parity” with persons they attack).
281. Voluntary Euthanasia, supra note 52, at 111.
282. See, e.g., Fletcher, Proportionality and the Psychotic Aggressor: A 
Vignette in Comparative Criminal Theory, supra note 66, at 371 (showing that 
the right of self-defense may be used against innocent as well as to culpable 
aggressors).  Fletcher’s well-known hypothetical goes as follows:
Imagine that your companion in an elevator goes berserk and attacks you 
with a knife.  There is no escape: the only way to avoid serious bodily harm 
or even death is to kill him.  The assailant acts purposively in the sense 
that he means further his aggressive end.  He does act in a frenzy or in a 
fit, yet it is clear that his conduct is non-responsible.  If he were brought to 
trial for his attack, he would have a valid defense of insanity.
Id.
283. In the majority of states, mistaken self-defense is a justification.  But see 
Robinson, supra note 72, at 239-40 (arguing that mistaken self-defense should be 
treated as an excuse rather than a justification); Unified Excuse, supra note 68, 
at 1483-84 (supporting Robinson’s argument).
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aggressors may have committed no criminal act at all.
Consider the case of Mrs. Cogdon who, in a 
somnambulistic state, killed her daughter Pat with an axe.284
Mrs. Cogdon was charged with murder but acquitted 
because “the act of killing was not, in law, regarded as her 
act at all.”285  Now, what if before the first fatal blow fell, Pat 
woke up and tried to defend herself—would she be justified 
if, after all other attempts failed, she shot her mother to 
death?  The answer is yes.  But how can we say that Mrs. 
Cogdon, who reportedly adored her daughter, has forfeited 
her right to life without even waking up?
One way out of this conundrum is to regard the 
hypothetical killing of Mrs. Cogdon not as justifiable but 
rather as excusable homicide, i.e., to claim not that Pat was 
right in killing her mother but that Pat was wrong, yet we 
understand her predicament and forgive her.  This position 
has been cleverly advocated by Laurence A. Alexander:
We can sympathize with and excuse a person who uses 
deadly force to fend off innocent aggressors, but we cannot 
say that it is right for him to do so.  Attack by innocent 
aggressors is better characterized as a case of duress that 
excuses homicide, not a case of Wrong that justifies it.286
At the first glance, Alexander’s suggestion seems 
attractive.  It allows setting apart killings of villainous and 
innocent aggressors.  However, it also leads to two major 
conceptual problems.  The first one deals with innocent 
bystanders, the second one with the defense of another.
If we are willing to excuse the intentional killing of an 
innocent aggressor, that has to be because we focus entirely 
on the emotional upheaval of the attacked.  But, from that 
perspective, there is no difference between an innocent 
aggressor and an innocent bystander.  By that logic, we 
have to excuse intentional killing of an innocent bystander 
too.  In fact, we have to excuse intentional killing of any 
number of innocent bystanders, if such sacrifice appears to 
the perpetrator necessary for his personal survival.  It is 
284. Norval Morris, Somnambulistic Homicide: Ghosts, Spiders, and North 
Koreans, 5 Res Judicatae 29, 29-30 (1951).
285. Id.
286. Laurence A. Alexander, Justification and Innocent Aggressors, 33 Wayne 
L. Rev. 1177, 1187 (1987).
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unlikely that many of us would find this solution 
morally acceptable.
The other problem is the following: one of the 
differences between justification and excuse is that excuse 
is always personal, whereas justification means an 
objectively better choice.287  Therefore, a person may not 
benefit from someone else’s excuse but may benefit from 
someone else’s justification.288  The defense of another 
extends to a third party the justification of self-defense 
available to the attacked person.  If we view Pat’s defensive 
killing of her mother as merely excusable, that would mean 
that no one else would be able to save Pat’s life by killing 
Mrs. Cogdon.  That outcome does not seem right.
Moreover, as a general matter, the excusatory 
interpretation of self-defense destroys the basis for the 
defense of another.  Traditionally, a third party defender is 
said to “stand in the shoes” of the person in danger.289  If 
the attacked person were merely excused in his self-
defense, the third party would be entitled neither to that 
excuse (excuse is always personal) nor to the justification 
based on the extension of self-defense (why should he, if the 
victim of the attack is not?).  One way to authorize a third 
party’s intervention would be by granting him a personal 
excuse too.  Then the law would consider the defender’s 
actions wrong but would excuse his violent reaction to the 
witnessed attack.  A major problem with this proposition is 
that it makes it absolutely irrelevant on whose side the 
third party intervenes, the attacker or the attacked.  The 
defense of another thus loses any sense.
Alexander deals with this dead-end outcome by 
suggesting that “third parties may intervene only pursuant 
to a lesser evils calculus”290; thus, according to Alexander, 
287. Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, in 
Justification and Excuse in the Criminal Law 341, 360 (Michael Louis Corrado 
ed., 1994) (explaining that excuses are individual and justifications are general, 
i.e., “an excuse does not reach others who perform similar acts, but a valid 
justification would apply to anyone else in similar conditions”).
288. See Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law, supra note 66, § 10.5, at 868-69 
(“Thinking of necessary defense as an excuse limits the options of third parties to 
intervene; thinking of the defense as a variation of lesser evils should generate a 
universal right to intervene and further the greater good.”).
289.  See LaFave & Scott, supra note 65, at §5.8(b) (discussing traditional view 
of “alter ego” rule which treats right to defend another as coextensive with the 
other’s right to defend himself).
290. Alexander, supra note 286, at 1187-88.
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when an innocent victim is outnumbered by innocent 
aggressors, a third party may intervene only on the side of 
the aggressors.291  For example, if two people attack me 
because they mistakenly but reasonably believe that I am 
about to attack them, they are innocent aggressors.  I may 
use any necessary force to defend myself.  However, if a 
bystander, who has been watching the entire incident and 
knows that the two aggressors are wrong, decides to 
intervene, he would be able to do so only on the side of the 
aggressors.  Could that be right?  If I am attacked by a 
group of violent maniacs who clearly qualify for the defense 
of insanity, a Good Samaritan may only help them to finish 
me?  I agree with Alexander that “[t]his conclusion will 
leave some readers very unhappy.”292
This analysis brings us back to the starting point—
self-defense (other than mistaken self-defense)293 requires 
some kind of a justificatory, and not merely excusatory, 
rationale that explains how, by becoming an aggressor, a 
person reduces his claim to life.  A recent work by Suzanne 
Uniacke supplies this missing link.  Her persuasive theory 
of self-defense is somewhat alternative to the classic 
understanding of forfeiture.294  Under her theory, a person 
does not lose his rights by becoming an aggressor.  Instead, 
individual rights are limited from the outset: “[o]ur 
possession of the right to life is conditional, the condition 
relevant to the justification of self-defense being that we 
not be an unjust immediate threat to another person.”295
Uniacke’s theory is very relevant to the position 
advocated in this paper—that the wrongfulness of the 
perpetrator’s acts may be understood only in the context of 
the perpetrator-victim relationship.  Indeed, what lies in the 
foundation of self-defense is a balancing theory of rights, 
which presumes that originally everyone has equal rights not 
291. Id. at 1188 (concluding that, when two innocent aggressors attack one 
innocent victim, third parties may intervene only on the side of the aggressors, 
“at least if, assumedly, a proper balancing of short and long-term interests would 
declare their two lives more important than the victim’s one life sufficiently often 
to warrant an instrumental rule to that effect”).
292. Id.
293. See discussion supra note 72 and the accompanying text.
294. Uniacke, supra note 80, at 194-231 (explaining that the use of force in self-
defense is justified because the victim’s right to life is conditional on not being an 
unjust immediate threat to another person’s life or proportionate interest).
295. Id. at 197.
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to be attacked, harmed or killed by others, and that the 
scope of an individual’s rights is directly related to how he 
treats similar rights of others.296  Killing an aggressor 
(including an innocent aggressor) is, therefore, permissible 
because his attack on the right to life of an unoffending 
person triggers the condition which reduces his own right to 
life.
3. Provocation
In provocation, we see the continuation of the same 
theme.  A perpetrator reacts, or rather overreacts, to an 
offensive attack on his rights by killing the offender.  The 
violated right of the perpetrator, however, is less 
significant than the right to life—it is either the right to 
physical integrity and liberty or the right to be free from 
certain emotional distress.  Traditionally, the “paradigms 
of misbehavior”297 that warranted the reduction of the 
perpetrator’s liability were: (1) an aggravated assault or 
battery; (2) mutual combat; (3) commission of a serious 
crime (chiefly violent or sexual assault) against a close 
relative of the defendant; (4) illegal arrest; and (5) 
observation of one’s spouse’s adultery.298  Because the 
violated right of the perpetrator is not as essential as the 
right he violates, the perpetrator is not completely 
exonerated of his offense.  Instead, his liability is reduced 
from murder to manslaughter.
In his analysis of provocation, Dressler finds the 
proposition that a provoking victim “forfeits his right to life 
(or, incoherently, forfeits part of his life), or that a private 
aggrieved individual may unilaterally determine that 
another human being ‘sort of’ deserves death or that his life 
does not count as much as another’s—morally 
objectionable.”299  Let’s take Dressler’s concerns one by one.
True, the traditional theory of forfeiture may not work 
296. See Judith Jarvis Thomson, Self-Defense, 20 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 283, 302 
(1991) (suggesting that what makes it permissible to kill deadly attackers “is the 
fact that they will otherwise violate your rights that they not kill you, and 
therefore lack rights that you not kill them”).
297. Brown v. United States, 584 A.2d 537, 540 (D.C. Ct. App. 1990).
298. Model Penal Code § 210.3 cmt. 5(a) at 57-58 (Official Draft and Revised 
Comments 1980).
299. Why Keep the Provocation Defense?, supra note 88, at 969.
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in all circumstances; just as it does not work in all cases 
of self-defense.  One type of case that does not fit into the 
traditional paradigm is mistaken provocation, in which the 
defendant strikes someone who has not violated any of his 
rights.  That could happen due to the defendant’s 
misinterpretation of either the victim’s acts or his own 
rights.  Just like cases of mistaken self-defense, these cases 
should be viewed only through the prism of the excusatory 
rationale; i.e., if the defendant’s fault is mitigated, that 
happens for reasons other than the conduct of the victim.
As for the more conventional cases of provocation, such 
as aggravated assault or battery, some version of forfeiture 
of rights, or assumption of risk, or conditional rights300
seems much more acceptable.  Of course, normally, the 
rights the offender risks or forfeits should be on a 
comparable scale with the rights he attacks.  Only to that 
extent is the defendant justified in his responsive strike.  
This is why provocation is merely a partial defense.  And, 
like any partial justification, it does not make the 
defendant’s offense right, it only reduces its wrongfulness 
relative to what it would have been had the victim not lost 
some of his rights by violating the rights of the defendant.  
As Andrew J. Ashworth has observed, “[t]he claim implicit 
in partial justification is that an individual is to some 
extent morally justified in making a punitive return 
against someone who intentionally causes him serious 
offense.”301
300. Uniacke herself would not agree with that because she does not believe in 
partial justification and regards provocation as an excuse only.  See Uniacke, 
supra note 80, at 13 (concluding that provocation is an excuse and not 
justification).
301. Andrew J. Ashworth, The Doctrine of Provocation, 35 Cambridge L.J. 292, 
307 (1976).  I would not limit provocation to an intentional offense, however.  An 
actor may be provoked by an assault caused recklessly or negligently, e.g., when 
the victim injured the defendant or killed a close relative of the defendant in an 
accident caused by the victim’s reckless or negligent driving.  Moreover, even if 
the victim were justified in his risky driving (e.g., because he was taking a very 
sick person to a hospital), the rationale for the provocation defense would still 
apply.  The defendant who, due to the victim’s careless driving, suffered an injury 
or witnessed the death of a close relative and in response hit the victim, causing 
the victim’s death, would still be entitled to the defense of provocation.  See, e.g., 
New Jersey v. Madden, 294 A.2d 609, 622 (N.J. 1972) (stating in dicta that in the 
event a close relative of the victim of a battery witnessed the beating, they would 
have a plausible defense of provocation); Pennsylvania v. Jenkins, 26 Phila. 177, 
185 (1993) (stating that viewing harm being inflicted on a crippled parent would 
be sufficient to provoke a reasonable person).
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Dressler’s second concern is that, by viewing 
provocation through the theory of comparative rights, we 
are giving individuals the license to kill.  I wonder whether, 
in making this claim, Dressler does not overlook the 
difference between a backward-looking defense and a 
forward-looking authorization of an otherwise prohibited 
act.  That difference was highlighted in Public Committee 
Against Torture v. State of Israel.302  The Supreme Court of 
Israel rejected the proposition that, in exceptional 
situations, the General Security Service (GSS) may use 
physical means in an interrogation of suspected 
terrorists.303  At the same time, the court did not foreclose 
the possibility that, if criminal charges are brought against 
GSS interrogators, they may be able to claim the defense of 
necessity.304  The court thus drew the line between 
“potential liability of GSS investigators”305 and inferring 
“the authority to, in advance, establish permanent 
directives setting out the physical interrogation means that 
may be used under conditions of ‘necessity.’”306
Similarly, there is a meaningful difference between 
authorizing an individual to “unilaterally determine that 
another human being “‘sort of’ deserves death” and 
objectively and retroactively considering the degree to 
which the defendant’s actions were justified.
C. How Can Victims’ Conduct Mitigate Perpetrators’ 
Liability?
1.  Principle of Conditionality of Rights
The analysis of the consent, self-defense, and 
provocation theories demonstrates a common principle 
underlying all three defenses and perhaps criminal law in 
general—the principle of conditionality of our rights.  By 
that principle, a person may lose some rights due to his 
own actions.  If that happens, the perpetrator may not be 
guilty of violating the rights that have been lost.
302. H.C. 5100/94 (Sept 6, 1999), available at http://www.derechos.org/human-
rights/mena/doc/torture.html.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
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The right not to be harmed is a fundamental 
human right and, as such, may very rarely, if ever, be lost 
completely; it, however, may be reduced.  By that, I do not 
mean that the right not to be harmed may suddenly drop 
from 100% to 70%.  Instead, I view the right not to be 
harmed as bunch of stick-like rights—not to be killed, not 
to be injured, not to be deprived of liberty, property etc.  A 
person’s actions may trigger the loss of some of those 
specific rights and, in this sense, reduce the overall right 
not to be harmed.
Accordingly, a person who, with the owner’s consent, 
destroyed a valuable piece of property, has violated no 
rights of the owner and is usually guilty of no offense.307
And a person who, while acting in self-defense, applied 
more force than reasonably necessary, is responsible only 
for that “extra” force because the attacker has lost his right 
not to be attacked at all, but retained a right not to be 
attacked with a disproportionate amount of force.308
This conclusion, naturally, leads to an important 
question: how can victims lose their rights to life, liberty, or 
property?  Do car owners lose their right not to have their 
cars stolen by leaving keys in the ignition?  Do women lose 
their right not to be raped by wearing mini-skirts?
Some scholars believe that victims are to blame for any 
misfortune that happens to them.  For instance, a 
criminologist Heinrich Applebaum has argued that unless 
the police start cracking down on the victims of criminal 
acts, the crime rate in this county will continue to rise.309
In his view, the people who are responsible for crime are 
the victims: “They walk down a street after dark, or they 
display jewelry in their store window, or they have their 
cash registers right out where everyone can see them.  
They seem to think that they can do this in the United 
307. Except in a situation in which the law views a right as inalienable, and, 
therefore, does not recognize an individual’s right to consent.  See, e.g., Fletcher, 
supra note 287, at 370-71 (discussing conflict between personal autonomy and 
competing social interests).
308. See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 3.09(2) (Official Draft and Revised 
Comments 1980) (providing that a defendant who was negligent or reckless in 
using force may not use self-defense and similar defenses under Article 3 in 
prosecution for negligence or recklessness).
309. See Karmen, supra note 13, at 135 (citing an interview with Prof. 
Applebaum originally published in the Washington Post, Feb. 4, 1969).
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States and get away with it.”310  Therefore, Applebaum’s 
solution to the problem was to hold victims responsible:
I say throw the book at anybody who’s been robbed.  They 
knew what they were getting into when they decided to be 
robbed, and they should pay the penalty for it.  Once a 
person has been a victim of crime and realizes he can’t get 
away with it, the chances of his becoming a victim again 
will be slim.311
Comparable views have been expressed by legal 
practitioners and academics alike.  For example, Mike 
Tyson’s lawyer, in a typical assumption of risk argument, 
contended that, because Tyson’s propensity for violence 
was a common knowledge, “to date him was to consent to 
sex.”312  Alon Harel, on the other hand, explained his 
position by considerations of economic efficiency and 
argued that “protection of careless victims is a particularly 
costly enterprise and consequently we may have to sacrifice 
some of the protection granted to careless victims.”313  To 
the extent that conclusion felt uncomfortable, Harel 
advised “not to think primarily of the controversial rape 
cases,”314 to focus instead on numerous morally acceptable 
situations, and expand the principle in accordance with our 
moral beliefs.315
Not thinking about an uncomfortable issue is not an 
option, however, if we are to build the principle of 
comparative liability into the structure of criminal law.  
Moreover, Harel’s suggestion to expand the comparative 
liability principle “in accordance with our moral beliefs” 
does not provide any guidance as to what exactly should be 
done.  In a diverse society like ours, moral beliefs differ 
considerably, and their formation is often affected by 
developments in criminal law.316
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Tyson Takes the Count, Nation, Mar. 2, 1992, at 253.
313. Harel, supra note 137, at 1228.
314. Id. at 1229.
315. Id.
316. See, e.g., Robinson & Darley, The Utility of Desert, supra note 140, at 473-
74 (arguing that the criminal law’s role as a “contributing mechanism by which 
the norm-nurturing process moves forward” is particularly important in a 
multicultural society which does not have a “a stable pre-existing consensus on 
the contours of condemnable conduct”).
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In contrast, the conditionality of rights principle 
provides both the methodology and specific answers to the 
question of how the victim’s conduct may reduce the 
perpetrator’s criminal liability.  Pursuant to that principle, 
there are two relevant inquiries: (i) what rights did the 
parties possess prior to the criminal encounter? and (ii) has 
the victim reduced his rights, voluntarily or involuntarily?
The first question includes legal as well as factual 
considerations.  The answer to it depends on whether the 
law recognizes that a particular individual is entitled to a 
particular right under particular circumstances.  This issue 
has been already discussed in connection with the victim’s 
ability to give valid consent.317  Among other things, it has 
been noted that the law may deny certain rights either 
completely (e.g., the right to enter into incestuous 
relations) or to some groups of citizens (e.g., the right of 
minors to sexual intercourse).  Naturally, if the victim does 
not possess the relevant right (or the right is deemed 
inalienable), he may not reduce it either.  In that case, the 
victim’s conduct should not affect the perpetrator’s liability.  
However, laws that deny people liberty or property rights 
are rather rare.  The following discussion relates to the 
second inquiry, namely, to the victim’s reduction of legally 
recognized rights.
2. Voluntary Reduction of Rights
Provided the victim had relevant alienable rights, he 
may reduce or waive them by consent.318  To be valid, 
consent has to be freely given and rational.319  To the extent 
the voluntary and rational nature of consent can be 
ensured, there is a strong argument for not punishing a 
317. See supra discussion in section I.B.1.
318. See, e.g., Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Realm of Rights 348-53 (1990) 
[herinafter Realm of Rights] (discussing various forms of consent, e.g., those 
providing the consent-receiver with claims, privileges or discretion).  See also 
Harm to Self, supra note 46, at 172-343 (discussing types of effective and 
defective consent).
319. See, e.g., Voluntary Euthanasia, supra note 52, at 122-23 (stating that an 
individual’s choice has to be “fully informed, well considered, and . . . fully 
voluntary”) (emphasis omitted).  See also Harm to Self, supra note 46, at 172-88 
(discussing various forms of consent, such as inferred consent, dispositional 
consent, prior consent, subsequent consent, tacit consent, and hypothetical 
rational consent).
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person who caused harm pursuant to the valid consent 
of the victim. 320  Such arguments have often been made in 
connection with assisted suicide.321
Assumption of risk is a form of consent.322  Specifically, 
it constitutes express or implied consent to undertake a 
certain risk of harm.323  Implied consent is given by, or may 
be imputed to, the victim when he undertakes a substantial 
risk of harm—whether recklessly, negligently, or even non-
culpably (e.g., in a situation when the dangerous conduct 
may be justified or excused by the circumstances).324  The 
less conscious the victim’s decision to engage in a 
dangerous activity is, the more appropriate it may be to 
treat his behavior as an involuntary, rather than a 
voluntary, reduction of rights.
The requirements for the valid assumption of risk are 
essentially the same as for consent in general.  Under the 
tort law, in order to be effective, consent must be given for 
the particular, or substantially the same, conduct of the 
320. Fletcher, supra note 287, at 770.
321. See, e.g., Voluntary Euthanasia, supra note 52, at 122-23 (pointing out 
that, although in fact there may be no reliable way to prove that an individual’s 
decision to take his life was completely voluntary, it is important to recognize 
such possibility).
At least such a consistent antipaternalistic strategy would keep us from 
resorting, like Sam Adams, to the peculiar idea of a “gift” that cannot be 
declined, given away, or returned, and would enable us to avoid the even 
more peculiar notion that the right to life of an autonomous person is not 
really his own at all, but rather the property of his creator.
Id. at 123.
322. See generally John Mansfield, Informed Choice in the Law of Torts, 22 La. 
L. Rev. 17 (1961) (discussing difference between assumption of risk and consent 
in torts).  Mansfield wrote:
Consent is the right term to use when the plaintiff was willing that a 
certain event occur, probably some conduct on the part of the defendant, 
because he desired an invasion of a normally protected interest.  Ordinarily 
he will believe that the invasion is substantially certain to follow the event, 
and the term consent focuses on his belief in the certainty of the invasion.  
Assumption of risk is the right term to use when the plaintiff was willing 
that a certain event occur, but he neither desired an invasion of a normally 
protected interest nor did he suppose that such an invasion was 
substantially certain to result.  The focus is on the uncertainty of the result 
from the plaintiff’s point of view.
Id. at 31.
323. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496a cmt. c (1965) (discussing the 
meaning of assumption of risk).  See also Kenneth W. Simons, Assumption Of 
Risk and Consent in the Law of Torts: A Theory of Full Preference, 67 B.U. L. 
Rev. 213 (1987) (analyzing assumption of risk as a fully preferred option).
324. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496C cmts b-g (1965).
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actor.325  “Thus consent to a fight with fists is not 
consent to an act of a very different character, such as 
biting off a finger, stabbing with a knife, or using brass 
knuckles.”326  Similar criteria applied to a criminal case 
would explain why consent to date Mike Tyson may not be 
viewed as consent to rape, just as consent to fighting may
not be viewed as consent to being stabbed with a knife.327
Conversely, if the scope of otherwise valid consent 
matches the scope of the parties’ actions, the consent of the 
victim should be regarded as a liability mitigator.328
Examples of situations in which this principle should be 
applied include those where defendants are held liable for a 
death resulting from a duel, a fatal round of Russian 
roulette, or a drag race, i.e., cases in which we can speak 
about the victim’s explicit consent to or disregard of
substantial risk.  The mitigating argument would be 
particularly strong in a situation in which the defendant 
was not a direct cause of the deadly accident.  Consider 
Commonwealth v. Peak.329  In that case, three buddies, 
John Young, George Ramsey, and Charles Peak, “after 
discussions in two barrooms, agreed to race their cars.”330
Young lost control of his car and was killed in an accident.  
There were no other casualties.331  Ramsey and Peak were 
325. See id., § 892a cmt. c.
326. Id.
327. The issue of consent in the context of sexual offenses has received in 
recent years significant attention by states’ courts and legislatures, academics 
and general public.  Criteria for what amounts to such consent are still in the 
state of flux but conceptually the principle is clear—a sexual act, without specific 
consent to it, is rape.  See generally Heidi M. Hurd, The Moral Magic of Consent, 
2 Legal Theory 121 (1996); Larry Alexander, The Moral Magic of Consent (II), 2 
Legal Theory 165 (1996); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Unwanted Sex: The Culture of 
Intimidation and the Failure of Law (1998); David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 
Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 317 (2000); Anne M. Coughlin, Sex and Guilt, 84 Va. L. Rev. 1 
(1998); Joshua Dressler, Where We Have Been, and Where We Might Be Going: 
Some Cautionary Reflections on Rape Law Reform, 46 Clev. St. L. Rev. 409 
(1998); Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 Yale L. Rev. 1087 (1986); George C. Thomas III, 
Realism About Rape Law: A Comment on “Redefining Rape,” 3 Buff. Crim. L. 
Rev. 527 (2000).
328. Cf. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 892C (1965) (recognizing consent to 
crime for purposes of defendant’s liability).
329. 12 Pa. D. & C.2d 379 (1957).
330. Id. at 380.
331. Id. at 380-81.  Naturally, if the victim-competitor kills not only himself but 
also a non-participating third party, the defendant may be held liable for that 
latter death through theories of complicity or joint criminal conduct.  See, e.g., 
State v. McFadden, 320 N.W.2d 608, 610 (Iowa 1982) (observing that aiding and 
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found guilty of involuntary manslaughter of Young.332
The court opined:
Defendants by participating in the unlawful racing initiated 
a series of events resulting in the death of Young.  Under 
these circumstances, decedent’s own unlawful conduct does 
not absolve defendants from their guilt.  The acts of 
defendants were contributing and substantial factors in 
bringing about the death of Young.333
It seems fair that the victim’s own unlawful conduct 
should not completely absolve defendants from their guilt.  
The question is: their guilt for what?  Ramsey and Peak are 
certainly guilty of violating the law prohibiting speeding 
contests but are they guilty of killing Young?  Wasn’t it 
Young himself who agreed to participate in the race?  
Wasn’t it his own lack of judgment or poor driving skills 
that cost him his life?  Some courts, after struggling with 
similar questions, have found no liability because the 
defendants’ conduct was not the direct cause of the victim’s 
death.334  But is it fair to say that the defendants bear no 
responsibility for what happened?
A more realistic and fair approach would be to 
apportion responsibility among all parties who have 
contributed to the criminal outcome, i.e., to hold Ramsey 
and Peak liable for the death of Young but reduce their 
level of liability.  For instance, if negligent homicide is a 
felony of the third degree,335 Ramsey’s and Peak’s 
participation in a dangerous activity that resulted in 
abetting and joint criminal conduct are vicarious liability theories, and that they 
are sufficient to convict the defendant for the death of a third party).  These 
theories, while completely appropriate in respect of the death of a bystander, are 
not applicable to the death of a co-competitor because a standard involuntary 
manslaughter statute requires the death of “another person.”  See id. at 610 
(observing that “[o]bviously, [the victim-competitor] could not have committed 
involuntary manslaughter with respect to his own death”).  In addition, under the 
MPC and in jurisdictions that follow the MPC, victims may not be convicted as 
accomplices.  See Model Penal Code § 2.06(6)(a) (Official Draft and Revised 
Comments 1980).
332. Peak, 12 Pa. D. & C.2d at 381.
333. Id. at 382.
334. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Root, 170 A.2d 310, 314 (Pa. 1961) (holding 
that “the defendant’s conduct was not a sufficiently direct cause of the competing 
driver’s death to make him criminally responsible therefore”).
335. See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 210.4(2) (Official Draft and Revised 
Comments 1980) (“Negligent homicide is a felony of the third degree”).
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negligent homicide could bring them the conviction of a 
misdemeanor.  In fact, the MPC already has a provision 
that may be used for that purpose.  Section 211.2 prohibits 
reckless conduct that “places or may place another person 
in danger of death or serious bodily injury.”336  Convicting 
Ramsey and Peak under that section would reflect the level 
of their fault better than either finding them guilty of 
homicide by twisting the concept of proximate causation or 
relieving them of any responsibility.
3. Involuntary Reduction of Rights
In an involuntary case, the criterion for determining 
whether a victim has lost any of his rights is imbedded in 
the very principle of conditional rights.  The corollary of 
having a right is that someone owes the right-holder a 
duty.337  If I have a right to life, you may not kill me.  If you 
try to kill me, you violate your duty to me, and thus lose 
moral parity with me.  That loss of moral parity reduces 
your right to inviolability and allows me to disregard it to 
the extent necessary to protect my right to life.338  That is a 
case of complete justification.  Overstepping these 
boundaries in cases of imperfect self-defense (either by 
exceeding the level of force reasonably necessary for the 
defense or by not following other requirements of a valid 
exercise of self-defense) or provocation results only in 
partial justification of the perpetrator.339  In contrast, in 
cases of mistaken self-defense and provocation (i.e., when 
the defendant strikes someone who has not violated any of 
his rights), the conduct of the victim provides offenders 
with no justification at all (although it may provide them 
336. Model Penal Code § 211.2 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980).  
See also Finkelstein, supra note 230, at 987-90 (arguing that imposition of risk is 
a harm to the person on whom it is inflicted).
337. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions 38 (Walter 
Wheeler Cook ed., 1919) (observing that “if X has a right against Y that he shall 
stay off the former’s land, the correlative (and equivalent) is that Y is under a 
duty toward X to stay off the place”).  See also Realm of Rights, supra note 323 
(discussing Hohfeld’s constructs in application to the moral theory).
338. See, e.g., Uniacke, supra note 80, at 198 (arguing that “the aggressor 
sacrifices something morally weighty when he becomes an unjust immediate 
threat; and if he does not forfeit the right to life itself, then he forfeits moral 
parity in respect of that right”).
339. In addition, the provoker’s loss of certain rights may be explained by the 
theory of the assumption of risk.  See discussion infra in section III.C.5.c.
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with an excuse).340
The conditionality of rights approach provides a 
practical and logical algorithm for distinguishing relevant 
and irrelevant elements of the victim’s conduct.  For 
example, it makes it plainly clear that a woman may not 
reduce her right not to be raped by wearing sexy clothes, 
having a drink with the offender, being involved in a prior 
relationship with him, or even agreeing to some intimacy.341
She does not reduce her rights simply because the offender 
has no corresponding right that she do not do any of these 
things.342  The inherent limitation on the victim’s 
involuntary reduction of rights, therefore, is: the offender’s 
liability may be mitigated by the conduct of the victim only 
if the offender has the right that the victim does not behave 
that way.  If that language were explicitly included in jury 
instructions, jurors would have a much better guide as to 
what factors may or may not weigh on the determination of 
the perpetrator’s guilt.
To summarize, the principle of conditionality of rights
provides a theoretical basis for the argument that the 
perpetrator’s liability may be properly evaluated only in 
the context of the entire crime, which must include the 
conduct of the victim as well as the perpetrator.  This 
principle also allows juries to distinguish situations in 
which the victim’s conduct is irrelevant from those in which 
the victim’s conduct should mitigate the perpetrator’s 
liability.  The former are situations in which the victim has 
340. See discussion supra note 72 and the accompanying text and section 
III.B.3.
341. See, e.g., Beul, 233 F.3d at 451 (“It is not a defense to a charge of rape 
that, for example, the victim was dressed provocatively, or drunk, or otherwise 
careless in the circumstances in which the rape occurred.”).
342. In addition, since the excusatory rationale of provocation requires that the 
perpetrator act impulsively, in an immediate response to an offense, a rapist (just 
like a torturer) should not be entitled to this defense even upon a traditional 
provocation such as a physical attack.  Cf., Sensobaugh v. State, 244 S.W. 379, 
379 (Tex. App. 1922) (denying defense of provocation to defendant who maimed 
his wife’s lover without the intent to kill).  Perhaps, for clarity sake, statutes 
should explicitly exclude sexual offenses from the application of the defense of 
provocation.  Some statutes already do that for purposes of penalty mitigation.  
For example, Federal Sentencing Guidelines authorize a sentence reduction in 
the case of a wrongful conduct by the victim.  See Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 
18 U.S.C. § 5K2.10 (1999).  This provision, however, does not apply to sexual 
offenses.  Id.  See also Alaska Stat. §§ 12.55.155(d)(7), 11.41.410-470 (Michie 
2002) (denying, in sexual offense cases, otherwise available penalty mitigation for 
victim provocation ).
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not waived his rights voluntarily or involuntarily.  
People may not lose their rights involuntarily if they have 
not violated a duty to the perpetrator.  This last 
consideration is analogous to the “no duty” rule in the tort 
law.  There is no legal duty that requires people to lock 
their cars, or not walk down a street after dark, or dress 
conservatively.343
As Fletcher has well observed, “this is what it means 
to be a free person, and the criminal law protects this 
freedom by not censuring those who expose themselves, 
perhaps with less than due care, to risks of criminal 
aggression.”344
4. Factors Important to Mitigation
The voluntary or involuntary reduction by the victim 
of his rights provides a ground for mitigating or 
eliminating the perpetrator's liability.  The inevitable 
question in this regard is to what extent should the 
perpetrator's liability be reduced?  An answer to this 
question involves weighing numerous factors, such as the 
magnitude of the affected rights of the perpetrator and the 
victim; the respective causative roles played by the 
perpetrator and the victim; and their relative culpability 
(including the nature of their conduct, the knowledge 
possessed by the participants, their respective capacities to 
avoid harm, the significance and value of purposes sought 
by their activities, the foreseeability and magnitude of the 
risk, and other factors).345  Depending on the specifics of 
each particular case, different considerations may be more 
or less important.
343. See George P. Fletcher, Domination in Wrongdoing, 76 B.U. L. Rev. 347, 
356 (1996), [hereinafter Domination in Wrongdoing].
The criminal law shields victims against their own imprudence.  They are 
entitled to move in the world at large with as much freedom as they enjoy 
behind locked doors.  They can walk in the park when they want, sit where 
they want in the subway, and wear skimpy clothes without fearing that 
they will be faulted for precipitating rape.
Id.
344. Id.
345. See Sisk, supra note 236, at 40-41 (discussing similar factors considered 
by the Supreme Court of Louisiana in Watson v. State Fire & Casualty Insurance 
Company, 469 So. 2d 967 (La. 1985), a tort action for wrongful death arising out 
of a hunting accident).
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a. The Magnitude of the Affected Rights
The question presented here includes two inquiries: 
does the law recognize the affected perpetrator’s right? and 
what is the comparative value assigned by the law to that 
right and to the right of the victim violated by the offense?  
For example, I have a legally recognized right not to be 
slapped on the face.  This right, like any right to bodily 
integrity, is quite high in the hierarchy of rights, and the 
violation of this right may subject the offender to a criminal 
punishment.346  Thus, if I overreact as a result of being 
slapped, I would be partially justified.  I would be more 
justified if I only slap the offender back, and less justified if 
I kill the offender.
In contrast, adultery is not criminally punishable in 
most states.347  Whatever claim I may have that my 
husband not cheat on me,348 this claim has very little legal 
ground.349  Accordingly, if I kill my husband upon 
witnessing his infidelity, my justification argument would 
be significantly less persuasive than in the previous 
example.  That is not to say I will not have a provocation 
claim.  My claim, however, will be based predominantly on 
the excusatory rationale.350
If we adopt this approach, the recognized triggers of 
provocation would no longer represent a list of equally-
valued historical incidents that “have no better reason for 
346. Under the MPC, a simple assault is a misdemeanor and an aggravated 
assault is a felony of the third or second degree.  See Model Penal Code § 211.1 
(Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980).
347. See, e.g., Martin J. Siegel, For Better or For Worse: Adultery, Crime & the 
Constitution, 30 J. Fam. L. 45, 49-54 (1991-92) (pointing out that majority of 
states have now decriminalized adultery, and remaining laws are rarely 
enforced).
348. The legal right to spousal fidelity may be found in the fact that, even in 
those states that have decriminalized adultery, it still provides grounds for 
divorce.  See 24 Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce And Separation, § 59.
349. Some states have excluded spousal infidelity from the list of events 
providing legal grounds for provocation.  See e.g., Md. Code, 1957, Art. 27, § 387A 
(“The discovery of one’s spouse engaged in sexual intercourse with another person 
does not constitute legally adequate provocation for the purpose of mitigating a 
killing from the crime of murder to voluntary manslaughter when the killing was 
provoked by that discovery.”).
350. Certain claims may not be recognized as excuses either.  For instance, 
there is a strong argument that an act of rape may not be viewed as an instant, 
uncontrollable response to being slapped or otherwise offended.  See supra note 
342.
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[existence] than that so it was laid down in the time of 
Henry IV.”351  Instead, jurors would view any instances of 
provocation from the perspective of violation of the 
perpetrator’s rights.  Accordingly, the triggering event 
would not be decided on a hit-or-miss basis but would be 
given different weight, and the extent of the offender’s 
justification would depend, in part, on the place of the 
offended right on the continuum of currently recognized 
rights.
It is important to highlight that the hierarchy of rights 
and their violations is to be determined from the objective
point of view, not from the individual preferences of the 
victim.  Some may argue that harm is in the eye of the 
victim, and accordingly, the injuries or losses that the 
victim likes least are most harmful, and the harms the 
victim can tolerate most are least harmful.352  Yet the 
preference-based scale of rights and harms inevitably 
produces absurd results, as Leo Katz’s elegant 
hypotheticals show.
In one of them, a man is about to rape a woman.  At 
the last moment, the woman pleads: “I would rather die 
than be violated,” so he obligingly kills her.353  At his trial, 
the defense argues that although the defendant is certainly 
guilty of a heinous crime, his punishment should be no 
more severe than a punishment for a rape.354  After all, the 
victim herself preferred murder to rape, i.e., regarded it as 
a lesser harm.  In another of Katz’s hypotheticals, the 
perpetrator rapes the woman despite her desperate plea to 
take her life instead.  At the trial, the prosecutor demands 
the death penalty for the defendant.  He argues that 
although ordinarily the death penalty may not be imposed 
in a case of rape, this case of rape is worse than murder: 
didn’t the victim herself feel so?
It is highly unlikely that either argument would 
succeed.  Partly, this is because the “victim cares only 
351. Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469 (1897) 
(opining that “[it] is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that 
so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.  It is still more revolting if the 
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule 
simply persists from blind imitation of the past”).
352. Katz, supra note 43, at 147.
353. Id.
354. Id.
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about one dimension of the perpetrator’s activities—the 
expected harm,”355 whereas criminal law cares about harm 
as one of several criteria of culpability.356  And partly, this 
is because the meaning of harm in criminal law is not 
limited to each victim’s idiosyncratic perception of harm.357
Criminal law embodies a uniform hierarchical set of moral 
and legal principles, based on the values assigned by 
society to specific rights.
b. Comparative Causation
The question of responsibility is closely tied to the 
problem of causation.  One scholar has proposed a non-
specific victim liability defense in which causation plays an 
essential role.  The defense envisioned by Aya Gruber 
would apply in the circumstances when the victim’s 
wrongful conduct “caused the defendant to commit the 
charged offense”358 which he was otherwise “not 
predisposed” to commit.359  Despite my strong support for a 
criminal defense based on the victim’s conduct, I find both 
requirements conceptually flawed.
The condition that the defendant not be predisposed to 
commit the offense is objectionable like any penalty 
directed not at a criminal act but rather at an actor’s 
propensity for crime or violent thoughts.  If a court takes 
this condition seriously, it will have to deny the defense to 
a woman who escaped rape by shooting her attacker simply 
because she was predisposed to kill any SOB who tries to 
rape her.
Still more problematic is the way Gruber treats 
causation.  Only if the victim had caused the defendant to 
commit the offense, would the defense apply.  Even leaving 
alone the doubtful proposition that one may cause another 
free and independent person to commit a crime,360 there 
355. Id. at 151.
356. Id.
357. See 1 Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of Criminal Law: Harm to Others 
188 (1984) (discussing that criminal law protects a “standard person” from 
standard forms of harm to “standard interests”).
358. Victim Wrongs, supra note 4, at 652.
359. Id.
360. Gruber herself concedes:
Admittedly, this is quite conceptually prickly when the intervening event is 
the operation of the defendant’s own free will, because it can slip down a 
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remains a bigger issue: why shouldn’t the defense apply, 
at least partially, when both the defendant and the victim 
contributed to the harmful outcome?  Is it fair and realistic 
to impose full causative responsibility on one party?
All our experience tells us that causation is almost 
never an all-or-nothing issue.  Many factors work together 
to bring about a result.361 Thus, in the words of Judith 
Jarvis Thomson, it is “no wonder it has seemed such a hard 
problem to work out the truth-conditions for ‘X is the cause 
of Y’—for it is doubtful that ‘X is the sole cause of Y’ can 
ever be true.”362  Yet criminal law has chosen to ignore the 
causative role of the victim and instead has attributed the 
entire responsibility for harm to the defendant who was 
just a “but for” cause and a proximate cause of the victim’s 
injury or loss.  To overcome this simplistic model, the law 
needs to adopt a comparative approach to causation, not 
stay with a black-and-white dichotomy and merely shift the 
entire burden from the perpetrator to the victim as Gruber 
proposes.
Can the causative importance of various events ever be 
compared?  There is a view that denies that possibility.  
Under that view, causation is not a relative concept; it 
either exists or it does not, and if it does exist, one may not 
speak of degrees of causation.363  If certain events were 
necessary to produce a result, it is impossible to tell which 
event was more necessary.364  Thus, if “it took malaria-
slope into speculative arguments about the operation of the human mind 
and the human will.  One is forced to confront the issue of whether one 
human being’s act can truly ever “cause” another person to do anything.
Id. at 717-18.
361. See, e.g., Mark Kelman, The Necessary Myth of Objective Causation 
Judgments in Liberal Political Theory, 63 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 579, 579 (1987) (“It 
will never be the case that injury could occur without the plaintiff, such that the 
defendant is entirely causally responsible.”).
362. Judith Jarvis Thomson, Causality and Rights: Some Preliminaries, 63 
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 471, 477 (1987).
363. See Richard N. Pearson, Apportionment of Losses Under Comparative 
Fault Laws—An Analysis of the Alternatives, 40 La. L. Rev. 343, 346 (1980).
364. See, e.g., John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic 214 (8th ed. 1874), quoted in 
Robert N. Strassfeld, Causal Comparisons, 60 Fordham L. Rev. 913, 919 (1992) 
(“no ‘condition’ of a result has a ‘closer relation’ to that result than another, since 
each is ‘equally indispensable to the production of the consequent’”); J.L. Mackie, 
The Cement of the Universe: A Study of Causation 128 (1980) (“[i]f two factors are 
each necessary in the circumstances, they are equally necessary”); Kelman, supra 
note 361, at 579 (arguing that “there is no obvious way to distinguish, on purely 
causal grounds, the relative causal contributions of two wholly necessary 
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bearing mosquitoes and the spread of Christianity to 
undo the Roman Empire, the mosquitoes were as necessary 
as the Christians and neither is paramount to the other.”365
Although it is sometimes difficult to distinguish the 
determinative cause among other causes, nevertheless, in 
many contexts, we compare events as being more or less 
important for certain consequences.366  The following 
examples demonstrate our everyday experience in 
comparing the significance of various events:
We might wish to say, for instance, that Lenin’s 
participation in the Bolshevik Revolution was a more 
important cause of its success than was Stalin’s, or that the 
absence of a skilled labor force is a more important cause of 
economic backwardness than is limited natural resources.  
Or, we might have reason to say that James is happier 
today than he was last week partly because he earned an A 
on his torts exam, but more because his love life has 
improved.367
Scholars have suggested various ways to compare the 
importance of contributing causes in torts.368  Some of these 
methods, although not completely importable to penal 
theory, may serve as models for developing a comparative 
theory of causation in criminal law.369  Among those are: 
counterfactual similarity, the “necessary element of a 
sufficient set,” and relative responsibility.
The method of counterfactual similarity “involves 
using imaginative alternatives to the actual course of 
events to determine whether something similar to the 
event would have occurred in the absence of a particular 
parties”).
365. See Strassfeld, supra note 364, at 919 (citing E. White, Why Rome Fell 
(1927)).
366. See, e.g., Sisk, supra note 236, at 42-49 (discussing comparative 
causation).
367. Strassfeld, supra note 364, at 920 (citing examples from works by Martin 
and Nagel).
368. For an in-depth discussion of causation in torts, see Symposium on 
Causation in the Law of Torts, 63 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 397, 397-680 (1987).
369. Such theory is clearly beyond the scope of this article.  Here, I merely 
intend to show that various theories of causation in the law of torts allow for 
comparison of causative impacts attributable to the perpetrator and the victim; 
and looking at these theories, I search for criteria that may be used to develop a 
theory of comparative causation in criminal law.
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cause.”370  Robert N. Strassfeld provides the following 
illustration of this method:
The change in James’ love life was a more important cause 
of his current happiness than was his torts grade, since had 
James not earned an A on his torts exam, his mood would 
more closely approximate his current level of happiness 
than it would had his love life not improved.371
Under the “necessary element of a sufficient set” test, 
“a particular condition was a cause of (condition 
contributing to) a specific consequence if and only if it was 
a necessary element of a set of antecedent actual conditions 
that was sufficient for the occurrence of the 
consequence.”372  This method does not offer a mechanism 
for comparing multiple causes; it is valuable however, in 
eliminating non-causes and limiting the circle of 
responsible parties.
Finally, under the relative responsibility method, the 
more important of two causes is the one that is more 
responsible for their effect.  The term “responsible” in this 
context means something other than making the biggest 
factual difference toward the occurrence of an event.373  It is 
instead “the statement of a moral and legal conclusion that 
a particular cause ought to be held more accountable than 
other causes for the effect.  It is an unabashedly normative 
interpretation of more important cause, and it bears a close 
kinship to traditional notions of proximate cause.”374
370. Sisk, supra note 236, at 43.  This method has its limitations.  See, e.g., 
Thomson, supra note 362, at 482 (showing that the counterfactual analysis does 
not work in a situation, in which there is more than one cause sufficient and 
certain to produce the harm).  For example, if there are two fires, each sufficient 
and certain to burn the plaintiff’s house, we cannot say that “but for” the fire 
which reached and burned it first, the house would not have been ruined because 
the second fire would have burned it anyway.  See Moore, supra note 127, at 349 
(analyzing Thomson’s theory of causation).
371. Strassfeld, supra note 364, at 937.
372. Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1735, 1790 
(1985) (emphasis deleted).  The phrase “a set” permits a plurality of sufficient 
sets.  Id.
373. See Hart & Honore, supra note 113, at 66 (observing that both in legal 
usage and in ordinary speech causation means more than just “but for” factual 
connection; “it is a disguised way of asserting the ‘normative’ judgment that he is 
responsible in the first sense, i.e., that it is proper or just to blame or punish him 
or make him pay.”).
374. Strassfeld, supra note 364, at 937.
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The outlined approaches capture important aspects 
of how we attribute causal weight to various events.  We 
measure the importance of a cause by (i) the difference it 
makes (“necessary element of a sufficient set” and 
counterfactual similarity) and (ii) the legal and moral 
weight we assign to different types of behavior (relative 
responsibility).  The famous case of Stephenson v. State375
provides good material for showing how these 
considerations may work.
In that case, the victim, Madge Oberholtzer, took 
poison after being kidnapped, beaten, humiliated, and 
nearly raped.376  She was denied medical help by her 
kidnapper and eventually died.377  In summary, factors that 
contributed to Madge Oberholtzer’s death apparently were: 
“shock, loss of food, loss of rest, action of the poison on her 
system and her lack of early treatment.”378  “According to 
medical testimony, it was unlikely that any one factor 
would have resulted in death on its own.379
The jury found the defendant guilty of second-degree 
murder, and the Supreme Court of Indiana affirmed the 
verdict.380  Some commentators have harshly criticized that 
decision, which, in their view, undermined the requirement 
of proximate causation by holding Stephenson responsible 
for an intervening act of the victim.381  However, if we 
recognize the principle of comparative causation, that 
decision would be much more convincing.  The question of 
liability would not be reduced to physical acts of the victim 
and the perpetrator.  Instead, the jurors would be 
instructed to evaluate all evidence in order to determine (a) 
whether Madge Oberholtzer’s death would have occurred in 
the absence of (i) her actions and (ii) the defendant’s 
actions, and (b) who is more accountable for her death.
As for the first question, the jurors would be likely to 
conclude that Stephenson’s actions were at least as 
important a cause of Madge Oberholtzer’s death as her 
own—but for him, she would not have taken the poison.  
375. 179 N.E. 633 (Ind. 1932).
376. Stephenson, 179 N.E. at 636.
377. Id.
378. Id. at  645.
379. See id. at  646-47.
380. Id. at 637.
381. See, e.g., Comment on Stephenson, 31 Mich. L. Rev. 659, 668-74 (1933).
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More importantly, even after she took the poison, she 
still could be saved had he not denied her medical 
treatment.382
As for the second question, the jurors would have to 
compare the legal and moral significance of cold-blooded, 
premeditated criminal acts committed by Stephenson and 
hysterical, semi-rational acts of Madge Oberholtzer 
committed in response to the attack she had suffered.  They 
would also have to include into the calculation the fact that 
Stephenson had not just the moral, but also the legal duty 
to rescue his victim—he was the one who created peril383
and who took her to a place of isolation where other people 
could not help her.384  If the question of causation were 
regarded this way, the Supreme Court of Indiana would 
have a much stronger legal basis to affirm the conviction 
and conclude that “[t]o say that there is no causal 
connection between the acts of appellant and the death of 
Madge Oberholtzer, and that the treatment accorded her 
by appellant had no causal connection with the death of 
Madge Oberholtzer would be a travesty on justice.”385
c. Comparative Culpability
In some instances, the comparative culpability of the 
participants may affect the value of their rights and the 
seriousness of encroachments on those rights.  The clearest 
example is provocation.  Partly, the rationale for why 
provoking victims (at least, culpable victims) lose certain 
382. For a discussion as to whether an omission may cause harm, see, e.g., 
Michael Moore, Act and Crime 28-31, 276-78 (1993) (arguing that omissions do 
not cause harm; by omission a person does not make the world worse; he only 
fails to make it better); Thomson, supra note 362, at 493-95 (suggesting that, even 
though an omission does not change things and, therefore, does not by itself cause 
anything, it is appropriate to hold a person who violated a duty to act responsible 
for the harm).  For example, a signalman whose failure to pull a lever resulted in 
a train crash is the cause of the harm.
Perhaps we can say that although his not pulling the lever did not cause 
anything at all, still he caused the crash in that there was an event or a 
state of affairs (the state of affairs consisting in the track’s aiming leftward 
at 4:10, for example) such that he caused everything it caused in that he 
was both capable of preventing it, and under a duty to do so.
Id. at 495.
383. See LaFave, supra note 51, at 315 (concluding that defendant has duty to 
rescue the victim when defendant is at fault in creating the situation of danger).
384. See id.
385. Stephenson, 179 N.E. at 649.
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rights may be found in the theory of consent, specifically 
in the assumption of risk.  By hitting you, I assume the risk 
that you may hit me back and that, being angered by the 
undeserved offense, you may hit me harder than I have hit 
you.
That semi-voluntary rationale may mandate a 
somewhat different treatment of innocent aggressors in 
situations of provocation compared to self-defense.  As we 
have seen in the case of self-defense, the culpability of the 
victim is irrelevant.386  The very fact that, if not stopped, 
the victim will violate the most essential rights of an 
innocent party triggers the condition that makes the victim 
lose his rights.387  That may be different in a provocation 
scenario.
Since the offender is not presented with a risk to his 
life, we may choose not to recognize as a justifying event (or 
give reduced weight to) provocation by innocent victims, 
just as we often do not recognize the consent of certain 
groups of people (e.g., minors) as valid.  For example, it is 
offensive when someone intentionally spits on you, and we 
can easily understand that such provoking conduct, coming 
from an adult man, may partially justify a violent response.  
It is, however, significantly less offensive when the offender 
is a young child.  Accordingly, the level of mitigation to 
which an offender may be entitled should reflect that.  
Similarly, negligent or reckless behavior that normally 
reduces the victim’s right not to be hurt may be given little 
or no weight if the victim was a minor or incompetent and 
the perpetrator was aware of that.  For example, if a child 
is injured while playing Russian roulette with an adult, the 
court should deny the defendant’s assumption of risk 
argument.
Moreover, the level of the provoker’s culpability should 
probably be taken into account in any case of mitigation 
based on the victim’s provocative conduct.  There is clearly 
a difference in how we perceive the liability of an actor who 
killed his victim after being physically attacked by an 
386. See Realm of Rights, supra note 318, at 366-71 (arguing that, in the case 
of self-defense, the fault of the attacker is irrelevant).  Thomson points out a truly 
puzzling fact that we “can be unlucky enough to find ourselves in a situation in 
which something other than ourselves, something other even than government, 
has made us cease to have rights we formerly had.”  Id. at 371.
387. Id. at 371.
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intentional actor as opposed to a merely negligent 
actor.388
This principle should be taken into account in other 
circumstances as well.  When the perpetrator and the 
victim are equally culpable (e.g., in cases of drag racing, 
duelling, or Russian roulette) the conduct of the victim 
should be a stronger mitigator than in cases when the 
perpetrator is more culpable than the victim (e.g., in a case 
of a car crash, in which the perpetrator drove recklessly 
whereas the victim was merely negligent).
In determining the respective culpability of the 
perpetrator and the victim, jurors may be instructed to
compare the nature of the participants’ conduct; their 
respective capacities to avoid harm; the significance and 
value of purposes sought by their activities; and the 
foreseeability and magnitude of the risk they took.  For 
example, if a fatal car crash happened because the 
perpetrator exceeded the speed limit and hit the victim’s car 
parked in the middle of a highway, the level of mitigation of 
the perpetrator’s liability may depend on a number of facts.  
It would be higher if the perpetrator was in a rush to deliver 
a sick child to a hospital, whereas the victim took an 
impromptu nap at the wheel after a few shots of whiskey.  
And it would be lower if the perpetrator was hurrying home 
for a favorite television show, whereas the victim had 
suffered a heart attack in his car.  These are, of course, 
extreme examples serving only to demonstrate how 
individual culpability can change the liability equation.
***
In this part, I suggested that defenses of consent, self-
defense, and provocation are examples of a general 
principle of criminal law, the principle of conditionality of 
rights.  Pursuant to that principle, criminal liability of the 
perpetrator should be reduced to the extent that the victim, 
by his own acts, has diminished his right not to be harmed.  
The victim may reduce his right not to be harmed either 
voluntarily, by consent, waiver, or assumption of risk, or 
involuntarily, by an attack on some legally recognized 
rights of the perpetrator.  The reduction of the victim’s 
388. Cf. Fletcher, supra note 287, at 858 (observing, in the context of self-
defense, that the “factor that skews the balancing in favor of the defender is the 
aggressor’s culpability in starting the fight”).
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right not to be harmed correlates with the reduction of 
the perpetrator’s liability.  Of course, the perpetrator’s 
liability is not determined solely by the rights of the victim.  
There are circumstances when society does not recognize 
either voluntary or involuntary reduction of the victim’s 
rights.  These circumstances, however, are quite limited.  
In most instances, if we take two identical cases that differ 
only in one aspect, namely the extent of violation of the 
victim’s rights, the defendant liable for a lesser violation 
should be entitled to a lesser punishment.
Factors relevant to the determination of the 
perpetrator’s liability may include the magnitude of the 
affected rights of the perpetrator and the victim, the relative 
causative roles played by the perpetrator and the victim, 
and their comparative culpability (including the nature of 
their conduct, the knowledge possessed by the participants, 
their respective capacities to avoid harm, the significance 
and value of purposes sought by their activities, the 
foreseeability and magnitude of the risk, and other factors).
CONCLUSION
Criminal law maintains that victims’ faulty conduct is 
no mitigator to perpetrators’ liability.  However, upon close 
examination, this declaration is only partially correct.  
Furthermore, to the extent it is correct, it produces legal 
rules that are in direct conflict with factual findings by 
social scientists, public perceptions of right and wrong and 
developments in other areas of law, such as torts.  
Considerations of fairness and effectiveness mandate that 
criminal law integrate victims into its theory of liability.  If 
a victim by her own actions has reduced her right not to be 
harmed, the defendant should be allowed to raise that as 
an affirmative defense at the trial.
In some circumstances, the victim’s conduct would 
provide a complete justification, whereas in other 
circumstances it would only mitigate the defendant’s 
liability.  In any event, the defendant would bear the 
burden of production.  As for the burden of persuasion, it 
may be more appropriate to follow the MPC approach and 
allocate it to the prosecution, unless specified otherwise.389
389. See Model Penal Code § 1.12(2)(a) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 
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This revision of criminal law doctrine is sorely needed 
to reflect the realities of human interaction and bring the 
theory of liability in accord with the principle of just desert.  
Such a reformation would ultimately result in a substantially 
more consistent, fair, and effective body of criminal law.
1980).  Consent to killing may serve as an example of a situation in which the 
burden of persuasion should be imposed on the defendant.
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